54 resultados para Contractual penalty
Resumo:
Although much literature on construction procurement is based on personal experiences, there is little data available to undertake realistic comparison between regions or from one year to another. A survey was undertaken in the UK to examine the feasibility of developing a replicable survey technique that will enable longitudinal studies and international comparisons. The survey showed that a majority felt traditional procurement methods were inappropriate. However, traditional general contracting is still the most common form of procurement. There was strong agreement that economic muscle compels weaker contracting parties to accept onerous contractual terms. There is no relationship between the size of a project and its procurement method, contrary to popular belief. The findings indicate that wider surveys would generate useful data about attitudes.
Resumo:
The context of construction management (CM) reveals that this method of procurement is as much a management philosophy as a contract structure. It is important to consider legal and contractual issues in this context. The interplay between management and law is complex and often misunderstood. Before considering specific issues, the use of contractual remedies in business agreements is discussed. In addition, the extent to which standardising a form of contract detracts or contributes to the success of projects is also considered. The dearth of judicial decisions, and the lack of a standard form, render it difficult to be specific about legal issues. Therefore, the main discussion of legal issues is centred around a recently completed research project which involved eliciting the views of a cross-section of experienced construction management clients, consultants and trade contractors. These interviews are used as the basis for highlighting some of the most important legal points to consider when setting up CM projects. The interviews revealed that the advantage of CM is the proximity of the client to the trade contractors and the disadvantage is that it depends on a high degree of professionalism and experience; qualities which are unfortunately difficult to find in the UK construction industry.
Resumo:
Financial Protection in the UK Building Industry provides comprehensive treatment of a complex aspect of construction management which is increasingly important in modern construction contracts. The term 'Financial Protection' refers to refers to the various mechanisms by which funds are made available to ensure the due performance of a partys contractual obligations. This book is based on material written for a research project funded by the Reading Construction Forum. Financial Protection in the UK Building Industry looks at the legal and economic background to the problem of providing financial protection to clients to guard against poor performance and or the insolvency of contractors, consultants and sub-contractors. The inclusion of practical guidance notes and summaries makes this a valuable guide for the construction professional as well as for the researcher. * provides in-depth analysis of financial protection measures * explores the ways in which financial protection can increase efficiency in the industry * financial protection in construction is beset with problems - this book points toward practical solutions
Resumo:
The basic premise of transaction-cost theory is that the decision to outsource, rather than to undertake work in-house, is determined by the relative costs incurred in each of these forms of economic organization. In construction the "make or buy" decision invariably leads to a contract. Reducing the costs of entering into a contractual relationship (transaction costs) raises the value of production and is therefore desirable. Commonly applied methods of contractor selection may not minimise the costs of contracting. Research evidence suggests that although competitive tendering typically results in the lowest bidder winning the contract this may not represent the lowest project cost after completion. Multi-parameter and quantitative models for contractor selection have been developed to identify the best (or least risky) among bidders. A major area in which research is still needed is in investigating the impact of different methods of contractor selection on the costs of entering into a contract and the decision to outsource.
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The SCoTLASS problem-principal component analysis modified so that the components satisfy the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) constraint-is reformulated as a dynamical system on the unit sphere. The LASSO inequality constraint is tackled by exterior penalty function. A globally convergent algorithm is developed based on the projected gradient approach. The algorithm is illustrated numerically and discussed on a well-known data set. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Resumo:
Formal and analytical risk models prescribe how risk should be incorporated in construction bids. However, the actual process of how contractors and their clients negotiate and agree on price is complex, and not clearly articulated in the literature. Using participant observation, the entire tender process was shadowed in two leading UK construction firms. This was compared to propositions in analytical models and significant differences were found. 670 hours of work observed in both firms revealed three stages of the bidding process. Bidding activities were categorized and their extent estimated as deskwork (32%), calculations (19%), meetings (14%), documents (13%), off-days (11%), conversations (7%), correspondence (3%) and travel (1%). Risk allowances of 1-2% were priced in some bids and three tiers of risk apportionment in bids were identified. However, priced risks may sometimes be excluded from the final bidding price to enhance competitiveness. Thus, although risk apportionment affects a contractor’s pricing strategy, other complex, microeconomic factors also affect price. Instead of pricing in contingencies, risk was priced mostly through contractual rather than price mechanisms, to reflect commercial imperatives. The findings explain why some assumptions underpinning analytical models may not be sustainable in practice and why what actually happens in practice is important for those who seek to model the pricing of construction bids.
