Late Quaternary highstands at Lake Chilwa, Malawi: frequency, timing and possible forcing mechanisms in the last 44ka

The extensive shoreline deposits of Lake Chilwa, southern Malawi, a shallow water body today covering 600 km2 of a basin of 7500 km2, are investigated for their record of late Quaternary highstands. OSL dating, applied to 36 samples from five sediment cores from the northern and western marginal sand ridges, reveal a highstand record spanning 44 ka. Using two different grouping methods, highstand phases are identified at 43.7–33.3 ka, 26.2–21.0 ka and 17.9–12.0 ka (total error method) or 38.4–35.5 ka, 24.3–22.3 ka, 16.2–15.1 ka and 13.5–12.7 ka (Finite Mixture Model age components) with two further discrete events recorded at 11.01 ± 0.76 ka and 8.52 ± 0.56 ka. Highstands are comparable to the timing of wet phases from other basins in East and southern Africa, demonstrating wet conditions in the region before the LGM, which was dry, and a wet Lateglacial, which commenced earlier in the southern compared to northern hemisphere in East Africa. We find no evidence that wet phases are insolation driven, but analysis of the dataset and GCM modelling experiments suggest that Heinrich events may be associated with enhanced monsoon activity in East Africa in both timing and as a possible causal mechanism.

National boundaries and the location of multinational firms in Europe

Using data on 5,102 subsidiaries established in the period 1991–1999, we examine the location choice of multinational firms of different nationalities in 47 regions of five EU countries. In particular we estimate a nested logit model and find that European multinationals consider regions across different countries as relatively closer substitutes than regions within national borders. This is consistent with the hypothesis that European regions compete to attract foreign direct investments relatively more across than within countries. However, in line with previous studies, we also find that national boundaries still play some role in choices made by non-European multinationals.

Contribution to collective harms and responsibility

In the present contribution, I discuss the claim, endorsed by a number of authors, that contributing to a collective harm is the ground for special responsibilities to the victims of that harm. Contributors should, between them, cover the costs of the harms they have inflicted, at least if those harms would otherwise be rights-violating. I raise some doubts about the generality of this principle before moving on to sketch a framework for thinking about liability for the costs of harms in general. This framework uses a contractualist framework to build an account of how to think about liability for costs on the basis of the presumably attractive thought that individual agents should have as much control over their liabilities as is compatible with others having like control. I then use that framework to suggest that liability on the basis of contribution should be restricted to cases in which the contributors could have avoided their contribution relatively costlessly, in which meeting the liability is not crippling for them, and in which such a liability would not have chilling effects, either on them or on third parties. This account of the grounds for contributory liability also has the advantage of avoiding a number of awkward questions about what counts as a contribution by shifting the issue away from often unanswerable questions about the precise causal genesis of some harm or other. Instead, control over conduct, which plausibly has some relation to the harm, becomes crucial. On the basis of this account, I then investigate whether a number of uses of the contributory principle are entirely appropriate. I argue that contributory liability is not appropriate for cases of collective harms committed by coordinated groups in the way that, for example, Iris Marion Young and Thomas Pogge have suggested and that further investigation of how members of such groups may be liable will be needed.