Deception-detection and machine intelligence in practical Turing tests

Deception-detection is the crux of Turing’s experiment to examine machine thinking conveyed through a capacity to respond with sustained and satisfactory answers to unrestricted questions put by a human interrogator. However, in 60 years to the month since the publication of Computing Machinery and Intelligence little agreement exists for a canonical format for Turing’s textual game of imitation, deception and machine intelligence. This research raises from the trapped mine of philosophical claims, counter-claims and rebuttals Turing’s own distinct five minutes question-answer imitation game, which he envisioned practicalised in two different ways: a) A two-participant, interrogator-witness viva voce, b) A three-participant, comparison of a machine with a human both questioned simultaneously by a human interrogator. Using Loebner’s 18th Prize for Artificial Intelligence contest, and Colby et al.’s 1972 transcript analysis paradigm, this research practicalised Turing’s imitation game with over 400 human participants and 13 machines across three original experiments. Results show that, at the current state of technology, a deception rate of 8.33% was achieved by machines in 60 human-machine simultaneous comparison tests. Results also show more than 1 in 3 Reviewers succumbed to hidden interlocutor misidentification after reading transcripts from experiment 2. Deception-detection is essential to uncover the increasing number of malfeasant programmes, such as CyberLover, developed to steal identity and financially defraud users in chatrooms across the Internet. Practicalising Turing’s two tests can assist in understanding natural dialogue and mitigate the risk from cybercrime.

Not another look at the Turing Test!

Practical application of the Turing Test throws up all sorts of questions regarding the nature of intelligence in both machines and humans. For example - Can machines tell original jokes? What would this mean to a machine if it did so? It has been found that acting as an interrogator even top philosophers can be fooled into thinking a machine is human and/or a human is a machine - why is this? Is it that the machine is performing well or is it that the philosopher is performing badly? All these questions, and more, will be considered. Just what does the Turing test tell us about machines and humans? Actual transcripts will be considered with startling results.

Turing, Kasparov and the future

The 'Turing 100' Conference in Manchester was the main event of the Turing Centenary Year in 2012. This is a report and reflection on Kasparov's popular talk. Within it, he explained how Turing and influenced computer chess, his career and the chess community. Kasparov also played Chessbase's 'TURING' emulation of Turing's second paper chess engine, here labelled 'AT2'. Quasi Turing-tests, computer contributions to world championship chess, and suspected cheating in chess are also mentioned.

Human misidentification in Turing tests

This paper presents some important issues on misidentification of human interlocutors in text-based communication during practical Turing tests. The study here presents transcripts in which human judges succumbed to theconfederate effect, misidentifying hidden human foils for machines. An attempt is made to assess the reasons for this. The practical Turing tests in question were held on 23 June 2012 at Bletchley Park, England. A selection of actual full transcripts from the tests is shown and an analysis is given in each case. As a result of these tests, conclusions are drawn with regard to the sort of strategies which can perhaps lead to erroneous conclusions when one is involved as an interrogator. Such results also serve to indicate conversational directions to avoid for those machine designers who wish to create a conversational entity that performs well on the Turing test.

Effects of lying in practical Turing tests

Interpretation of utterances affects an interrogator’s determination of human from machine during live Turing tests. Here, we consider transcripts realised as a result of a series of practical Turing tests that were held on 23 June 2012 at Bletchley Park, England. The focus in this paper is to consider the effects of lying and truth-telling on the human judges by the hidden entities, whether human or a machine. Turing test transcripts provide a glimpse into short text communication, the type that occurs in emails: how does the reader determine truth from the content of a stranger’s textual message? Different types of lying in the conversations are explored, and the judge’s attribution of human or machine is investigated in each test.

Assumption of knowledge and the Chinese Room in Turing test interrogation

Whilst common sense knowledge has been well researched in terms of intelligence and (in particular) artificial intelligence, specific, factual knowledge also plays a critical part in practice. When it comes to testing for intelligence, testing for factual knowledge is, in every-day life, frequently used as a front line tool. This paper presents new results which were the outcome of a series of practical Turing tests held on 23rd June 2012 at Bletchley Park, England. The focus of this paper is on the employment of specific knowledge testing by interrogators. Of interest are prejudiced assumptions made by interrogators as to what they believe should be widely known and subsequently the conclusions drawn if an entity does or does not appear to know a particular fact known to the interrogator. The paper is not at all about the performance of machines or hidden humans but rather the strategies based on assumptions of Turing test interrogators. Full, unedited transcripts from the tests are shown for the reader as working examples. As a result, it might be possible to draw critical conclusions with regard to the nature of human concepts of intelligence, in terms of the role played by specific, factual knowledge in our understanding of intelligence, whether this is exhibited by a human or a machine. This is specifically intended as a position paper, firstly by claiming that practicalising Turing's test is a useful exercise throwing light on how we humans think, and secondly, by taking a potentially controversial stance, because some interrogators adopt a solipsist questioning style of hidden entities with a view that it is a thinking intelligent human if it thinks like them and knows what they know. The paper is aimed at opening discussion with regard to the different aspects considered.

Making internalization theory good for practice: the essence of Alan Rugman’s contributions to international business

This perspectives paper and its associated commentaries examine Alan Rugman's conceptual contribution to international business scholarship. Most significantly, we highlight Rugman's version of internalization theory as an approach that integrates transaction cost economics and ‘classical’ internalization theory with elements from the resource-based view, such that it is especially relevant to strategic management. In reviewing his oeuvre, we also offer observations on his ideas for ‘new internalization theory’. We classify his other novel insights into four categories: Network Multinationals; National competitiveness; Development and public policy; and Emerging Economy MNEs. This special section offers multiple views on how his work informed the larger academic debate and considers how these ideas might evolve in the longer term.

Alan Rugman’s methodology

This paper argues that the intellectual contribution of Alan Rugman reflects his distinctive research methodology. Alan Rugman trained as an economist, and relied heavily on economic principles throughout his work. He believed that one good theory was sufficient for IB studies, and that theory, he maintained, was internalisation theory. He rejected theoretical pluralism, and believed that IB suffered from a surfeit of theories. Alan was a positivist. The test of a good theory was that it led to clear predictions which were corroborated by empirical evidence. Many IB theories, Alan believed, were weak; their proliferation sowed confusion and they needed to be refuted. Alan’s interpretation of internalisation was, however, unconventional in some respects. He played down the trade-offs presented in Coase’s original work, and substituted heuristics in their place. Instead of analysing internalisation as a context-specific choice between alternative contractual arrangements, he presented it as a strategic imperative for firms possessing strong knowledge advantages. His heuristics did not apply to every possible case, but in Alan’s view they applied in the great majority of cases and were therefore a basis for management action.