Has the mechanism by which the endocrine placenta scavenges the mother whilst sparing the foetus been unmasked?

The endocrine placenta has a dilemma; it shares the foetal circulation and yet it needs to secrete active peptide hormones into the maternal circulation to control her metabolism to meet the demands of the growing foetus. Simultaneously, it needs to allow the endocrine systems of the foetus to develop independently. This article will describe how peptide hormones are processed from inactive intermediates and will propose a hypothesis of how the placenta has revised this process to protect the foetus from the potentially damaging affects of these products.

Curriculum theory, curriculum policy and the problem of ill-disciplined thinking

This paper examines the implications of policy fracture and arms length governance within the decision making processes currently shaping curriculum design within the English education system. In particular it argues that an unresolved ‘ideological fracture’ at government level has been passed down to school leaders whose response to the dilemma is distorted by the target-driven agenda of arms length agencies. Drawing upon the findings of a large scale on-line survey of history teaching in English secondary schools, this paper illustrates the problems that occur when policy making is divorced from curriculum theory, and in particular from any consideration of the nature of knowledge. Drawing on the social realist theory of knowledge elaborated by Young (2008), we argue that the rapid spread of alternative curricular arrangements, implemented in the absence of an understanding of curriculum theory, undermines the value of disciplined thinking to the detriment of many young people, particularly those in areas of social and economic deprivation.

The repatriation of 1973 and the re-making of modern south Asia

In the aftermath of the 1971 war, nearly 250,000 people found themselves stranded in various parts of the subcontinent. These 'trapped minorities' became hostages in a complex negotiation process that highlighted how questions of citizenship and belonging remained unresolved in post-Partition South Asia. By studying three groups - the non-Bengalis, the Bengalis and the prisoners of war in a comparative perspective, this paper re-visits the question of who was welcome within certain borders and on what terms. It argues that these decisions depended not just on the state's policies towards 'outsiders' but also upon its own relationship with its minority communities.

The stability of ecosystems: a brief overview of the paradox of enrichment

In theory, enrichment of resource in a predator-prey model leads to destabilization of the system, thereby collapsing the trophic interaction, a phenomenon referred to as "the paradox of enrichment". After it was first proposed by Rosenzweig (1971), a number of subsequent studies were carried out on this dilemma over many decades. In this article, we review these theoretical and experimental works and give a brief overview of the proposed solutions to the paradox. The mechanisms that have been discussed are modifications of simple predator-prey models in the presence of prey that is inedible, invulnerable, unpalatable and toxic. Another class of mechanisms includes an incorporation of a ratio-dependent functional form, inducible defence of prey and density-dependent mortality of the predator. Moreover, we find a third set of explanations based on complex population dynamics including chaos in space and time. We conclude that, although any one of the various mechanisms proposed so far might potentially prevent destabilization of the predator-prey dynamics following enrichment, in nature different mechanisms may combine to cause stability, even when a system is enriched. The exact mechanisms, which may differ among systems, need to be disentangled through extensive field studies and laboratory experiments coupled with realistic theoretical models.

Physiological and behavioral patterns of corruption

We study the behavior and emotional arousal of the participants in an experimental auction, leading to an asymmetric social dilemma involving an auctioneer and two bidders. An antisocial transfer (bribe) which is beneficial for the auctioneer (official) is paid, if promised, by the winner of the auction. Some pro-social behavior on both the auctioneers' and the bidders' sides is observed even in the absence of any punishment mechanism (Baseline, Treatment 0). However, pro-social behavior is adopted by the vast majority of subjects when the loser of the auction can inspect the transaction between the winner and the auctioneer (Inspection, Treatment 1). The inspection and punishment mechanism is such that, if a bribe is (not) revealed, both corrupt agents (the denouncing bidder) lose(s) this period's payoffs. This renders the inspection option unprofitable for the loser and is rarely used, especially towards the end of the session, when pro-social behavior becomes pervasive. Subjects' emotional arousal was obtained through skin conductance responses. Generally speaking, our findings suggest that stronger emotions are associated with decisions deviating from pure monetary reward maximization, rather than with (un)ethical behavior per se. In fact, using response times as a measure of the subject's reflection during the decision-making process, we can associate emotional arousal with the conflict between primary or instinctive and secondary or contemplative motivations and, more specifically, with deviations from the subject's pure monetary interest.

Heaps and Chains: Is the Chaining Argument for parity a sorites?

I argue that the Ruth Chang’s Chaining Argument for her parity view of value incomparability trades illicitly on the vagueness of the predicate ‘is comparable with’. Chang is alert to this danger and argues that the predicate is not vague, but this defense does not succeed. The Chaining Argument also faces a dilemma. The predicate is either vague or precise. If it is vague, then the argument is most plausibly a sorites. If it is precise, then the argument is either question begging or dialectically ineffective. I argue that no chaining-type argument can succeed.

Corruption and individual ethics: insights from a public procurement auction

This article proposes an auction model where two firms compete for obtaining the license for a public project and an auctioneer acting as a public official representing the political power, decides the winner of the contest. Players as firms face a social dilemma in the sense that the higher is the bribe offered, the higher would be the willingness of a pure monetary maximizer public official to give her the license. However, it implies inducing a cost of reducing all players’ payoffs as far as our model includes an endogenous externality, which depends on bribe. All players’ payoffs decrease with the bribe (and increase with higher quality). We find that the presence of bribe aversion in either the officials’ or the firms’ utility function shifts equilibrium towards more pro-social behavior. When the quality and bribe-bid strategy space is discrete, multiple equilibria emerge including more pro-social bids than would be predicted under a continuous strategy space.