German open ended funds: was there a valuation problem?

In late 2005, a number of German open ended funds suffered significant withdrawals by unit holders. The crisis was precipitated by a long term bear market in German property investment and the fact that these funds offered short term liquidity to unit holders but had low levels of liquidity in the fund. A more controversial suggestion was that the crisis was exacerbated by a perception that the valuations of the fund were too infrequent and inaccurate. As units are priced by reference to these valuations with no secondary market, the valuation process is central to the process. There is no direct evidence that these funds were over-valued but there is circumstantial evidence and this paper examines the indirect evidence of the process to see whether the hypothesis that valuation is an issue for the German funds holds any credibility. It also discusses whether there is a wider issue for other funds of this nature or whether it is a parochial problem confined to Germany. The conclusions are that there is reason to believe that German valuation processes make over-valuation in a recession more likely than in other countries and that more direct research into the German valuation system is required to identify the issues which need to be addressed to make the valuation system more trusted.

Back from beyond the bid-ask spread: perspectives on liquidity

Research into the topic of liquidity has greatly benefited from the availability of data. Although bid-ask spreads were inaccessible to researchers, Roll (1984) provided a conceptual model that estimated the effective bid-ask prices from regular time series data, recorded on a daily or longer interval. Later data availability improved and researchers were able to address questions regarding the factors that influenced the spreads and the relationship between spreads and risk, return and liquidity. More recently transaction data have been used to measure the effective spread and researchers have been able to refine the concepts of liquidity to include the impact of transactions on price movements (Clayton and McKinnon, 2000) on a trade-by-trade analysis. This paper aims to use techniques that combine elements from all three approaches and, by studying US data over a relatively long time period, to throw light on earlier research as well as to reveal the changes in liquidity over the period controlling for extraneous factors such as market, age and size of REIT. It also reveals some comparable results for the UK market over the same period.

Back from beyond bid-ask spread: estimating liquidity in international markets

Research on the topic of liquidity has greatly benefited from the improved availability of data. Researchers have addressed questions regarding the factors that influence bid-ask spreads and the relationship between spreads and risk, return and liquidity. Intra-day data have been used to measure the effective spread and researchers have been able to refine the concepts of liquidity to include the price impact of transactions on a trade-by-trade analysis. The growth in the creation of tax-transparent securities has greatly enhanced the visibility of securitized real estate, and has naturally led to the question of whether the increased visibility of real estate has caused market liquidity to change. Although the growth in the public market for securitized real estate has occurred in international markets, it has not been accompanied by universal publication of transaction data. Therefore this paper develops an aggregate daily data-based test for liquidity and applies the test to US data in order to check for consistency with the results of prior intra-day analysis. If the two approaches produce similar results, we can apply the same technique to markets in which less detailed data are available and offer conclusions on the liquidity of a wider set of markets.

Liquidity in commercial property markets: deconstructing the transaction process

This paper draws from a wider research programme in the UK undertaken for the Investment Property Forum examining liquidity in commercial property. One aspect of liquidity is the process by which transactions occur including both how properties are selected for sale and the time taken to transact. The paper analyses data from three organisations; a property company, a major financial institution and an asset management company, formally a major public sector pension fund. The data covers three market states and includes sales completed in 1995, 2000 and 2002 in the UK. The research interviewed key individuals within the three organisations to identify any common patterns of activity within the sale process and also identified the timing of 187 actual transactions from inception of the sale to completion. The research developed a taxonomy of the transaction process. Interviews with vendors indicated that decisions to sell were a product of a combination of portfolio, specific property and market based issues. Properties were generally not kept in a “readiness for sale” state. The average time from first decision to sell the actual property to completion had a mean time of 298 days and a median of 190 days. It is concluded that this study may underestimate the true length of the time to transact for two reasons. Firstly, the pre-marketing period is rarely recorded in transaction files. Secondly, and more fundamentally, studies of sold properties may contain selection bias. The research indicated that vendors tended to sell properties which it was perceived could be sold at a ‘fair’ price in a reasonable period of time.

Executive pay and performance: did bankers’ bonuses cause the crisis?

This paper examines the pay-performance relationship between executive cash compensation (including bonuses) and company performance for a sample of large UK companies, focusing particularly on the financial services industry, since incentive misalignment has been blamed as one of the factors causing the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Although we find that pay in the financial services sector is high, the cash-plus-bonus pay-performance sensitivity of financial firms is not significantly higher than in other sectors. Consequently, we conclude that it unlikely that incentive structures could be held responsible for inducing bank executives to focus on short-term results.