Contemporary ordinary language philosophy

There is a widespread assumption that ordinary language philosophy was killed off sometime in the 1960s or 70s by a combination of Gricean pragmatics and the rapid development of systematic semantic theory. Contrary to that widespread assumption, however, contemporary versions of ordinary language philosophy are alive and flourishing, but going by various aliases—in particular (some versions of) "contextualism" and (some versions of) "experimental philosophy". And a growing group of contemporary philosophers are explicitly embracing the methods as well as the title of ordinary language philosophy and arguing that it has been unfairly maligned and was never decisively refuted. In this overview, I will outline the main projects and arguments employed by contemporary ordinary language philosophers, and make the case that updated versions of the arguments made by ordinary language philosophers in the middle of the twentieth century are attracting renewed attention.

Geoffrey Hill and performative utterance

Utterance of a sentence in poetry can be performative, and explicitly so. The best-known of Geoffrey Hill’s critical essays denies this, but his own poetry demonstrates it. I clarify these claims and explain why they matter. What Hill denies illuminates anxieties about responsibility and commitment that poets and critics share with philosophers. What Hill demonstrates affords opportunities for mutual benefit between philosophy and criticism.

Thin, fine and with sensitivity: a metamethodology of intuitions

Do philosophers use intuitions? Should philosophers use intuitions? Can philosophical methods (where intuitions are concerned) be improved upon? In order to answer these questions we need to have some idea of how we should go about answering them. I defend a way of going about methodology of intuitions: a metamethodology. I claim the following: (i) we should approach methodological questions about intuitions with a thin conception of intuitions in mind; (ii) we should carve intuitions finely; and, (iii) we should carve to a grain to which we are sensitive in our everyday philosophising. The reason is that, unless we do so, we don’t get what we want from philosophical methodology. I argue that what we want is information that will aid us in formulating practical advice concerning how to do philosophy responsibly/well/better.

Intuitions, disagreement and referential pluralism

Mallon, Machery, Nichols and Stich (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79: 332–356, 2009) argue that the use of intuitions in the philosophy of reference is problematic as recent studies show intuitions about reference vary both within and between cultures. I use some ideas from the recent literature on disagreement and truth relativism to shed light on the debate concerning the appropriate reaction to these studies. Mallon et al. argue that variation is problematic because if one tries to use intuitions which vary to find the correct theory of reference one will end up endorsing an absurd position: referential pluralism. I argue that there is hope for intuition-based philosophy of reference. One can avoid endorsing referential pluralism (as Mallon et al. understand it). Furthermore, referential pluralism may not be so absurd after all.

Predicating from an early age: edusemiotics and the potential of children’s preconceptions

This paper aims to explain how semiotics and constructivism can collaborate in an educational epistemology by developing a joint approach to prescientific conceptions. Empirical data and findings of constructivist research are interpreted in the light of Peirce’s semiotics. Peirce’s semiotics is an anti-psychologistic logic (CP 2.252; CP 4.551; W 8:15; Pietarinen in Signs of logic, Springer, Dordrecht, 2006; Stjernfelt in Diagrammatology. An investigation on the borderlines of phenomenology, ontology and semiotics, Springer, Dordrecht, 2007) and relational logic. Constructivism was traditionally developed within psychology and sociology and, therefore, some incompatibilities can be expected between these two schools. While acknowledging the differences, we explain that constructivism and semiotics share the assumption of realism that knowledge can only be developed upon knowledge and, therefore, an epistemological collaboration is possible. The semiotic analysis performed confirms the constructivist results and provides a further insight into the teacher-student relation. Like the constructivist approach, Peirce’s doctrine of agapism infers that the personal dimension of teaching must not be ignored. Thus, we argue for the importance of genuine sympathy in teaching attitudes. More broadly, the article also contributes to the development of postmodern humanities. At the end of the modern age, the humanities are passing through a critical period of transformation. There is a growing interest in semiotics and semiotic philosophy in many areas of the humanities. Such a case, on which we draw, is the development of a theoretical semiotic approach to education, namely edusemiotics (Stables and Semetsky, Pedagogy and edusemiotics: theoretical challenge/practical opportunities, Sense Publishers, Rotterdam, 2015).

Voices from the aid 'chain': The personal dynamics of care

This paper uses a simplified model of the aid 'chain' to explore some causes and consequences of breakdown in communication. Although the rhetoric of Northern-based donors is awash with words such as 'partnership' and 'inclusion' when dealing with their Southern-based partners, the situation in practice is different. Unequal power relationships sometimes result in donor imposition of Perspectives and values. It is our contention, based on a collective experience of fifty-four years in a Nigerian-based non-governmental development organization (NGDO), the Diocesan Development Services (DDS), that much of the driving force behind the successes and problems faced by the institution was founded on relationships that evolved between individuals. In order to understand why things happened the way they did it is necessary to begin with the human element that cannot be condensed into objects or categories. While injudicious donor interference bad damaging repercussions, our experience suggests that care and consideration flow throughout the aid chain and actions are not malevolent. Breakdowns can be attributed to a number of factors, with the over-riding one being pressures operating at the personal level that emanate from within the institution itself and the larger community. The paper analyses three experiences using institutional ethnography theory and methodologies as a basis. Examples taken address the influence key donor personnel had in the function of DDS, and how these changed with time. The mission, policies and even procedures of the donor did not change markedly over thirty-two years, but each changing desk officer had their own philosophy and approach and a different interpretation of their own institutional policies. Hence while the 'macro' has an influence it is mediated via individual interpretation. In our view, the importance of people-people relationships is particularly understated in development literature where emphasis gravitates towards the aggregate and global.

Evolution in software systems: foundations of the SPE classification scheme

The SPE taxonomy of evolving software systems, first proposed by Lehman in 1980, is re-examined in this work. The primary concepts of software evolution are related to generic theories of evolution, particularly Dawkins' concept of a replicator, to the hermeneutic tradition in philosophy and to Kuhn's concept of paradigm. These concepts provide the foundations that are needed for understanding the phenomenon of software evolution and for refining the definitions of the SPE categories. In particular, this work argues that a software system should be defined as of type P if its controlling stakeholders have made a strategic decision that the system must comply with a single paradigm in its representation of domain knowledge. The proposed refinement of SPE is expected to provide a more productive basis for developing testable hypotheses and models about possible differences in the evolution of E- and P-type systems than is provided by the original scheme. Copyright (C) 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

How not to do things with words

If philosophy and poetry are to illuminate each other, we should first understand their tendencies to mutual antipathy. Examining (and, where possible, correcting) mutual misapprehension is part of this task. J. L. Austin's remarks on poetry offer one such point of entry: they are often cited by poets and critics as an example of philosophy's blindness to poetry (I). These remarks are complex and their purpose obscure—more so than those who take exception to them usually allow or admit (II). But it is reasonable to think that, for all his levity at their expense, what Austin offers poets is exemption from forms of commitment. Since such exemption is precisely what poets and critics have sought, this diagnosis is eirenic (III). This exemption has a price, but it may be affordable (IV).