Christian Gottlob Heyne and the changing fortunes of the commentary in the age of Altertumswissenschaft

This chapter discusses the pedagogic and scholarly priorities that informed Heyne’s commentaries on Tibullus (1755), Virgil (1767-75) and Homer (1802), as well as their initial critical reception. Like those of his teachers, Gesner and Ernesti, Heyne’s works eschew detailed textual scholarship in favour of aesthetic and historicizing appreciation of literary works as wholes. Their formal innovations – most notably the relegation of advanced philological discussions to endnotes and the inclusion of excursuses on significant historical and cultural questions – are an attempt to tailor a traditional format to the demands of an Enlightened age and the cultural-historical interests of the new Altertumswissenschaft. The chapter discusses their contrasting critical receptions in order to raise questions about the viability of Heyne’s endeavours to make a traditional medium fit new concerns.

The foundations of the rule of law

Formal conceptions of the rule of law are popular among contemporary legal philosophers. Nonetheless, the coherence of accounts of the rule of law committed to these conceptions is sometimes fractured by elements harkening back to substantive conceptions of the rule of law. I suggest that this may be because at its origins the ideal of the rule of law was substantive through and through. I also argue that those origins are older than is generally supposed. Most authors tend to trace the ideas of the rule of law and natural law back to classical Greece, but I show that they are already recognisable and intertwined as far back as Homer. Because the founding moment of the tradition of western intellectual reflection on the rule of law placed concerns about substantive justice at the centre of the rule of law ideal, it may be hard for this ideal to entirely shrug off its substantive content. It may be undesirable, too, given the rhetorical power of appeals to the rule of law. The rule of law means something quite radical in Homer; this meaning may provide a source of normative inspiration for contemporary reflections about the rule of law.