Curriculum theory, curriculum policy and the problem of ill-disciplined thinking

This paper examines the implications of policy fracture and arms length governance within the decision making processes currently shaping curriculum design within the English education system. In particular it argues that an unresolved ‘ideological fracture’ at government level has been passed down to school leaders whose response to the dilemma is distorted by the target-driven agenda of arms length agencies. Drawing upon the findings of a large scale on-line survey of history teaching in English secondary schools, this paper illustrates the problems that occur when policy making is divorced from curriculum theory, and in particular from any consideration of the nature of knowledge. Drawing on the social realist theory of knowledge elaborated by Young (2008), we argue that the rapid spread of alternative curricular arrangements, implemented in the absence of an understanding of curriculum theory, undermines the value of disciplined thinking to the detriment of many young people, particularly those in areas of social and economic deprivation.

Formal theory building for the avalanche game: explaining counter-intuitive behaviour of a complex system using geometrical and human behavioural/physiological effects

In 'Avalanche', an object is lowered, players staying in contact throughout. Normally the task is easily accomplished. However, with larger groups counter-intuitive behaviours appear. The paper proposes a formal theory for the underlying causal mechanisms. The aim is to not only provide an explicit, testable hypothesis for the source of the observed modes of behaviour-but also to exemplify the contribution that formal theory building can make to understanding complex social phenomena. Mapping reveals the importance of geometry to the Avalanche game; each player has a pair of balancing loops, one involved in lowering the object, the other ensuring contact. For more players, sets of balancing loops interact and these can allow dominance by reinforcing loops, causing the system to chase upwards towards an ever-increasing goal. However, a series of other effects concerning human physiology and behaviour (HPB) is posited as playing a role. The hypothesis is therefore rigorously tested using simulation. For simplicity a 'One Degree of Freedom' case is examined, allowing all of the effects to be included whilst rendering the analysis more transparent. Formulation and experimentation with the model gives insight into the behaviours. Multi-dimensional rate/level analysis indicates that there is only a narrow region in which the system is able to move downwards. Model runs reproduce the single 'desired' mode of behaviour and all three of the observed 'problematic' ones. Sensitivity analysis gives further insight into the system's modes and their causes. Behaviour is seen to arise only when the geometric effects apply (number of players greater than degrees of freedom of object) in combination with a range of HPB effects. An analogy exists between the co-operative behaviour required here and various examples: conflicting strategic objectives in organizations; Prisoners' Dilemma and integrated bargaining situations. Additionally, the game may be relatable in more direct algebraic terms to situations involving companies in which the resulting behaviours are mediated by market regulations. Finally, comment is offered on the inadequacy of some forms of theory building and the case is made for formal theory building involving the use of models, analysis and plausible explanations to create deep understanding of social phenomena.

An experiment on subjective game valuations

We report experimental results on a prisoners' dilemma implemented in a way which allows us to elicit incentive−compatible valuations of the game. We test the hypothesis that players' valuations coincide with their Nash equilibrium earnings. Our results offer significantly less support for this hypothesis than for the prediction of Dominant Strategy (DS) play.

The stability of ecosystems: a brief overview of the paradox of enrichment

In theory, enrichment of resource in a predator-prey model leads to destabilization of the system, thereby collapsing the trophic interaction, a phenomenon referred to as "the paradox of enrichment". After it was first proposed by Rosenzweig (1971), a number of subsequent studies were carried out on this dilemma over many decades. In this article, we review these theoretical and experimental works and give a brief overview of the proposed solutions to the paradox. The mechanisms that have been discussed are modifications of simple predator-prey models in the presence of prey that is inedible, invulnerable, unpalatable and toxic. Another class of mechanisms includes an incorporation of a ratio-dependent functional form, inducible defence of prey and density-dependent mortality of the predator. Moreover, we find a third set of explanations based on complex population dynamics including chaos in space and time. We conclude that, although any one of the various mechanisms proposed so far might potentially prevent destabilization of the predator-prey dynamics following enrichment, in nature different mechanisms may combine to cause stability, even when a system is enriched. The exact mechanisms, which may differ among systems, need to be disentangled through extensive field studies and laboratory experiments coupled with realistic theoretical models.

Physiological and behavioral patterns of corruption

We study the behavior and emotional arousal of the participants in an experimental auction, leading to an asymmetric social dilemma involving an auctioneer and two bidders. An antisocial transfer (bribe) which is beneficial for the auctioneer (official) is paid, if promised, by the winner of the auction. Some pro-social behavior on both the auctioneers' and the bidders' sides is observed even in the absence of any punishment mechanism (Baseline, Treatment 0). However, pro-social behavior is adopted by the vast majority of subjects when the loser of the auction can inspect the transaction between the winner and the auctioneer (Inspection, Treatment 1). The inspection and punishment mechanism is such that, if a bribe is (not) revealed, both corrupt agents (the denouncing bidder) lose(s) this period's payoffs. This renders the inspection option unprofitable for the loser and is rarely used, especially towards the end of the session, when pro-social behavior becomes pervasive. Subjects' emotional arousal was obtained through skin conductance responses. Generally speaking, our findings suggest that stronger emotions are associated with decisions deviating from pure monetary reward maximization, rather than with (un)ethical behavior per se. In fact, using response times as a measure of the subject's reflection during the decision-making process, we can associate emotional arousal with the conflict between primary or instinctive and secondary or contemplative motivations and, more specifically, with deviations from the subject's pure monetary interest.

Heaps and Chains: Is the Chaining Argument for parity a sorites?

I argue that the Ruth Chang’s Chaining Argument for her parity view of value incomparability trades illicitly on the vagueness of the predicate ‘is comparable with’. Chang is alert to this danger and argues that the predicate is not vague, but this defense does not succeed. The Chaining Argument also faces a dilemma. The predicate is either vague or precise. If it is vague, then the argument is most plausibly a sorites. If it is precise, then the argument is either question begging or dialectically ineffective. I argue that no chaining-type argument can succeed.

Corruption and individual ethics: insights from a public procurement auction

This article proposes an auction model where two firms compete for obtaining the license for a public project and an auctioneer acting as a public official representing the political power, decides the winner of the contest. Players as firms face a social dilemma in the sense that the higher is the bribe offered, the higher would be the willingness of a pure monetary maximizer public official to give her the license. However, it implies inducing a cost of reducing all players’ payoffs as far as our model includes an endogenous externality, which depends on bribe. All players’ payoffs decrease with the bribe (and increase with higher quality). We find that the presence of bribe aversion in either the officials’ or the firms’ utility function shifts equilibrium towards more pro-social behavior. When the quality and bribe-bid strategy space is discrete, multiple equilibria emerge including more pro-social bids than would be predicted under a continuous strategy space.

Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.