Fractal spatialities

This paper argues for the use of ‘fractals’ in theorising sociospatial relations. From a realist position, a nonmathematical but nonmetaphoric and descriptive view of ‘fractals’ is advanced. Insights from the natural sciences are combined with insights on the position of the observer from Luhmann and notions of assemblages and repetitions from Deleuze. It is argued that the notion of ‘fractals’ can augment current understanding of sociospatialities in three ways. First, it can pose questions about the scalar position of the observer or the grain of observation; second, as a signifier of particular attributes, it prompts observation and description of particular structuring processes; and third, the epistemic access afforded by the concept can open up possibilities for transformative interventions and thereby inform the same. The theoretical usefulness of the concept is demonstrated by discussing the territory, place, scale, and networks (TPSN) model for theorising sociospatial relations advanced by B Jessop, N Brenner, and M Jones in their 2008 paper “Theorizing sociospatial relations”, published in this journal (volume 26, pages 389–401). It is suggested that a heuristic arising from a ‘fractal’ ontology can contribute to a polymorphous, as opposed to polyvalent, understanding of sociospatial relations.

New wine into old skins: the enactment of literacy policy in Singapore

To better comprehend how educational reforms and classroom practice interconnect, we need to understand the epistemic environments created for learning, as well as the pedagogical activities and the modes of classroom discourse related to these activities. This article examines how a particular innovation in English literacy, Strategies for English Language Learning and Reading (STELLAR), has been implemented in Singapore. Outlining the broader curriculum initiatives, current literacy policy landscape and pedagogical effect of classroom discourse, we look at how English language teachers in grades 1 and 2 interpret the STELLAR curriculum. Situated within the larger international zeal of educational reform, Singapore presents a rich case for the study of policy–pedagogy initiatives, literacy instruction and cultural values. Adding to the existing policy enactment research, this investigation provides an opportunity to probe both the prospects and limitations of policy implementation associated with centralised educational structures, examination-oriented systems and societal cultural frameworks.

A model intervenes: the many faces of moral hazard

This article builds on advances in social ontology to develop a new understanding of how mainstream economic modelling affects reality. We propose a new framework for analysing and describing how models intervene in the social sphere. This framework allows us to identify and articulate three key epistemic features of models as interventions: specificity, portability and formal precision. The second part of the article uses our framework to demonstrate how specificity, portability and formal precision explain the use of moral hazard models in a variety of different policy contexts, including worker compensation schemes, bank regulation and the euro-sovereign debt crisis.

Whatever works: proportionality as a constitutional doctrine

In The Global Model of Constitutional Rights Kai Möller claims that the proportionality test is underlain by an expansive moral right to autonomy. This putative right protects everything that advances one’s self-conception. It may of course be limited when balanced against other considerations such as the rights of others. But it always creates a duty on the state to justify the limitation. Möller further contends that the practice of proportionality can best be understood as protecting the right to autonomy. This review article summarizes the main tenets of Möller’s theory and criticizes them on two counts. First, it disputes the existence of a general right to autonomy; such a right places an unacceptably heavy burden on others. Second, it argues that we do not need to invoke a right to autonomy to explain and justify the main features of the practice of proportionality. Like other constitutional doctrines, proportionality is defensible, if it is grounded in pragmatic –mainly epistemic and institutional- considerations about how to increase overall rights compliance. These considerations are independent of any substantive theory of rights.

The rise of Western rationalism: Paul Feyerabend’s story

I summarise certain aspects of Paul Feyerabend’s account of the development of Western rationalism, show the ways in which that account is supposed to run up against an alternative, that of Karl Popper, and then try to give a preliminary comparison of the two. My interest is primarily in whether what Feyerabend called his ‘story’ constitutes a possible history of our epistemic concepts and their trajectory. I express some grave reservations about that story, and about Feyerabend’s framework, finding Popper’s views less problematic here. However, I also suggest that one important aspect of Feyerabend’s material, his treatment of religious belief, can be given an interpretation which makes it tenable, and perhaps preferable to a Popperian approach.

On judging the credibility of climate predictions

Incorporating a prediction into future planning and decision making is advisable only if we have judged the prediction’s credibility. This is notoriously difficult and controversial in the case of predictions of future climate. By reviewing epistemic arguments about climate model performance, we discuss how to make and justify judgments about the credibility of climate predictions. We propose a new bounding argument that justifies basing such judgments on the past performance of possibly dissimilar prediction problems. This encourages a more explicit use of data in making quantitative judgments about the credibility of future climate predictions, and in training users of climate predictions to become better judges of credibility. We illustrate the approach using decadal predictions of annual mean, global mean surface air temperature.

