Cheap dates and the delusion of gratification: are votes sold or traded in the EU Council of Ministers?

Each year, small Member States receive a disproportionate share of the European Union's (EU's) budget. A prominent explanation for this is that Council decision-making involves a healthy dose of vote selling, whereby large Member States offer small states generous fiscal transfers in exchange for influence over policy. But nobody has investigated whether net budget contributors actually get anything for their money. In this paper I identify the vote selling model's observable implications and find virtually no evidence consistent with Council cash-for-votes exchanges. I also show that a compromise model – the leading model of EU decision-making to date – modified to incorporate vote selling does not outperform a standard one that assumes votes are traded rather than sold. Taken together, the results suggest that Council decision-making operates with little or no vote selling, and that regardless of whatever they think they might be buying, net budget contributors get little or nothing in return for their money. These findings call for further investigation into how Member States approach the issue of fiscal transfers, and into the factors other than formal voting weight that affect the power of actors engaged in EU decision-making.

Internal doubts about Cohen's Rescue of Justice

G.A. Cohen's Rescuing Justice and Equality is the culmination of twenty years' work on Rawls's theory of justice. In this paper I distinguish three prongs of attack advanced by Cohen, and show how two of the prongs (the claim that egalitarianism includes productive demands and the claim that equality is best understood as 'luck egalitarianism') are incompatible.

The professional voice: comparing questionnaire and telephone methods in a national survey of teachers' perceptions

This article compares the results obtained from using two different methodological approaches to elicit teachers’ views on their professional role, the key challenges and their aspirations for the future. One approach used a postal/online questionnaire, while the other used telephone interviews, posing a selection of the same questions. The research was carried out on two statistically comparable samples of teachers in England in spring 2004. Significant differences in responses were observed which seem to be attributable to the methods employed. In particular, more ‘definite’ responses were obtained in the interviews than in response to the questionnaire. This article reviews the comparative outcomes in the context of existing research and explores why the separate methods may have produced significantly different responses to the same questions.

Risks, costs and labour markets: explaining cross-national patterns of far right party success in European Parliament elections

What is the impact of the economy on cross national variation in far right-wing party support? This paper tests several hypotheses from existing literature on the results of the last three EP elections in all EU member states. We conceptualise the economy affects support because unemployment heightens the risks and costs that the population faces, but this is crucially mediated by labour market institutions. Findings from multiple regression analyses indicate that unemployment, real GDP growth, debt and deficits have no statistically significant effect on far right-wing party support at the national level. By contrast, labour markets influence costs and risks: where unemployment benefits and dismissal regulations are high, unemployment has no effect, but where either one of them is low, unemployment leads to higher far right-wing party support. This explains why unemployment has not led to far right-wing party support in some European countries that experienced the 2008 Eurozone crisis.