European Union

Determination of shadow notifications of domestic support for agriculture in the European Union under the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreement on Agriculture, and consideration of the potential impact of an agreement in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations.

How the European Union does not work: national bargaining success in the Council of Ministers

We know surprisingly little about whether the content of European Union legislation reflects the preferences of some Member States more than others. The few studies that have examined national bargaining success rates for EU legislation have conceptual and methodological weaknesses. To redress these problems I use a salience-weighted measure to gauge the relative success of Member States in translating their national preferences into legislation, and test two plausible, competing hypotheses about how the EU works: that no state consistently achieves more of what it really wants than any other, and that large Member States tend to beat small ones. Neither hypothesis receives empirical support. Not only do states differ far more significantly in their respective levels of bargaining success than previously recognised, but some of the smaller states are the ones that do especially well. The paper‟s main contribution -- demonstrating that the EU does not work as most people think it does -- sets the stage for new research questions, both positive and normative. In the last section I make a tentative start answering two of the most important: which factors explain the surprising empirical results, and whether differential national bargaining success might undermine the legitimacy of the integration process.

Consequences of a coexistence policy on the adoption of GMHT crops in the European Union

This article examines the adoption of genetically modified herbicide tolerant (GMHT) crops in the European Union (EU) prior to its commercial release. A set of potential drivers including the implementation of coexistence measures by farmers, farmers’ own motivational factors (e.g. economic, environmental and technical factors) and perceived social pressure to accept or reject adoption may influence European Union farmers’ willingness to adopt GMHT oilseed rape and GMHT maize. The analysis includes economic and sociological factors. Results show that coexistence measures may hamper GMHT adoption in the EU.

Updated empirical model of genetically-modified maize grain production practices to achieve European Union labeling thresholds

An updated empirical approach is proposed for specifying coexistence requirements for genetically modified (GM) maize (Zea mays L.) production to ensure compliance with the 0.9% labeling threshold for food and feed in the European Union. The model improves on a previously published (Gustafson et al., 2006) empirical model by adding recent data sources to supplement the original database and including the following additional cases: (i) more than one GM maize source field adjacent to the conventional or organic field, (ii) the possibility of so-called “stacked” varieties with more than one GM trait, and (iii) lower pollen shed in the non-GM receptor field. These additional factors lead to the possibility for somewhat wider combinations of isolation distance and border rows than required in the original version of the empirical model. For instance, in the very conservative case of a 1-ha square non-GM maize field surrounded on all four sides by homozygous GM maize with 12 m isolation (the effective isolation distance for a single GM field), non-GM border rows of 12 m are required to be 95% confident of gene flow less than 0.9% in the non-GM field (with adventitious presence of 0.3%). Stacked traits of higher GM mass fraction and receptor fields of lower pollen shed would require a greater number of border rows to comply with the 0.9% threshold, and an updated extension to the model is provided to quantify these effects.