Performance-based contracting in the construction sector

Construction procurement is complex and there is a very wide range of options available to procurers. Inappropriate choices about how to procure may limit practical opportunities for innovation. In particular, traditional approaches to construction procurement set up many obstacles for technology suppliers to provide innovative solutions. This is because they are often employed as sub-contractors simply to provide and install equipment to specifications developed before the point at which they become involved in a project. A research team at the University of Reading has developed a procurement framework that comprehensively defines the various options open to procurers in a more fine-grained way than has been known in the past. This enables informed decisions that can establish tailor-made procurement approaches that take into account the needs of specific clients. It enables risk and reward structures to be aligned so that contracts and payment mechanisms are aligned precisely with what a client seeks to achieve. This is not a “one-size-fits-all” approach. Rather, it is an approach that enables informed decisions about how to organize individual procurements that are appropriate to particular circumstances, acknowledging that they differ for each client and for each procurement exercise. Within this context, performance-based contracting (PBC) is explored in terms of the different ways in which technology suppliers within constructed facilities might be encouraged and rewarded for the kinds of innovation sought by the ultimate clients. Examples from various industry sectors are presented, from public sector and from private sector, with a commentary about what they sought to achieve and the extent to which they were successful. The lessons from these examples are presented in terms of feasibility in relation to financial issues, governance, economics, strategic issues, contractual issues and cash flow issues for clients and for contractors. Further background documents and more detailed readings are provided in an appendix for those who wish to find out more.

Legal and regulatory barriers to effective public-private partnership governance in Kazakhstan

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical assessment of legal and regulatory impediments to effective governance of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in Kazakhstan. Design/methodology/approach – The qualitative study develops propositions from the PPP literature and then tests them against findings from in-depth interviews. Interviewees have been selected by a purposeful sampling from PPP projects in Kazakhstan as well as from national and regional PPP centres. Findings – The identified barriers to effective PPP management include irregularities in the PPP legal framework, such as lack of legal definition of a PPP and controversy with the government guarantee’s legal status for its long-term payments to partnerships; bureaucratic tariff setting for partnership services; non-existent opportunity for private asset ownership; and excessive government regulation of PPP workers’ wage rates. Practical implications – The partners’ opposing perspectives on a number of PPP issues show that management needs to identify and carefully reconcile stakeholder values in a partnership in order to achieve more effective PPP governance. Practitioners, particularly those in the public agencies, have to be concerned with ways to reduce the government overregulation of the private operators, which is likely to result in greater PPP flexibility in management and, ultimately, higher efficiency in delivering the public services. Originality/value – By elucidating multiple examples of overregulation and PPPs’ inefficiency, the paper demonstrates that the government dominance in PPP management is conceptually inappropriate. Instead, the government should adopt the concept of co-production and manage its relations with the private sector partner in a collaborative fashion.