Beyond the "liberal peace"

The article critically reviews the contributions to the understanding of contemporary peacebuilding practices of several recent contributions to the peacebuilding literature, including the 2011 World Development Report. It examines some of the conceptual problems with recent criticisms of the "liberal peace", and proposes that the concept of "liberal peace" should be abandonned as it lacks any analytical purchase.

Political economy of state-building: power after peace

The purpose of this volume is to examine and evaluate the impact of international state-building interventions on the political economy of post-conflict countries over the last 20 years. It analyses how international interventions have shaped political and economic dynamics and structures – both formal and informal – and what kind of state, and what kind of state-society relations have been created as a result, through three different lenses: first, through the approaches taken by different international actors like the UN, the International Financial Institutions, or the European Union, to state-building; second, through detailed analysis of key state-building policies; and third, through a wide range of country case studies. Amongst the recurring themes that are highlighted by the book’s focus on the political economy of state-building, and that help to explain why international state-building interventions have tended to fall short of the visions of interveners and local populations alike are evidence of important continuities between war-time and “post-conflict” economies and authority structures, which are often consolidated as a consequence of international involvement; tensions arising from what are often the competing interests and values held by different interveners and local actors; and, finally, the continuing salience of economic and political violence in state-building processes and war-to-peace transitions. The book aims to offer a more nuanced understanding of the complex impact of state-building practices on post-conflict societies, and of the political economy of post-conflict state-building.

Securing Peace in Europe, 1945-62: Thoughts for the Post-Cold War Era

Articles include: Beatrice Heuser: ‘Stalin as Hitler's Successor: Western Interpretations of the Soviet threat', pp. 17-40

War, Peace and World Orders from Antiquity until the 20th century

Chapters contributed by experts on each period examine how world views have determined the view of war and peace, and the conduct of war, throughout European history.

Victory, peace, and justice : the neglected trinity

The assumption that the most important aim of war is to create a better peace than existed before the war, i.e. a peace with justice, was self-evident for writers prior to Clausewitz. This does not mean that princes saw this as their priority, but theoreticians did. This changed dramatically with the Napoleonic Wars: Clausewitz initiated an era where writers on strategy paid no heed to what would come after military victory, now seen as the be-all and end-all of war. Terrible consequences flowed from this, and a series of ephemeral victories leading to new wars. It was only around the Second World War, to some in itself the consequence of this obsession with victory and not with peace, that it began to dawn on writers that peace, not military victory must be the ultimate aim to be kept in sight.

Introduction: power after peace

The chapter provides a substantive conceptual introduction to the volume, examining what is meant by the concept of "political economy of statebuilding", and what the implications for the study of statebuilding are

Whose peace? Local ownership and UN peacebuilding

In recent years, there has been an increasing emphasis on the participation of national actors in United Nations peace operations, reflecting what has become a near orthodox commitment to ‘local ownership.’ Advocates of local ownership assert that it: (1) increases the legitimacy of UN peacebuilding efforts; (2) increases the sustainability of peacebuilding activities after the departure of the UN; and (3) increases democratic governance in post-conflict states. While such thinking about local ownership has informed UN peacebuilding policy to a large extent, the UN has, to date, assumed these positive benefits without critically examining the causal mechanisms that allegedly produce them, specifying the conditions under which this correlation holds, or providing convincing evidence for these assertions. Moreover, exactly what local ownership is, what is being owned, and who local ‘owners’ are remain unclear. Indeed a closer examination of ownership’s relation with legitimacy, sustainability, and democratization reveal a plethora of contradictions that imply that local ownership may in fact decrease the UN’s ability to deliver peacekeeping results. Crucially, however, the UN persists in adopting a local ownership approach to peacebuilding, suggesting that it does so because it is normatively appropriate rather than operationally effective.

Profits, malversations, restitutions. Les bénéfices des financiers durant la guerre de la Ligue d’Augsbourg et la taxe de Chamillart

Profit, embezzlement, restitution. The role of the traitants in the Nine Years War and Chamillart’s tax on financial benefits The aim of this article is to revisit the question of the financiers in Old Regime France. It starts with an analysis of the discourses about the financiers under the Absolute monarchy that underlines the complexity of their relationship with the government and the public. It then reviews the secondary literature and highlights the existence of competing historical interpretations (functional, political, utilitarian), which raise the question of their overall capacity to account for the role and impact of the financiers at different times. On this ground, the article focuses on a specific group of financiers, the so-called traitants d’affaires extraordinaires, during the Nine Years War. Further to a description of the specific role and scope of the activities of the various financiers responsible for helping the monarchy to raise the funds it needed to pay for its peace and wartime expenditure, the article examines the conditions and profits granted by the king in his contracts with the traitants whose services were hired for the purpose of selling royal offices in the public and advancing the revenue to the Treasury. It also explores the contractual arrangements of the companies established by the financiers to manage their operations as well as the rights and the responsibilities of their various stakeholders. These bases being laid, the article relies on the administrative correspondence relating to the traités during the Nine Years War to address a range of issues, in particular the extent to which these contracts, and other control procedures, were robust enough to deter fraud. The accounts of two traitants’ companies offer an opportunity to analyse and compare the structure of their income and expenditure (including the volume and cost of the promissory notes sold in the public to finance their payments to the Treasury), to explore the strategies of the contractors, to calculate their net profits and further discuss the problem of embezzlement. The article ends with the study of the context and debates which led to the introduction by finance minister Michel Chamillart, in 1700, of a shortfall tax on the financial profits of the gens d’affaires or traitants, the method used to determine its rate (50 % of the net benefits), its distribution among the various stakeholders (including the bailleurs de fonds or backers), and the related procedures. In total, the article argues that the relationship between the monarchy, society and the financiers under the Ancien Regime was not static and, therefore, suggests that the broad question of control and fraud must be examined against changing circumstances. With regard specifically to the Nine Years War, the article concludes that within the constraints of the Absolute monarchy, contractors offered valuable services by raising capital for the benefit of a king who ruled over a country which, at the time, was by far the wealthiest in Europe, and where ministers failed to foresee long wars of attrition and whose financial strategy was limited by the very existence of privilege. Overall, the traités were too costly to be a viable system of war financing. In these conditions, the substantial fortunes made by a handful of very successful traitants suffice to explain that the government easily gave in to public criticism against the wealth of the financiers and felt compelled, when peace resumed, to cancel the advantageous conditions offered in the treaties by taxing financial profits.