the implication of social cognition for experimental economics From the issue entitled "Special issue on Experimental economics and the social embedding of economic behavior and cognition"

Can human social cognitive processes and social motives be grasped by the methods of experimental economics? Experimental studies of strategic cognition and social preferences contribute to our understanding of the social aspects of economic decisions making. Yet, papers in this issue argue that the social aspects of decision-making introduce several difficulties for interpreting the results of economic experiments. In particular, the laboratory is itself a social context, and in many respects a rather distinctive one, which raises questions of external validity.

Position paper on the future of social networking

Social networking mediated by web sites is a relatively new phenomenon and as with all technological innovations there continues to be a period of both technical and social adjustment to fit the services in with people’s behaviours, and for people to adjust their practices in the light of the affordances provided by the technology. Social networking benefits strongly from large scale availability. Users gain greater benefit from social networking services when more of their friends are using them.This applies in social terms, but also in eLearning and professional networks. The network effect provides one explanation for the popularity of internet based social networking sites (SNS) because the number of connections between people which can be maintained by using them is greatly increased in comparison to the networks available before the internet. The ability of users to determine how much they trust information available to them from contacts within their social network is important in almost all modes of use. As sources of information on a range of topics from academic to shopping advice, the level of trust which a user can put in other nodes is a key aspect of the utility of the system.

Are conventions solutions to uncertainty? Contrasting visions of social coordination

In recent years, there has been an increase in research on conventions motivated by the game-theoretic contributions of the philosopher David Lewis. Prior to this surge in interest, discussions of convention in economics had been tied to the analysis of John Maynard Keynes's writings. These literatures are distinct and have very little overlap. Yet this confluence of interests raises interesting methodological questions. Does the use of a common term, convention, denote a set of shared concerns? Can we identify what differentiates the game theoretic models from the Keynesian ones? This paper maps out the three most developed accounts of convention within economics and discusses their relations with each other in an attempt to provide an answer.