Exploring the construction of social class in educational discourse: the rational order of the nation state vs. global uncertainties

This article aims to create intellectual space in which issues of social inequality and education can be analyzed and discussed in relation to the multifaceted and multi-levelled complexities of the modern world. It is divided into three sections. Section One locates the concept of social class in the context of the modern nation state during the period after the Second World War. Focusing particularly on the impact of ‘Fordism’ on social organization and cultural relations, it revisits the articulation of social justice issues in the United Kingdom, and the structures put into place at the time to alleviate educational and social inequalities. Section Two problematizes the traditional concept of social class in relation to economic, technological and sociocultural changes that have taken place around the world since the mid-1980s. In particular, it charts some of the changes to the international labour market and global patterns of consumption, and their collective impact on the re-constitution of class boundaries in ‘developed countries’. This is juxtaposed with some of the major social effects of neo-classical economic policies in recent years on the sociocultural base in developing countries. It discusses some of the ways these inequalities are reflected in education. Section Three explores tensions between the educational ideals of the ‘knowledge economy’ and the discursive range of social inequalities that are emerging within and beyond the nation state. Drawing on key motifs identified throughout, the article concludes with a reassessment of the concept of social class within the global cultural economy. This is discussed in relation to some of the major equity and human rights issues in education today.

Access to the countryside of England and Wales: public/private partnership or the privatisation of public rights?

This paper examines the evolution of public rights of access to private land in England and Wales. Since the Eighteenth Century the administration and protection of these rights has been though a form of public/private partnership in which the judiciary, while maintaining the dominance of private property, have safeguarded de facto public access by refusing consistently to punish simple trespass. While this situation has been modified, principally by post-World War II legislation, to allow for some formalisation of access arrangements and consequent compensation to landowners in areas of high recreational pressure and low legal accessibility, recent policy initiatives suggest that the balance of the partnership has now shifted in favour of landowners. In particular, the new access payment schemes, developed by the UK Government in response to the European Commission's Agri-Environment Regulations, locate the landowner as the beneficiary of the partnership, financed by tax revenue and justified on the spurious basis of improved 'access provision'. As such the state, as the former upholder of citizen rights, now assumes the duplicitous position of underwriting private property ownership through the commodification of access, while proclaiming a significant improvement in citizens' access rights.

Republicanism, rights and democratic Athens

Cartledge and Edge (2010) argue that the modern republican tradition offers a useful framework for understanding the Athenian concept of freedom; and that within this framework the Athenians protected their freedoms without reference to any concept of rights. This paper agrees with both of these conclusions but identifies and corrects three assumptions behind Cartledge and Edge’s argument: that the only purpose of rights is to protect individual freedoms against the state; that rights have no place at all in the republican tradition; and that the ancient Greeks did not understand rights. In fact the Athenians did have an understanding of rights but they did not use rights to protect freedoms. The reason for this is that the protected freedom is a very modern and particularly sophisticated application of the concept of rights.

Voting rights of refugees

The book develops a novel legal argument about the voting rights of recognised 1951 Geneva Convention Refugees. The main normative contention is that such refugees should have the right to vote in the political community where they reside, assuming that the political community is a democracy and that its citizens have the right to vote. The basis of this contention is that the right to political participation in some political community is a basic right from the point of view of dignity and the protection of one’s interests. Due to their unique political predicament, 1951 Geneva Convention Refugees are a special category of non-citizen residents. They are unable to participate in elections of their state of origin, do not enjoy its diplomatic protection and consular assistance abroad, and – most fundamentally – are unable or unwilling, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, to return to it; thus, they are in limbo for a potentially protracted period. Refugees, too, deserve to have a place in the world in the Arendtian sense, where their opinions are significant and their actions are effective. Their state of asylum is, for the time being, the only community in which there is any realistic prospect of political participation on their part.