Developing “Best Practices” for bankers’ pay in line with Basel III

This paper proposes hybrid capital securities as a significant part of senior bank executive incentive compensation in light of Basel III, a new global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy and liquidity agreed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The committee developed Basel III in a response to the deficiencies in financial regulation brought about by the global financial crisis. Basel III strengthens bank capital requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage. The hybrid bank capital securities we propose for bank executives’ compensation are preferred shares and subordinated debt that the June 2004 Basel II regulatory framework recognised as other admissible forms of capital. The past two decades have witnessed dramatic increase in performance-related pay in the banking industry. Stakeholders such as shareholders, debtholders and regulators criticise traditional cash and equity-based compensation for encouraging bank executives’ excessive risk taking and short-termism, which has resulted in the failure of risk management in high profile banks during the global financial crisis. Paying compensation in the form of hybrid bank capital securities may align the interests of executives with those of stakeholders and help banks regain their reputation for prudence after years of aggressive risk-taking. Additionally, banks are desperately seeking to raise capital in order to bolster balance sheets damaged by the ongoing credit crisis. Tapping their own senior employees with large incentive compensation packages may be a viable additional source of capital that is politically acceptable in times of large-scale bailouts of the financial sector and economically wise as it aligns the interests of the executives with the need for a stable financial system.

Changing HRM systems in two Russian oil companies: Western hegemony or Russian spetsifika?

We contrast attempts to introduce what were seen as sophisticated Western-style human resource management (HRM) systems into two Russian oil companies – a joint venture with a Western multinational corporation (TNK-BP) and a wholly Russian-owned company (Yukos). The drivers for Western hegemony within the joint venture, heavily influenced by expatriates and the established HRM processes introduced by the Western parent, were counteracted to a significant degree by the Russian spetsifika – the peculiarly Russian way of thinking and doing things. In contrast, developments were absorbed faster in the more authoritarian Russian-owned company. The research adds to the theoretical debate about international knowledge transfer and provides detailed empirical data to support our understanding of the effect of both organizational and cultural context on the knowledge-transfer mechanisms of local and multinational companies. As the analysis is based on the perspective of senior local nationals, we also address a relatively under-researched area in the international HRM literature which mostly relies on empirical data collected from expatriates and those based solely in multinational headquarters.