Introduction: power after peace

The chapter provides a substantive conceptual introduction to the volume, examining what is meant by the concept of "political economy of statebuilding", and what the implications for the study of statebuilding are

Asymmetric output gap effects in Phillips Curve and mark-up pricing models: evidence for the US and the UK

A number of studies have found an asymmetric response of consumer price index inflation to the output gap in the US in simple Phillips curve models. We consider whether there are similar asymmetries in mark-up pricing models, that is, whether the mark-up over producers' costs also depends upon the sign of the (adjusted) output gap. The robustness of our findings to the price series is assessed, and also whether price-output responses in the UK are asymmetric.

How large is congressional dependence in agriculture. Bayesian inference about ‘scale’ and ‘scope’ in measuring a spatial externality

The political economy literature on agriculture emphasizes influence over political outcomes via lobbying conduits in general, political action committee contributions in particular and the pervasive view that political preferences with respect to agricultural issues are inherently geographic. In this context, ‘interdependence’ in Congressional vote behaviour manifests itself in two dimensions. One dimension is the intensity by which neighboring vote propensities influence one another and the second is the geographic extent of voter influence. We estimate these facets of dependence using data on a Congressional vote on the 2001 Farm Bill using routine Markov chain Monte Carlo procedures and Bayesian model averaging, in particular. In so doing, we develop a novel procedure to examine both the reliability and the consequences of different model representations for measuring both the ‘scale’ and the ‘scope’ of spatial (geographic) co-relations in voting behaviour.

The WTO: no longer relevant for CAP reform?

The chapter explores the role the World Trade Organization (WTO) played or, rather, did not play in the 2013 ‘recalibration’ of the CAP. It is organised as follows: first, a brief review of policy changes from 1992 to 2008 and their (apparent) conformability with evolving WTO rules; second, a re-examination of the relevance of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) in the mid-2010s; and, third, a short account of how WTO constraints were addressed by the European Commission and the European Parliament in the 2013 CAP reform debate.

CAP reform, 2005-14, and the muted role of the dis-United Kingdom

In 2003 the CAP underwent a significant reform. Despite a seemingly endless turmoil of CAP reform, in 2005 the British government pressed for a new reform debate, and in the European Council meeting of December 2005 secured a commitment for the Commission “to undertake a full, wide ranging review covering all aspects of EU spending, including the CAP, ...” But but the initiative petered out, and the CAP ‘reform’ package proposed by the Commission, and then adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers in 2013, fell well short of the UK’s initial ambition. The chapter attempts to explore the reasons leading to the UK’s failed policy initiative.

Business

This main argument of the chapter is that the explanation of the slow pace of business action requires a socio-cultural theory that transcends the narrow premises of dominant corporate social responsibility (CRS) and business management approaches. I assert that only a critical political economy approach which captures the complex interplay between cultural ideas, power, politics, and economic interests can provide basis for explaining the prospects and limits of corporate climate governance. My argument, which draws from similar existing works (Levy and Egan 2003, Levy and Newell 2005, Okereke et al. 2009) is focused on carbon-intensive multinational companies (MNCs) whose activities are generally considered crucial in shaping societal response to climate change (McKibben 2012).

Coordination, inclusiveness and wage inequality between median and bottom income workers

What explains cross-national variation in wage inequality? Research in comparative political economy stresses the importance of the welfare state and wage coordination in reducing not only disposable income inequality but also gross earnings inequality. However, the cross-national variation in gross earnings inequality between median and low income workers is at odds with this conventional wisdom: the German coordinated market economy is now more unequal in this type of inequality than the UK, a liberal market economy. To solve this puzzle, I argue that non-inclusive coordination benefits median but not bottom income workers and is as a result associated with higher – rather than lower - wage inequality. I find support for this argument using a large N quantitative analysis of wage inequality in a panel of Western European countries. Results are robust to the inclusion of numerous controls, country fixed effects, and also hold with a sample of OECD countries. Taken together these findings force us to reconsider the relationship between coordination and wage inequality at the bottom of the income distribution.