An inspector's-eye view - The prospective enforcement of work-related fatality cases

This paper concerns the prospective implementation of the proposed 'corporate killing' offence. These proposals suggested that the Health and Safety Executive (HSE)-the body currently responsible for regulating work-related health and safety issues-should handle cases in which a 'corporate killing' charge is a possibility. Relatively little attention has been paid to this issue of implementation. An empirical investigation was undertaken to assess the compatibility of the HSE's methodology and enforcement philosophy with the new offence. It was found that inspectors categorize themselves as enforcers of criminal law, see enforcement action as valuable and support the new offence, but disagree over its use. They also broadly supported the HSE taking responsibility for the new offence. This suggests that 'corporate killing' may not necessarily be incompatible with the HSE's modus operandi, and there may be positive reasons forgiving the HSE this responsibility.

Truth commissions: a barrier to the provision of judicial assistance?

Truth commissions and criminal trials have come to be perceived as complementary transitional justice mechanisms. However, where effective prosecutions are dependent on the exchange of information and transfer of suspects between states under existing mutual legal assistance and extradition arrangements, the operation of a truth commission in the state of territoriality may act as an obstacle to international cooperation. At the same time, requests for assistance from a third state pursuing prosecutions may impact negatively on the truth commission process in the requested state by inhibiting those reluctant to become involved in criminal proceedings from offering testimony. This article demonstrates a practical discord between these bodies when they operate in different states and questions whether they can truly be considered “complementary”.

The vulnerable subject of negligence law

The approach taken by English courts to the duty of care question in negligence has been subject to harsh criticism in recent years. This article examines this fundamental issue in tort law, drawing upon Canadian and Australian jurisprudence by way of comparison. From this analysis, the concept of vulnerability is developed as a productive means of understanding the duty of care. Vulnerability is of increasing interest in legal and political theory and it is of particular relevance to the law of negligence. In addition to aiding doctrinal coherence, vulnerability – with its focus on relationships and care – has the potential to broaden the way in which the subject of tort law is conceived because it challenges dominant assumptions about autonomy as being prior to the relationships on which it is dependent.

Could the presumption of innocence protect the guilty?

At criminal trial, we demand that those accused of criminal wrongdoing be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond any reasonable doubt. What are the moral and/or political grounds of this demand? One popular and natural answer to this question focuses on the moral badness or wrongness of convicting and punishing innocent persons, which I call the direct moral grounding. In this essay, I suggest that this direct moral grounding, if accepted, may well have important ramifications for other areas of the criminal justice process, and in particular those parts in which we (through our legislatures and judges) decide how much punishment to distribute to guilty persons. If, as the direct moral grounding suggests, we should prefer under-punishment to over-punishment under conditions of uncertainty, due to the moral seriousness of errors which inappropriately punish persons, then we should also prefer erring on the side of under-punishment when considering how much to punish those who may justly be punished. Some objections to this line of thinking are considered.

The international law implications of the Turkish/Kurdish conflict

This article considers the threaties and customs governing armed conflict in the context of the long standing insurgency in southeast Turkey. The first part of the article analyzes the existing treaty and customary law concerning the threshold of an armed conflict and concludes that the insurgency in Southeast Turkey existing since 1984 rises to the level of an armed conflict based on criteria identified both in treaty and customary international law. The next consideration is the classification of this conflict and this part concludes that this situation is a non-international armed conflict due to lack of involvement of forces of another country. Finally, this article considers international humanitarian law applicable to this non-international armed conflict and reveals that as a result of the monumental International Committee of the Red Cross customary humanitarian law study, particularly with respect to the law of targeting, that the rules applicable to international and non-international armed conflict have never been closer.

Attacking human implants: a new generation of cybercrime

Human ICT implants, such as RFID implants, cochlear implants, cardiac pacemakers, Deep Brain Stimulation, bionic limbs connected to the nervous system, and networked cognitive prostheses, are becoming increasingly complex. With ever-growing data processing functionalities in these implants, privacy and security become vital concerns. Electronic attacks on human ICT implants can cause significant harm, both to implant subjects and to their environment. This paper explores the vulnerabilities which human implants pose to crime victimisation in light of recent technological developments, and analyses how the law can deal with emerging challenges of what may well become the next generation of cybercrime: attacks targeted at technology implanted in the human body. After a state-of-the-art description of relevant types of human implants and a discussion how these implants challenge existing perceptions of the human body, we describe how various modes of attacks, such as sniffing, hacking, data interference, and denial of service, can be committed against implants. Subsequently, we analyse how these attacks can be assessed under current substantive and procedural criminal law, drawing on examples from UK and Dutch law. The possibilities and limitations of cybercrime provisions (eg, unlawful access, system interference) and bodily integrity provisions (eg, battery, assault, causing bodily harm) to deal with human-implant attacks are analysed. Based on this assessment, the paper concludes that attacks on human implants are not only a new generation in the evolution of cybercrime, but also raise fundamental questions on how criminal law conceives of attacks. Traditional distinctions between physical and non-physical modes of attack, between human bodies and things, between exterior and interior of the body need to be re-interpreted in light of developments in human implants. As the human body and technology become increasingly intertwined, cybercrime legislation and body-integrity crime legislation will also become intertwined, posing a new puzzle that legislators and practitioners will sooner or later have to solve.

Humanitarian law, human rights law and the bifurcation of armed conflict

This article offers a fresh examination of the distinction drawn in international humanitarian law (IHL) between international and non-international armed conflicts. In particular, it considers this issue from the under-explored perspective of the influence of international human rights law (IHRL). It is demonstrated how, over time, the effect of IHRL on this distinction in IHL has changed dramatically. Whereas traditionally IHRL encouraged the partial elimination of the distinction between types of armed conflict, more recently it has been invoked in debates in a manner that would preserve what remains of the distinction. By exploring this important issue, it is hoped that the present article will contribute to the ongoing debates regarding the future development of the law of non-international armed conflict.