For the public without the public

How is the notion of public interest operationalised in the regulatory practices of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB)? A fundamental objective in setting international accounting standards for both the private and public sector is to serve the ‘public interest’. Who or what constitutes ‘public interest’ however remains a highly complex and controversial issue. Private sector financial reporting research posits that users (of financial information) are used as a proxy for the ‘public’ and users are further refined to current and potential investors - a small proportion of the public. The debates surrounding public interest are even more contentious in public sector financial reporting which deals with ‘public’ (tax payers’) money. In our study we use Bourdieu’s notion of semi-homogenous fields to show how autonomous and heteronomous pressures from the epistemic community of the accounting profession and political/government interests compete for the right to define the public interest and determine how (by what accounting solutions) this interest is best served. This is a theoretical study grounded in the analysis of empirical data from interviews with the board members of the IPSASB. The main contribution of the paper is to further our understanding of the perceptions of the main decision makers from the ‘inner regulatory circle’ with regards to the problematic construct of public interest. The main findings suggest a paternal and un-reflexive attitude of the board members leading to the conclusion that the public have no real voice in these matters.

Causation, complexity, and the concert: the pragmatics of causal explanation in international relations

A causal explanation provides information about the causal history of whatever is being explained. However, most causal histories extend back almost infinitely and can be described in almost infinite detail. Causal explanations therefore involve choices about which elements of causal histories to pick out. These choices are pragmatic: they reflect our explanatory interests. When adjudicating between competing causal explanations, we must therefore consider not only questions of epistemic adequacy (whether we have good grounds for identifying certain factors as causes) but also questions of pragmatic adequacy (whether the aspects of the causal history picked out are salient to our explanatory interests). Recognizing that causal explanations differ pragmatically as well as epistemically is crucial for identifying what is at stake in competing explanations of the relative peacefulness of the nineteenth-century Concert system. It is also crucial for understanding how explanations of past events can inform policy prescription.

A new regime of carbon counting: the practices and politics of accounting for everyday carbon through C02e

Inspired by the commercial desires of global brands and retailers to access the lucrative green consumer market, carbon is increasingly being counted and made knowable at the mundane sites of everyday production and consumption, from the carbon footprint of a plastic kitchen fork to that of an online bank account. Despite the challenges of counting and making commensurable the global warming impact of a myriad of biophysical and societal activities, this desire to communicate a product or service's carbon footprint has sparked complicated carbon calculative practices and enrolled actors at literally every node of multi-scaled and vastly complex global supply chains. Against this landscape, this paper critically analyzes the counting practices that create the ‘e’ in ‘CO2e’. It is shown that, central to these practices are a series of tools, models and databases which, in building upon previous work (Eden, 2012 and Star and Griesemer, 1989) we conceptualize here as ‘boundary objects’. By enrolling everyday actors from farmers to consumers, these objects abstract and stabilize greenhouse gas emissions from their messy material and social contexts into units of CO2e which can then be translated along a product's supply chain, thereby establishing a new currency of ‘everyday supply chain carbon’. However, in making all greenhouse gas-related practices commensurable and in enrolling and stabilizing the transfer of information between multiple actors these objects oversee a process of simplification reliant upon, and subject to, a multiplicity of approximations, assumptions, errors, discrepancies and/or omissions. Further the outcomes of these tools are subject to the politicized and commercial agendas of the worlds they attempt to link, with each boundary actor inscribing different meanings to a product's carbon footprint in accordance with their specific subjectivities, commercial desires and epistemic framings. It is therefore shown that how a boundary object transforms greenhouse gas emissions into units of CO2e, is the outcome of distinct ideologies regarding ‘what’ a product's carbon footprint is and how it should be made legible. These politicized decisions, in turn, inform specific reduction activities and ultimately advance distinct, specific and increasingly durable transition pathways to a low carbon society.

The metaphysics of self in Praśastapāda's differential naturalism

In A Compendium of the Characteristics of Categories (Padārthadharmasaṃgraha) the classical Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda (6th c. CE) presents an innovative metaphysics of the self. This article examines the defining metaphysical and axiological features of this conception of self and the dualist categorial schema in which it is located. It shows how this idea of the self, as a reflexive and ethical being, grounds a multinaturalist view of natural order and offers a conception of agency that claims to account for all the reflexive features of human mental and bodily life. Finally, it discusses the ends of self’s reflexivity and of human life as a return to the true self. It argues that at the heart of Praśastapāda’s metaphysics of self is the idea that ethics is metaphysics, and that epistemic practice is ethical practice.