The financial and environmental performance of firms exposed to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme

This thesis is an empirical-based study of the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and its implications in terms of corporate environmental and financial performance. The novelty of this study includes the extended scope of the data coverage, as most previous studies have examined only the power sector. The use of verified emissions data of ETS-regulated firms as the environmental compliance measure and as the potential differentiating criteria that concern the valuation of EU ETS-exposed firms in the stock market is also an original aspect of this study. The study begins in Chapter 2 by introducing the background information on the emission trading system (ETS), which focuses on (i) the adoption of ETS as an environmental management instrument and (ii) the adoption of ETS by the European Union as one of its central climate policies. Chapter 3 surveys four databases that provide carbon emissions data in order to determine the most suitable source of the data to be used in the later empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter, which is also Chapter 4 of this thesis, investigates the determinants of the emissions compliance performance of the EU ETS-exposed firms through constructing the best possible performance ratio from verified emissions data and self-configuring models for a panel regression analysis. Chapter 5 examines the impacts on the EU ETS-exposed firms in terms of their equity valuation with customised portfolios and multi-factor market models. The research design takes into account the emissions allowance (EUA) price as an additional factor, as it has the most direct association with the EU ETS to control for the exposure. The final empirical Chapter 6 takes the investigation one step further, by specifically testing the degree of ETS exposure facing different sectors with sector-based portfolios and an extended multi-factor market model. The findings from the emissions performance ratio analysis show that the business model of firms significantly influences emissions compliance, as the capital intensity has a positive association with the increasing emissions-to-emissions cap ratio. Furthermore, different sectors show different degrees of sensitivity towards the determining factors. The production factor influences the performance ratio of the Utilities sector, but not the Energy or Materials sectors. The results show that the capital intensity has a more profound influence on the utilities sector than on the materials sector. With regard to the financial performance impact, ETS-exposed firms as aggregate portfolios experienced a substantial underperformance during the 2001–2004 period, but not in the operating period of 2005–2011. The results of the sector-based portfolios show again the differentiating effect of the EU ETS on sectors, as one sector is priced indifferently against its benchmark, three sectors see a constant underperformance, and three sectors have altered outcomes.

Providing extrinsic reward for test performance undermines long-term memory acquisition

Based on numerous studies showing that testing studied material can improve long-term retention more than restudying the same material, it is often suggested that the number of tests in education should be increased to enhance knowledge acquisition. However, testing in real-life educational settings often entails a high degree of extrinsic motivation of learners due to the common practice of placing important consequences on the outcome of a test. Such an effect on the motivation of learners may undermine the beneficial effects of testing on long-term memory because it has been shown that extrinsic motivation can reduce the quality of learning. To examine this issue, participants learned foreign language vocabulary words, followed by an immediate test in which one-third of the words were tested and one-third restudied. To manipulate extrinsic motivation during immediate testing, participants received either monetary reward contingent on test performance or no reward. After 1 week, memory for all words was tested. In the immediate test, reward reduced correct recall and increased commission errors, indicating that reward reduced the number of items that can benefit from successful retrieval. The results in the delayed test revealed that reward additionally reduced the gain received from successful retrieval because memory for initially successfully retrieved words was lower in the reward condition. However, testing was still more effective than restudying under reward conditions because reward undermined long-term memory for concurrently restudied material as well. These findings indicate that providing performance–contingent reward in a test can undermine long-term knowledge acquisition.