An experiment on spatial competition with endogenous pricing

Hotelling's (1929) principle of minimum differentiation and the alternative prediction that firms will maximally differentiate from their rivals in order to relax price competition have not been explicitly tested so far. We report results from experimental spatial duopolies designed to address this issue. The levels of product differentiation observed are systematically lower than predicted in equilibrium under risk neutrality and compatible with risk aversion. The observed prices are consistent with collusion attempts. Our main findings are robust to variations in three experimental conditions: automated vs. human market sharing rule for ties, individual vs. collective decision making, and even vs. odd number of locations.

Buyer–seller interaction in experimental spatial markets

We report results from experimental spatial markets with endogenous buyer location on a discrete version of Hotelling's linear city. Buyer locations favor more often the hypothesis of transportation cost minimization than that of strategic location aimed at increasing price competition between sellers. However, the latter of the two hypotheses receives systematic support too. Differentiation by seller-subjects is substantially less than the theory would predict for the specific framework used. Our results suggest that location strategies adopted by subjects can be seen as a rational process favoring conservative product design and spatial agglomeration of economic activities.