Attention, visual consciousness and indeterminacy

I propose a new argument showing that conscious vision sometimes depends constitutively on conscious attention. I criticise traditional arguments for this constitutive connection, on the basis that they fail adequately to dissociate evidence about visual consciousness from evidence about attention. On the same basis, I criticise Ned Block's recent counterargument that conscious vision is independent of one sort of attention (‘cognitive access'). Block appears to achieve the dissociation only because he underestimates the indeterminacy of visual consciousness. I then appeal to empirical work on the interaction between visual indeterminacy and attention, to argue for the constitutive connection.

Unconscious effects of language-specific terminology on pre-attentive colour perception

It is now established that native language affects one's perception of the world. However, it is unknown whether this effect is merely driven by conscious, language-based evaluation of the environment or whether it reflects fundamental differences in perceptual processing between individuals speaking different languages. Using brain potentials, we demonstrate that the existence in Greek of 2 color terms—ghalazio and ble—distinguishing light and dark blue leads to greater and faster perceptual discrimination of these colors in native speakers of Greek than in native speakers of English. The visual mismatch negativity, an index of automatic and preattentive change detection, was similar for blue and green deviant stimuli during a color oddball detection task in English participants, but it was significantly larger for blue than green deviant stimuli in native speakers of Greek. These findings establish an implicit effect of language-specific terminology on human color perception.

Language in calculation: A core mechanism?

Although there is evidence that exact calculation recruits left hemisphere perisylvian language systems, recent work has shown that exact calculation can be retained despite severe damage to these networks. In this study, we sought to identify a “core” network for calculation and hence to determine the extent to which left hemisphere language areas are part of this network. We examined performance on addition and subtraction problems in two modalities: one using conventional two-digit problems that can be easily encoded into language; the other using novel shape representations. With regard to numerical problems, our results revealed increased left fronto-temporal activity in addition, and increased parietal activity in subtraction, potentially reflecting retrieval of linguistically encoded information during addition. The shape problems elicited activations of occipital, parietal and dorsal temporal regions, reflecting visual reasoning processes. A core activation common to both calculation types involved the superior parietal lobule bilaterally, right temporal sub-gyral area, and left lateralized activations in inferior parietal (BA 40), frontal (BA 6/8/32) and occipital (BA 18) regions. The large bilateral parietal activation could be attributed to visuo-spatial processing in calculation. The inferior parietal region, and particularly the left angular gyrus, was part of the core calculation network. However, given its activation in both shape and number tasks, its role is unlikely to reflect linguistic processing per se. A possibility is that it serves to integrate right hemisphere visuo-spatial and left hemisphere linguistic and executive processing in calculation.

The Whorfian mind : electrophysiological evidence that language shapes perception

Color perception has been a traditional test-case of the idea that the language we speak affects our perception of the world.1 It is now established that categorical perception of color is verbally mediated and varies with culture and language.2 However, it is unknown whether the well-demonstrated language effects on color discrimination really reach down to the level of visual perception, or whether they only reflect post-perceptual cognitive processes. Using brain potentials in a color oddball detection task with Greek and English speakers, we demonstrate that language effects may exist at a level that is literally perceptual, suggesting that speakers of different languages have differently structured minds.