24 resultados para Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle.
Resumo:
Human ICT implants, such as RFID implants, cochlear implants, cardiac pacemakers, Deep Brain Stimulation, bionic limbs connected to the nervous system, and networked cognitive prostheses, are becoming increasingly complex. With ever-growing data processing functionalities in these implants, privacy and security become vital concerns. Electronic attacks on human ICT implants can cause significant harm, both to implant subjects and to their environment. This paper explores the vulnerabilities which human implants pose to crime victimisation in light of recent technological developments, and analyses how the law can deal with emerging challenges of what may well become the next generation of cybercrime: attacks targeted at technology implanted in the human body. After a state-of-the-art description of relevant types of human implants and a discussion how these implants challenge existing perceptions of the human body, we describe how various modes of attacks, such as sniffing, hacking, data interference, and denial of service, can be committed against implants. Subsequently, we analyse how these attacks can be assessed under current substantive and procedural criminal law, drawing on examples from UK and Dutch law. The possibilities and limitations of cybercrime provisions (eg, unlawful access, system interference) and bodily integrity provisions (eg, battery, assault, causing bodily harm) to deal with human-implant attacks are analysed. Based on this assessment, the paper concludes that attacks on human implants are not only a new generation in the evolution of cybercrime, but also raise fundamental questions on how criminal law conceives of attacks. Traditional distinctions between physical and non-physical modes of attack, between human bodies and things, between exterior and interior of the body need to be re-interpreted in light of developments in human implants. As the human body and technology become increasingly intertwined, cybercrime legislation and body-integrity crime legislation will also become intertwined, posing a new puzzle that legislators and practitioners will sooner or later have to solve.
Resumo:
European labour markets are increasingly divided between insiders in full-time permanent employment and outsiders in precarious work or unemployment. Using quantitative as well as qualitative methods, this thesis investigates the determinants and consequences of labour market policies that target these outsiders in three separate papers. The first paper looks at Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) that target the unemployed. It shows that left and right-wing parties choose different types of ALMPs depending on the policy and the welfare regime in which the party is located. These findings reconcile the conflicting theoretical expectations from the Power Resource approach and the insider-outsider theory. The second paper considers the regulation and protection of the temporary work sector. It solves the puzzle of temporary re-regulation in France, which contrasts with most other European countries that have deregulated temporary work. Permanent workers are adversely affected by the expansion of temporary work in France because of general skills and low wage coordination. The interests of temporary and permanent workers for re-regulation therefore overlap in France and left governments have an incentive to re-regulate the sector. The third paper then investigates what determines inequality between median and bottom income workers. It shows that non-inclusive economic coordination increases inequality in the absence of compensating institutions such as minimum wage regulation. The deregulation of temporary work as well as spending on employment incentives and rehabilitation also has adverse effects on inequality. Thus, policies that target outsiders have important economic effects on the rest of the workforce. Three broader contributions can be identified. First, welfare state policies may not always be in the interests of labour, so left parties may not always promote them. Second, the interests of insiders and outsiders are not necessarily at odds. Third, economic coordination may not be conducive to egalitarianism where it is not inclusive.
Resumo:
Why are some states more willing to adopt military innovations than others? Why, for example, were the great powers of Europe able to successfully reform their military practices to better adapt to and participate in the so-called military revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries while their most important extra-European competitor, the Ottoman Empire, failed to do so? This puzzle is best explained by two factors: civil-military relations and historical timing. In the Ottoman Empire, the emergence of an institutionally strong and internally cohesive army during the early stages of state formation—in the late fourteenth century—equipped the military with substantial bargaining powers. In contrast, the great powers of Europe drew heavily on private providers of military power during the military revolution and developed similar armies only by the second half of the seventeenth century, limiting the bargaining leverage of European militaries over their rulers. In essence, the Ottoman standing army was able to block reform efforts that it believed challenged its parochial interests. Absent a similar institutional challenge, European rulers initiated military reforms and motivated officers and military entrepreneurs to participate in the ongoing military revolution.
