Redefining the outer boundaries of EU Law: the Zambrano, McCarthy and Dereci trilogy

In its three recent rulings in the cases of Zambrano, McCarthy, and Dereci, the Court appears to have been determined to redefine the external boundaries of EU law, in cases involving the family reunification rights of Union citizens.These three judgments can be read as an indication that for Article 20 TFEU to apply, there is no longer a requirement of a cross-border element on the facts of the case, and that it is sufficient if the contested national measure has the effect of ‘depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance’ of their rights (the ‘Zambrano principle’).The cases can, at the same time, also be read as a confirmation that the free movement provisions do – still – require a cross-border element and, in particular, the exercise of inter-State movement, in order to apply. Though the result in these cases has not been entirely unexpected, especially in the aftermath of the Rottmann ruling, it is rather problematic in that, although it is obvious that the Court wishes to redraw the line dividing the national and EU spheres of competence, it does not make it entirely clear where this line now lies and leaves many essential questions unanswered, which will obviously require some time to be resolved. EU lawyers are consequently, once more, left with having to decipher as best as they can the real intentions of the Court in this new line of case-law, which has been further complicated by the fact that what the Court seems to have given with one hand in Zambrano (and before that in Rottmann), has taken it back to a large extent through its rulings in McCarthy and Dereci, which appear to confine the former two cases to their own exceptional facts.6 Moreover, the ‘reverse discrimination Pandora’s box’, the opening of which appears to have been the real target of these references, remains untouched: instead of providing a direct solution to this problem, the Court has chosen to – once again – broaden the scope of the Treaty provisions in order to include within it as many situations as possible and, thus, prevent the emergence of this type of differential treatment on a case-by-case basis.As will be explained, nonetheless, this is by no means an appropriate solution to the reverse discrimination conundrum.

‘That’s definite discrimination’: practice under the umbrella of inclusion

Inclusive practice is well embedded across society and has developed over time. However, although policy and public view have moved forward, the way organisations address the agenda for inclusion often represents a superficial interpretation of this concept. Qualitative data were gathered using new ethnography to explore the experiences of a library-based reading group for visually impaired readers. The voices of the individuals shed light on the individual and collective experience of reading. These insights challenge the traditional views of distinct provision that are designed to address targets for inclusion of individuals with disabilities. We argue for a clearer focus on the unintentional consequences of practice in the name of inclusion that leave individuals feeling marginalised. This paper suggests the alternative focus on social justice as offering a discourse that focuses on society and away from the individual.

Youth justice reform: redressing age discrimination against children?

This article considers whether the system of reprimands and final warnings in the youth justice system in England and Wales constitutes age discrimination for the purposes of human rights law. Whilst much youth justice discourse has addressed the use of diversionary measures that steer children away from formal justice processes, little attention has been paid to measures which negatively discriminate against children, in comparison to adults, without reasonable justification. The discussion contextualizes the issue within discourses on the sociology of childhood and youth justice, and considers why there is a general reluctance to recognize children as ‘victims’ of age discrimination.

The notions of 'restriction' and 'discrimination' in the context of the free movement of persons provisions: from a relationship of interdependence to one of (almost complete) independence

This article aims to analyse how the meaning of the notions of ‘restrictions’ and ‘discrimination’ in EU free movement law has developed through the years, and to explore how the relationship between them has evolved. It is explained that the two concepts under examination had originally been closely intertwined, in the sense that one defined the other, the element holding them together being the aim of the relevant provisions to liberalise the inter-State movement of persons in the EU, as part of the process of establishing an internal market. Yet, more recently, the way that the Court has chosen to delimit their scope, illustrates that each of these notions can now have a life of its own, meaning that ‘discrimination’ can include discriminatory measures which do not lead to restrictions that are contrary to the free movement provisions, and ‘restriction’ can cover national measures that are not discriminatory.

Conflicts of law and the mutual recognition of same-sex unions in the EU

My thesis uses legal arguments to demonstrate a requirement for recognition of same-sex marriages and registered partnerships between EU Member States. I draw on the US experience, where arguments for recognition of marriages void in some states previously arose in relation to interracial marriages. I show how there the issue of recognition today depends on conflicts of law and its interface with US constitutional freedoms against discrimination. I introduce the themes of the importance of domicile, the role of the public policy exception, vested rights, and relevant US constitutional freedoms. Recognition in the EU also depends on managing the tension between private international law and freedoms guaranteed by higher norms, in this case the EU Treaties and the European Convention on Human Rights. I set out the inconsistencies between various private international law systems and the problems this creates. Other difficulties are caused by the use of nationality as a connecting factor to determine personal capacity, and the overuse of the public policy exception. I argue that EU Law can constrain the use of conflicts law or public policy by any Member State where these are used to deny effect to same-sex unions validly formed elsewhere. I address the fact that family law falls only partly within Union competence, that existing EU Directives have had limited success at achieving full equality and that powers to implement new measures have not been used to their full potential. However, Treaty provisions outlawing discrimination on grounds of nationality can be interpreted so as to require recognition in many cases. Treaty citizenship rights can also be interpreted favourably to mandate recognition, once private international law is itself recognised as an obstacle to free movement. Finally, evolving interpretations of the European Convention on Human Rights may also support claims for cross-border recognition of existing relationships.