Resumo:
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to show the extent to which clients amend standard form contracts in practice, the locus of the amendments, and how contractors respond to the amendments when putting together a bid. Design/methodology/approach – Four live observational case studies were carried out in two of the top 20 UK construction firms. The whole process used to review the proposed terms and conditions of the contract was shadowed using participant observation, interview and documentary analysis. Findings – All four cases showed strong evidence of amendments relating mostly to payment and contractual aspects: 83 amendments in Case Study 1 (CS1), 80 in CS2, 15 in CS3 and 29 in CS4. This comprised clauses that were modified (37 per cent), substituted (23 per cent), deleted (7 per cent) and new additions (33 per cent). Risks inherent in the amendments were mostly addressed through contractual rather than price mechanisms, to reflect commercial imperatives. “Qualifications” and “clarifications” were included in the tender submissions for post-tender negotiations. Thus, the amendments did not necessarily influence price. There was no evidence of a “standard-form contract“ being used as such, although clients may draw on published “standard-form contracts” to derive the forms of contract actually used in practice. Practical implications – Contractors should pay attention to clauses relating to contractual and financial aspects when reviewing tender documents. Clients should draft equitable payment and contractual terms and conditions to reduce risk of dispute. Indeed, it is prudent for clients not to pass on inestimable risks. Originality/value – A better understanding of the extent and locus of amendments in standard form contracts, and how contractors respond, is provided.
Resumo:
This research examines dynamics associated with new representational technologies in complex organizations through a study of the use of a Single Model Environment, prototyping and simulation tools in the mega-project to construct Terminal 5 at Heathrow Airport, London. The ambition of the client, BAA. was to change industrial practices reducing project costs and time to delivery through new contractual arrangements and new digitally-enabled collaborative ways of working. The research highlights changes over time and addresses two areas of 'turbulence' in the use of: 1) technologies, where there is a dynamic tension between desires to constantly improve, change and update digital technologies and the need to standardise practices, maintaining and defending the overall integrity of the system; and 2) representations, where dynamics result from the responsibilities and liabilities associated with sharing of digital representations and a lack of trust in the validity of data from other firms. These dynamics are tracked across three stages of this well-managed and innovative project and indicate the generic need to treat digital infrastructure as an ongoing strategic issue.
Resumo:
The efficacy of explicit and implicit learning paradigms was examined during the very early stages of learning the perceptual-motor anticipation task of predicting ball direction from temporally occluded footage of soccer penalty kicks. In addition, the effect of instructional condition on point-of-gaze during learning was examined. A significant improvement in horizontal prediction accuracy was observed in the explicit learning group; however, similar improvement was evident in a placebo group who watched footage of soccer matches. Only the explicit learning intervention resulted in changes in eye movement behaviour and increased awareness of relevant postural cues. Results are discussed in terms of methodological and practical issues regarding the employment of implicit perceptual training interventions. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Resumo:
The aim of this chapter is to examine what the construction sector brings to our understanding of the procurement of complex performance. The chapter is divided into the following parts: fi rst, an overview of the various matters that contribute to the complexity of construction procurement is provided. Second, the most important contractual incentive schemes found in construction contracts are discussed, and this is followed by, third, an examination of the changes associated with the shift towards procuring complex performance (PCP) (service provision). Fourth, the main findings of the authors’ recent research on PCP contracts are summarised, followed by the conclusion. It should be noted that the procurement of services is referred to as ‘PCP’ in this chapter.
Resumo:
Near isogenic lines (NILs) varying for alleles for reduced height (Rht) and photoperiod insensitivity (Ppd-D1a) in a cvar Mercia background (rht (tall), Rht-B1b, Rht-D1b, Rht-B1c, Rht8c+Ppd-D1a, Rht-D1c, Rht12) were compared at a field site in Berkshire, UK, but within different systems (‘organic’, O, in 2005/06, 2006/07 and 2007/08 growing seasons v. ‘conventional’, C, in 2005/06, 2006/07, 2007/08 and 2008/09). In 2007 and 2008, further NILs (rht (tall), Rht-B1b, Rht-D1b, Rht-B1c, Rht-B1b+Rht-D1b, Rht-D1b+Rht-B1c) in both Maris Huntsman and Maris Widgeon backgrounds were added. The contrasting systems allowed NILs to be tested in diverse rotational and agronomic, but commercially relevant, contexts, particularly with regard to the assumed temporal distribution of nitrogen availability, and competition from weeds. For grain, nitrogen-use efficiency (NUE; grain dry matter (DM) yield/available N; where available N=fertilizer N+soil mineral N), recovery of N in the grain (grain N yield/available N), N utilization efficiency to produce grain (NUtEg; grain DM yield/above-ground crop N yield), N harvest index (grain N yield/above-ground crop N yield) and dry matter harvest index (DMHI; grain DM yield/above-ground crop DM yield) all peaked at final crop heights of 800–950 mm. Maximum NUE occurred at greater crop heights in the organic system than in the conventional system, such that even adding just a semi-dwarfing allele (Rht-D1b) to the shortest background, Mercia, reduced NUE in the organic system. The mechanism of dwarfing (gibberellin sensitive or insensitive) made little difference to the relationship between NUE and its components with crop height. For above-ground biomass: dwarfing alleles had a greater effect on DM accumulation compared with N accumulation such that all dwarfing alleles could reduce nitrogen utilization efficiency (NUtE; crop DM yield/crop N yield). This was particularly evident at anthesis in the conventional system when there was no significant penalty for severe dwarfism for N accumulation, despite a 3-tonne (t)/ha reduction in biomass compared to the tallest lines. Differences between genotypes for recovery of N in the grain were thus mostly a function of net N uptake after anthesis rather than of remobilized N. This effect was compounded as dwarfing, except when coupled with Ppd-D1a, was associated with delayed anthesis. In the organic experiments there was greater reliance on N accumulated before anthesis, and genotype effects on NUE were confounded with effects on N accumulated by weeds, which was negatively associated with crop height. Optimum height for maximizing wheat NUE and its components, as manipulated by Rht alleles, thus depend on growing system, and crop utilization (i.e. biomass or grain production).
