Online data processing consent under EU law: a theoretical framework and empirical evidence from the UK

This article analyses the results of an empirical study on the 200 most popular UK-based websites in various sectors of e-commerce services. The study provides empirical evidence on unlawful processing of personal data. It comprises a survey on the methods used to seek and obtain consent to process personal data for direct marketing and advertisement, and a test on the frequency of unsolicited commercial emails (UCE) received by customers as a consequence of their registration and submission of personal information to a website. Part One of the article presents a conceptual and normative account of data protection, with a discussion of the ethical values on which EU data protection law is grounded and an outline of the elements that must be in place to seek and obtain valid consent to process personal data. Part Two discusses the outcomes of the empirical study, which unveils a significant departure between EU legal theory and practice in data protection. Although a wide majority of the websites in the sample (69%) has in place a system to ask separate consent for engaging in marketing activities, it is only 16.2% of them that obtain a consent which is valid under the standards set by EU law. The test with UCE shows that only one out of three websites (30.5%) respects the will of the data subject not to receive commercial communications. It also shows that, when submitting personal data in online transactions, there is a high probability (50%) of incurring in a website that will ignore the refusal of consent and will send UCE. The article concludes that there is severe lack of compliance of UK online service providers with essential requirements of data protection law. In this respect, it suggests that there is inappropriate standard of implementation, information and supervision by the UK authorities, especially in light of the clarifications provided at EU level.

Unwritten law in Hobbesian political thought

In Hobbesian terminology, ‘unwritten laws’ are natural laws enforced within a polity, by a non-sovereign judge, without some previous public promulgation. This article discusses the idea in the light of successive Hobbesian accounts of ‘law’ and ‘obligation’. Between De Cive and Leviathan, Hobbes dropped the idea that natural law is strictly speaking law, but he continued to believe unwritten laws must form a part of any legal system. He was unable to explain how such a law could claim a legal status. His loyalty to the notion, in spite of all the trouble that it caused, is a sign of his belief that moral knowledge is readily accessible to all.

Retributivists! The harm principle is not for you!

Retributivism is often explicitly or implicitly assumed to be compatible with the harm principle, since the harm principle (in some guises) concerns the content of the criminal law, whilst retributivism concerns the punishment of those that break the law. In this essay I show that retributivism should not be endorsed alongside any version of the harm principle. For some versions of the harm principle, this is because retributivism is logically incompatible with it, or its grounds. For others, retributivists can only endorse the harm principle at the cost of endorsing implausible positions about the content of the criminal law.

Time and retribution

Retributivists believe that punishment can be deserved, and that deserved punishment is intrinsically good. They also believe that certain crimes deserve certain quantities of punishment. On the plausible assumption that the overall amount of any given punishment is a function of its severity and duration, we might think that retributivists (qua retributivists) would be indifferent as to whether a punishment were long and light or short and sharp, provided the offender gets the overall amount of punishment he deserves. In this paper I argue against this, showing that retributivists should actually prefer shorter and more severe punishments to longer, gentler options. I show this by focusing on, and developing a series of interpretations of, the retributivist claim that not punishing the guilty is bad, focussing on the relationship between that badness and time. I then show that each interpretation leads to a preference for shorter over longer punishment.

Neural processing of reward and punishment in young people at increased familial risk of depression

Background Abnormalities in the neural representation of rewarding and aversive stimuli have been well-described in patients with acute depression, and we previously found abnormal neural responses to rewarding and aversive sight and taste stimuli in recovered depressed patients. The aim of the present study was to determine whether similar abnormalities might be present in young people at increased familial risk of depression but with no personal history of mood disorder. Methods We therefore used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine the neural responses to pleasant and aversive sights and tastes in 25 young people (16–21 years of age) with a biological parent with depression and 25 age- and gender-matched control subjects. Results We found that, relative to the control subjects, participants with a parental history of depression showed diminished responses in the orbitofrontal cortex to rewarding stimuli, whereas activations to aversive stimuli were increased in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex and insula. In anterior cingulate cortex the at-risk group showed blunted neural responses to both rewarding and aversive stimuli. Conclusions Our findings suggest that young people at increased familial risk of depression have altered neural representation of reward and punishment, particularly in cortical regions linked to the use of positive and negative feedback to guide adaptive behavior.