Resumo:
When the solar wind blows: The northern lights are a sign of the awesome power that the Earth receives from the solar wind. The big puzzle is how
Resumo:
Sergio Tenenbaum and Diana Raffman contend that ‘vague projects’ motivate radical revisions to orthodox, utility-maximising rational choice theory. Their argument cannot succeed if such projects merely ground instances of the paradox of the sorites, or heap. Tenenbaum and Raffman are not blind to this, and argue that Warren Quinn’s Puzzle of the Self-Torturer does not rest on the sorites. I argue that their argument both fails to generalise to most vague projects, and is ineffective in the case of the Self-Torturer itself.
Resumo:
Understanding the dynamics and diversity of marine phytoplankton is essential for predicting oceanic primary production, oxygen generation and carbon sequestration. Several top-down and bottom-up factors lead to complex phytoplankton dynamics. Complexities further arise from inter-species interactions within phytoplankton communities. Consequently, some of the basic questions on phytoplankton diversity, identified long ago, still puzzle the ecologists: for example, what regulates the diversity in simple systems where species compete for limiting resources? In this context, allelopathic interaction among phytoplankton species has been identified as a potential driver of their dynamics and regulator of their diversity. This chapter deals with the importance of allelopathy in regulating the outcome of nutrient competition among phytoplankton species, through analysis of a resource-competition model. It demonstrates that, through the mechanism of pseudo-mixotrophy - proposed earlier by the author - allelopathy provides essential growth advantage to weaker competitors, and stabilizes resource competition, which ensures the coexistence of two phytoplankton on a single nutrient. In simple nutrient-phytoplankton interactions where higher-trophic influences are negligible, this mechanism theoretically promotes phytoplankton diversity, and can potentially support high diversity in natural phytoplankton communities.
Resumo:
Application of the Bernhardt et al. (Journal of Financial Economics 2006; 80(3): 657–675) test of herding to the calendar-year annual output growth and inflation forecasts suggests forecasters tend to exaggerate their differences, except at the shortest horizon, when they tend to herd. We consider whether these types of behaviour can help to explain the puzzle that professional forecasters sometimes make point predictions and histogram forecasts which are mutually inconsistent.
Resumo:
Why has the extreme right Greek Golden Dawn, a party with clear links to fascism experienced a rise defying all theories that claim that such a party is unlikely to win in post-WWII Europe? And, if we accept that economic crisis is an explanation for this, why has such a phenomenon not occurred in other countries that have similar conducive conditions, such as Portugal and Spain? This article addresses this puzzle by (a) carrying out a controlled comparison of Greece, Portugal and Spain and (b) showing that the rise of the extreme right is not a question of intensity of economic crisis. Rather it is the nature of the crisis, i.e. economic versus overall crisis of democratic representation that facilitates the rise of the extreme right. We argue that extreme right parties are more likely to experience an increase in their support when economic crisis culminates into an overall crisis of democratic representation. Economic crisis is likely to become a political crisis when severe issues of governability impact upon the ability of the state to fulfil its social contract obligations. This breach of the social contract is accompanied by declining levels of trust in state institutions, resulting in party system collapse.
Resumo:
What explains cross-national variation in wage inequality? Research in comparative political economy stresses the importance of the welfare state and wage coordination in reducing not only disposable income inequality but also gross earnings inequality. However, the cross-national variation in gross earnings inequality between median and low income workers is at odds with this conventional wisdom: the German coordinated market economy is now more unequal in this type of inequality than the UK, a liberal market economy. To solve this puzzle, I argue that non-inclusive coordination benefits median but not bottom income workers and is as a result associated with higher – rather than lower - wage inequality. I find support for this argument using a large N quantitative analysis of wage inequality in a panel of Western European countries. Results are robust to the inclusion of numerous controls, country fixed effects, and also hold with a sample of OECD countries. Taken together these findings force us to reconsider the relationship between coordination and wage inequality at the bottom of the income distribution.