Trying to think systematically about 'systems thinking'

I noticed with interest that Peter Checkland has now contributed' to the debate on the use of the term 'systems thinking' in a paper by Eric Wolstenholme2. However, due to the self-confessed lag in his reading schedule, Peter is responding to the original piece and not to any of the subsequent observations on it3'4 (although he is kind enough to reference some of my other work on the matter).

Reading aloud in high schools: students and teachers across the curriculum

Reading aloud is apparently an indispensible part of teaching. Nevertheless, little is known about reading aloud across the curriculum by students and teachers in high schools. Nor do we understand teachers’ attitudes towards issues such as error correction, rehearsal time, and selecting students to read. A survey of 360 teachers in England shows that, although they have little training in reading aloud, they are extremely confident. Reading aloud by students and teachers is strongly related, and serves to further understanding rather than administrative purposes or pupils’ enjoyment. Unexpectedly, Modern Language teachers express views that set them apart from other subjects.

The practice of reading aloud in the high school: a preliminary investigation

The paper considers students’ views of why reading aloud takes place and what are its effects.The results of two small focus-group discussions are presented, in which high school students were given the opportunity to express their responses to the practice of reading aloud in the classroom. Their responses are considered in the context of theoretical perspectives: pedagogical, reader-response and social/vocational. Analysis of responses reveals acknowledgement that reading aloud is not only a useful skill but also that it is a site of anxiety and even conflict.

Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive?

Direct epistemic consequentialism is the idea that X is epistemically permissible iff X maximizes epistemic value. It has received lots of attention in recent years and is widely accepted by philosophers to have counterintuitive implications. There are various reasons one might suspect that the relevant intuitions will not be widely shared among non-philosophers. This paper presents an initial empirical study of ordinary intuitions. The results of two experiments demonstrate that the counterintuitiveness of epistemic consequentialism is more than a philosophers' worry---the folk seem to agree!