Orde Wingate and the Theory behind the Chindit Operations: Some Recent Findings

This short paper discusses some of the theory behind the Chindit operations in Burma of 1943-44, drawing parallels between Wingate's theoretical concepts post 1990s concepts of 'manoeuvre warfare.'

Numerical modeling of the propagation environment in the atmospheric boundary layer over the Persian Gulf

Strong vertical gradients at the top of the atmospheric boundary layer affect the propagation of electromagnetic waves and can produce radar ducts. A three-dimensional, time-dependent, nonhydrostatic numerical model was used to simulate the propagation environment in the atmosphere over the Persian Gulf when aircraft observations of ducting had been made. A division of the observations into high- and low-wind cases was used as a framework for the simulations. Three sets of simulations were conducted with initial conditions of varying degrees of idealization and were compared with the observations taken in the Ship Antisubmarine Warfare Readiness/Effectiveness Measuring (SHAREM-115) program. The best results occurred with the initialization based on a sounding taken over the coast modified by the inclusion of data on low-level atmospheric conditions over the Gulf waters. The development of moist, cool, stable marine internal boundary layers (MIBL) in air flowing from land over the waters of the Gulf was simulated. The MIBLs were capped by temperature inversions and associated lapses of humidity and refractivity. The low-wind MIBL was shallower and the gradients at its top were sharper than in the high-wind case, in agreement with the observations. Because it is also forced by land–sea contrasts, a sea-breeze circulation frequently occurs in association with the MIBL. The size, location, and internal structure of the sea-breeze circulation were realistically simulated. The gradients of temperature and humidity that bound the MIBL cause perturbations in the refractivity distribution that, in turn, lead to trapping layers and ducts. The existence, location, and surface character of the ducts were well captured. Horizontal variations in duct characteristics due to the sea-breeze circulation were also evident. The simulations successfully distinguished between high- and low-wind occasions, a notable feature of the SHAREM-115 observations. The modeled magnitudes of duct depth and strength, although leaving scope for improvement, were most encouraging.

The evolution of strategy: thinking war from antiquity to the present

Latin had no word for "strategy", but the East Romans, whom we call the Byzantines, did. This book tracks the evolution of the concept of warfare being subjected to higher political aims from Antiquity to the Present, using Greek, Latin, French, Spanish, Italian, English and German sources. It tracks the rise, fall, and resurrection of the belief in the Roman and later the medieval and early modern world that warfare was only legitimate if it pursued the higher goal of a just peace, which in the 19th century gave way to a blinkered concentration on military victory as only war aim. It explains why one school of thought, from Antiquity to the present, emphasised eternal principles of warfare, while others emphasised, in Clausewitz's term, the "changing character of war". It tracks ideas from land warfare to naval warfare to air power and nuclear thinking, but it also stresses great leaps and discontinuities in thinking about strategy. It covers asymmetric wars both from the point of view of the weaker power seeking to overthrow a stronger power, and from the stronger power dealing with insurgents and other numerically inferior forces. It concludes with a commentary of the long-known problems of bureaucratic politics, non-centralised command and inter-service rivalry, which since the 16th century or earlier has created obstacles to coherent strategy making.

Small wars in the age of Clausewitz: the watershed between partisan war and people's war

Around the time of Clausewitz’s writing, a new element was introduced into partisan warfare: ideology. Previously, under the ancien régime, partisans were what today we would call special forces, light infantry or cavalry, almost always mercenaries, carrying out special operations, while the main action in war took place between regular armies. Clausewitz lectured his students on such ‘small wars’. In the American War of Independence and the resistance against Napoleon and his allies, operations carried out by such partisans merged with counter-revolutionary, nationalist insurgencies, but these Clausewitz analysed in a distinct category, ‘people's war’. Small wars, people's war, etc. should thus not be thought of as monopoly of either the political Right or the Left.

Antoine de La Sale's 'La Sale': the cannonball and the prince's head

The elderly tutor La Sale's didactic treatise for his charges (dated 1451) includes an eye-witness account of the siege of Anjou-held Naples by the Aragonese in 1438. It narrates the accidental death (or miracle, depending on the perspective of the chroniclers) of the infante Pedro of Castille, brother of King Alfonso the Magnanimous of Aragon. This article explores how "La Sale", an adapted version of the Middle French translation of Valerius Maximus's 'Facta et dicta memorabilia', frames and skews the anecdote towards an exploration of the reliability and authority of the tutor-narrator.

A qualified defense of American drone attacks in northwest Pakistan under international humanitarian law

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, international law has had to grapple with the fundamental challenges that large-scale violence carried out by non-State actors poses to the traditional inter- State orientation of international law. Questions related to the “adequacy” and “effectiveness” of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the law related to the use of force have been particularly pronounced. This paper focuses on the international humanitarian law implications of American drone attacks in northwest Pakistan. A highly-advanced modality of modern warfare, armed drones highlight the possibilities, problems, prospects and pitfalls of high-tech warfare. How is the battlefield to be defined and delineated geographically and temporally? Who can be targeted, and by whom? Ultimately, this paper concludes that American drone attacks in northwest Pakistan are not unlawful as such under international humanitarian law, though, like any tactical decision in the context of asymmetric warfare, they should be continuously and closely monitored according to the dictates of law with sensitivity to facts on the ground.

Military doctrine, command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory

Military doctrine is one of the conceptual components of war. Its raison d’être is that of a force multiplier. It enables a smaller force to take on and defeat a larger force in battle. This article’s departure point is the aphorism of Sir Julian Corbett, who described doctrine as ‘the soul of warfare’. The second dimension to creating a force multiplier effect is forging doctrine with an appropriate command philosophy. The challenge for commanders is how, in unique circumstances, to formulate, disseminate and apply an appropriate doctrine and combine it with a relevant command philosophy. This can only be achieved by policy-makers and senior commanders successfully answering the Clausewitzian question: what kind of conflict are they involved in? Once an answer has been provided, a synthesis of these two factors can be developed and applied. Doctrine has implications for all three levels of war. Tactically, doctrine does two things: first, it helps to create a tempo of operations; second, it develops a transitory quality that will produce operational effect, and ultimately facilitate the pursuit of strategic objectives. Its function is to provide both training and instruction. At the operational level instruction and understanding are critical functions. Third, at the strategic level it provides understanding and direction. Using John Gooch’s six components of doctrine, it will be argued that there is a lacunae in the theory of doctrine as these components can manifest themselves in very different ways at the three levels of war. They can in turn affect the transitory quality of tactical operations. Doctrine is pivotal to success in war. Without doctrine and the appropriate command philosophy military operations cannot be successfully concluded against an active and determined foe.