Cheap dates and the delusion of gratification: are votes sold or traded in the EU Council of Ministers?

Each year, small Member States receive a disproportionate share of the European Union's (EU's) budget. A prominent explanation for this is that Council decision-making involves a healthy dose of vote selling, whereby large Member States offer small states generous fiscal transfers in exchange for influence over policy. But nobody has investigated whether net budget contributors actually get anything for their money. In this paper I identify the vote selling model's observable implications and find virtually no evidence consistent with Council cash-for-votes exchanges. I also show that a compromise model – the leading model of EU decision-making to date – modified to incorporate vote selling does not outperform a standard one that assumes votes are traded rather than sold. Taken together, the results suggest that Council decision-making operates with little or no vote selling, and that regardless of whatever they think they might be buying, net budget contributors get little or nothing in return for their money. These findings call for further investigation into how Member States approach the issue of fiscal transfers, and into the factors other than formal voting weight that affect the power of actors engaged in EU decision-making.

How the European Union does not work: national bargaining success in the Council of Ministers

We know surprisingly little about whether the content of European Union legislation reflects the preferences of some Member States more than others. The few studies that have examined national bargaining success rates for EU legislation have conceptual and methodological weaknesses. To redress these problems I use a salience-weighted measure to gauge the relative success of Member States in translating their national preferences into legislation, and test two plausible, competing hypotheses about how the EU works: that no state consistently achieves more of what it really wants than any other, and that large Member States tend to beat small ones. Neither hypothesis receives empirical support. Not only do states differ far more significantly in their respective levels of bargaining success than previously recognised, but some of the smaller states are the ones that do especially well. The paper‟s main contribution -- demonstrating that the EU does not work as most people think it does -- sets the stage for new research questions, both positive and normative. In the last section I make a tentative start answering two of the most important: which factors explain the surprising empirical results, and whether differential national bargaining success might undermine the legitimacy of the integration process.

Bottom-up planning and the future of planning education in India

The article discusses normative guidelines for reorienting planning education in India within the context of the immensely influential Constitutional Amendment Act of 1993. First, it briefly sketches the status of planning education at present in India, in relation to the role of planners in planning practice. It then descibes the changes that have taken place in general, following the Constitutional Amendment Act, dwelling more on the specific changes within the State of Kerala. The implications of these for planning education in general are then discussed normatively, highlighting three areas that need immediate attention from the planning academic community.

Connecting the complex ‘lived’ world(s) of Fairtrade

Although certified Fairtrade continues to use discourses of defetishization, its move into mainstream markets has acted to refetishize the consumer–producer relationship through the use of a standardized label, which acts as a substitute for engaged knowledges. Through Fairhills, a South African Fairtrade wine project, this paper explores the contextual complexity on the producer side of the commodity network. By incorporating the national discourse of Black Economic Empowerment into its operations, both in Fairhills and in South Africa in general, Fairtrade has adapted to this context, ensuring its relevance and credibility to stakeholders. However, in the UK, little more information than that commonly associated with Fairtrade is offered to Fairhills consumers. The particular market challenges facing Fairtrade wine in the UK make this negotiation between regulation and representation extremely pertinent. A productive way forward may be to conceptualize commodity fetishism as a continuum rather than a binary particularly when considering the difficult balance required when adding complexity to the targeted message of the existing label. This strategy for the sustainability of Fairtrade may be enhanced by utilizing the micro-level dynamism and adaptability that this paper shows is inherent, and indeed essential, to the durability and transferability of the discourse of Fairtrade.

HMEF: framework to evaluate merging of Higher Education Institutions – application of Enterprise Architecture

Mergers of Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) are organisational processes requiring tremendous amount of resources, in terms of time, work, and money. A number of mergers have been seen on previous years and more are to come. Several studies on mergers have been conducted, revealing some crucial factors that affect the success of mergers. Based on literature review on these studies, factors are: the initiator of merger, a reason for merger, geographical distance of merging institutions, organisational culture, the extend of overlapping course portfolio, and Quality Assurance Systems (QASs). Usually these kind of factors are not considered on mergers, but focus is on financial matters. In this paper, a framework (HMEF) for evaluating merging of HEIs is introduced. HMEF is based on Enterprise Architecture (EA), focusing on factors found to be affecting the success of mergers. By using HMEF, HEIs can focus on matters that crucial for merging.