How reliable is internet-based self-reported identity, socio-demographic and obesity measures in European adults?

In e-health intervention studies, there are concerns about the reliability of internet-based, self-reported (SR) data and about the potential for identity fraud. This study introduced and tested a novel procedure for assessing the validity of internet-based, SR identity and validated anthropometric and demographic data via measurements performed face-to-face in a validation study (VS). Participants (n = 140) from seven European countries, participating in the Food4Me intervention study which aimed to test the efficacy of personalised nutrition approaches delivered via the internet, were invited to take part in the VS. Participants visited a research centre in each country within 2 weeks of providing SR data via the internet. Participants received detailed instructions on how to perform each measurement. Individual’s identity was checked visually and by repeated collection and analysis of buccal cell DNA for 33 genetic variants. Validation of identity using genomic information showed perfect concordance between SR and VS. Similar results were found for demographic data (age and sex verification). We observed strong intra-class correlation coefficients between SR and VS for anthropometric data (height 0.990, weight 0.994 and BMI 0.983). However, internet-based SR weight was under-reported (Δ −0.70 kg [−3.6 to 2.1], p < 0.0001) and, therefore, BMI was lower for SR data (Δ −0.29 kg m−2 [−1.5 to 1.0], p < 0.0001). BMI classification was correct in 93 % of cases. We demonstrate the utility of genotype information for detection of possible identity fraud in e-health studies and confirm the reliability of internet-based, SR anthropometric and demographic data collected in the Food4Me study.

Expecting moral philosophers to be reliable

Are philosophers’ intuitions more reliable than philosophical novices’? Are we entitled to assume the superiority of philosophers’ intuitions just as we assume that experts in other domains have more reliable intuitions than novices? Ryberg raises some doubts and his arguments promise to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy once and for all. In this paper, I raise a number of objections to these arguments. I argue that philosophers receive sufficient feedback about the quality of their intuitions and that philosophers’ experience in philosophy plausibly affects their intuitions. Consequently, the type of argument Ryberg offers fails to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy.

Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions

Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have a unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we have, the effect of framing on the strength of those intuitions still needs to be taken into account. I argue that this by itself poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy.