Truth commissions: a barrier to the provision of judicial assistance?

Truth commissions and criminal trials have come to be perceived as complementary transitional justice mechanisms. However, where effective prosecutions are dependent on the exchange of information and transfer of suspects between states under existing mutual legal assistance and extradition arrangements, the operation of a truth commission in the state of territoriality may act as an obstacle to international cooperation. At the same time, requests for assistance from a third state pursuing prosecutions may impact negatively on the truth commission process in the requested state by inhibiting those reluctant to become involved in criminal proceedings from offering testimony. This article demonstrates a practical discord between these bodies when they operate in different states and questions whether they can truly be considered “complementary”.

Any response? How demand response could be enhanced based on early UK experience

Policy makers are in broad agreement that demand response should play a major role in EU electricity systems and provide much needed future system flexibility. Yet, little demand response has been forthcoming in member states to date. This paper identifies some of the technical potential for demand response, based on empirical data from one UK demand aggregator. Half-hourly electricity readings of demand during normal operation and during response events have been analysed for different industry and service sectors. We review these findings in the context of ongoing EU policy developments with particular focus on the role appropriate arrangements to enhance the available resource. We conclude that in some sectors appropriate policy and regulation could triple the available response capacity and thereby lead to stronger commercial uptake of demand response.

The Article 51 reporting requirement for self-defense actions

This article examines one legal criterion for the exercise of the right of self-defense that has been significantly overlooked by commentators: the so-called “reporting requirement.” Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter provides, inter alia, that “[m]easures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council.” Although the requirement to report all self-defense actions to the Council is clearly set out in Article 51, the Charter offers no further guidance with regard to this obligation. Reference to the practice of states since the UN’s inception in 1945 is therefore essential to understanding the scope and nature of the reporting requirement. As such, this article is underpinned by an extensive original dataset of reporting practice covering the period from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2013. We know from Article 51 that states “shall” report, but do they, and—if so—in what manner? What are the various implications of reporting, of failing to report, and of the way in which states report? How are reports used, and by whom? Most importantly, this article questions the ultimate value of states reporting their self-defense actions to the Security Council in modern interstate relations.

National experiences with insurgencies and counterinsurgencies: are there “National styles”?

There are clearly identifiable patterns in the way in which insurgents operate in certain geographic areas and cultures, and in which states deal with them. These have been stressed by writing about national "ways of war", strategic culture, or national styles. Nevertheless, there have been important ruptures and changes in some of these, so that for Britain, for example, three successive phases corresponding to patterns can be identified. For France, two pronounced rivaling traditions coincided over two centuries. Algerians by contrast changed fundamentally in their fighting style with the different political ideologies they were following. Palestinian insurgency against Israel is also marked by change in approach. Russia and China possibly show the longest continuity in their handling of insurgencies.