Incense and insensibility: Austin on the 'non-seriousness' of poetry

What is at stake when J. L. Austin calls poetry ‘non-serious’, and sidelines it in his speech act theory? (I). Standard explanations polarize sharply along party lines: poets (e.g. Geoffrey Hill) and critics (e.g. Christopher Ricks) are incensed, while philosophers (e.g. P. F. Strawson; John Searle) deny cause (II). Neither line is consistent with Austin's remarks, whose allusions to Plato, Aristotle and Frege are insufficiently noted (III). What Austin thinks is at stake is confusion, which he corrects apparently to the advantage of poets (IV). But what is actually at stake is the possibility of commitment and poetic integrity. We should reject what Austin offers (V).

Style, experimentation and Jingju (Beijing Opera) as a decentered multiplicity

Jingju (Beijing Opera) is widely considered to be a fundamentally non-naturalistic practice that became known in the West after it caught the attention of western practitioners in 1935 following Mei Lanfang’s performance in Moscow. Given the implication that its importance is largely historical, some non-specialists have implied that Jingju has little relevance to contemporary modes of thinking, particularly the multiplicities of experience as outlined by philosophers such as Deleuze and Guattari. This article seeks to demonstrate the multiplicity of Jingju for a wider readership through both a historical analysis and a deconstruction of the form. It will show how, at the same time that Mei Lanfang was providing a ‘non-realistic’ model for western practitioners eager to displace the dominance of naturalism, realistic settings were becoming an integral part of Jingju performances in Shanghai. The article also engages with the various acting pai/styles that weave Jingju into a complex, multiple form. The article demonstrates how Deleuzian models actually facilitate a greater understanding of Jingju.

Not another look at the Turing Test!

Practical application of the Turing Test throws up all sorts of questions regarding the nature of intelligence in both machines and humans. For example - Can machines tell original jokes? What would this mean to a machine if it did so? It has been found that acting as an interrogator even top philosophers can be fooled into thinking a machine is human and/or a human is a machine - why is this? Is it that the machine is performing well or is it that the philosopher is performing badly? All these questions, and more, will be considered. Just what does the Turing test tell us about machines and humans? Actual transcripts will be considered with startling results.

Are normative properties descriptive properties?

Some philosophers think that normative properties are identical to descriptive properties. In this paper, I argue that this entails that it is possible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I argue that Frank Jackson’s argument to show that this is possible fails, and that the objections to this argument show that it is impossible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I conclude that normative properties are not identical to descriptive properties. I then show that if we combine this conclusion with the conclusion of a different argument that Jackson has given to show that there are no irreducibly normative properties, it follows that there are no normative properties at all.

Probabilistic forecasting: why model imperfection is a poison pill

This volume is a serious attempt to open up the subject of European philosophy of science to real thought, and provide the structural basis for the interdisciplinary development of its specialist fields, but also to provoke reflection on the idea of ‘European philosophy of science’. This efforts should foster a contemporaneous reflection on what might be meant by philosophy of science in Europe and European philosophy of science, and how in fact awareness of it could assist philosophers interpret and motivate their research through a stronger collective identity. The overarching aim is to set the background for a collaborative project organising, systematising, and ultimately forging an identity for, European philosophy of science by creating research structures and developing research networks across Europe to promote its development.

‘The Historikerstreit: Uniqueness and Comparability of the Holocaust'

A critical analysis of the public debate among German historians, philosophers and other intellectuals in the mid-1980s about the uniqueness or comparability of the Holocaust in relation to other instances of genocide.

Morality and the good life

Being moral sometimes handicaps decent people in their pursuit of worthwhile goals. This is especially likely to happen when those with power in society have badly mistaken ideas about what morality requires. A good person might not last long in a bad society.

Should kids pay their own way?

Children are expensive to raise. Ensuring that they are raised such that they are able to lead a minimally decent life costs time and money, and lots of both. Who is responsible for bearing the costs of the things that children are undoubtedly owed? This is a question that has received comparatively little scrutiny from political philosophers, despite children being such a drain on public and private finances alike. To the extent that there is a debate, two main views can be identified. The Parents Pay view says that parents, responsible for the existence of the costs, must foot the bill. The Society Pays view says that a next generation is a benefit to all, and so to allow parents to foot the bill alone is the worst kind of free-riding. In this paper, I introduce a third potentially liable party currently missing from the debate: children themselves. On my backward-looking view, we are entitled to ask people to contribute to the raising of children on the basis that they have benefited from being raised themselves.