Resumo:
The problem of a manipulator operating in a noisy workspace and required to move from an initial fixed position P0 to a final position Pf is considered. However, Pf is corrupted by noise, giving rise to Pˆf, which may be obtained by sensors. The use of learning automata is proposed to tackle this problem. An automaton is placed at each joint of the manipulator which moves according to the action chosen by the automaton (forward, backward, stationary) at each instant. The simultaneous reward or penalty of the automata enables avoiding any inverse kinematics computations that would be necessary if the distance of each joint from the final position had to be calculated. Three variable-structure learning algorithms are used, i.e., the discretized linear reward-penalty (DLR-P, the linear reward-penalty (LR-P ) and a nonlinear scheme. Each algorithm is separately tested with two (forward, backward) and three forward, backward, stationary) actions.
Resumo:
The authors consider the problem of a robot manipulator operating in a noisy workspace. The manipulator is required to move from an initial position P(i) to a final position P(f). P(i) is assumed to be completely defined. However, P(f) is obtained by a sensing operation and is assumed to be fixed but unknown. The authors approach to this problem involves the use of three learning algorithms, the discretized linear reward-penalty (DLR-P) automaton, the linear reward-penalty (LR-P) automaton and a nonlinear reinforcement scheme. An automaton is placed at each joint of the robot and by acting as a decision maker, plans the trajectory based on noisy measurements of P(f).
Resumo:
The orthodox approach for incentivising Demand Side Participation (DSP) programs is that utility losses from capital, installation and planning costs should be recovered under financial incentive mechanisms which aim to ensure that utilities have the right incentives to implement DSP activities. The recent national smart metering roll-out in the UK implies that this approach needs to be reassessed since utilities will recover the capital costs associated with DSP technology through bills. This paper introduces a reward and penalty mechanism focusing on residential users. DSP planning costs are recovered through payments from those consumers who do not react to peak signals. Those consumers who do react are rewarded by paying lower bills. Because real-time incentives to residential consumers tend to fail due to the negligible amounts associated with net gains (and losses) or individual users, in the proposed mechanism the regulator determines benchmarks which are matched against responses to signals and caps the level of rewards/penalties to avoid market distortions. The paper presents an overview of existing financial incentive mechanisms for DSP; introduces the reward/penalty mechanism aimed at fostering DSP under the hypothesis of smart metering roll-out; considers the costs faced by utilities for DSP programs; assesses linear rate effects and value changes; introduces compensatory weights for those consumers who have physical or financial impediments; and shows findings based on simulation runs on three discrete levels of elasticity.
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The impending decline of the tenanted sector in British agriculture has been forecast for many years. Much debate has surrounded the issues and ensuing legislation has repeatedly attempted to stave-off what some view as the inevitable demise of tenant farmers. Following a flurry of activity after the Northfield Report of 1979 and culminating in the Agricultural Holdings Acts of 1984 and 1986, the debate has recently been fuelled by a strongly pro-market lobby. With the public support of successive Ministers of Agriculture, this lobby has advocated a rejection of the former state intervention in the landlord/tenant relationship in favour of freedom of contract, an option that now appears increasingly likely to reach the statute books. This paper reviews the significant elements of the debate, attempting to explain the principal reasons for the failure of earlier legislation and the primary shortcomings of the current emphasis of consultation. The paper concludes that while there are some significant legislative disincentives to letting land, the freeing-up of contracts in isolation from other, non-contractual issues, will not result in the increase in lettings purportedly desired by the Ministers and their acolytes.