Raz on rights: human rights, fundamental rights and balancing

After clarifying the outlines of Raz’s interest theory of rights and its relationship to aspects of the principles theory of rights, I consider how his recent observations on human rights fit (or fail to fit) into the interest theory. I then address two questions. First, I elaborate on Raz’s definition of morally fundamental rights, arguing that he is right in claiming that there are no such rights. I then show that the interest theory accommodates the notion that rights may take qualitative precedence over conflicting considerations – a question that has become increasingly relevant in light of recent writing on rights.

Just another case of treaty interpretation? Reconciling humanitarian law and human rights law in the ICJ

This chapter offers a fresh critique of the approach taken by the International Court of Justice to the relationship between humanitarian law and human rights law. In so doing, it seeks to move beyond the intractable debates that have dominated this area, offering an original account of the relationship that is firmly grounded in general international law concepts of treaty interpretation.

The Léger ruling as another example of the ECJ’s disappointingly reticent approach to the protection of the rights of LGB persons under EU law

In the 1980s, in the midst of the AIDS epidemic, many countries introduced lifetime bans on blood donations by men who had sexual relations with men (MSM). These blanket bans have, recently, begun to be challenged and, as a result, many countries have either relaxed them or completely abolished them. The case under examination (Léger ) is another instance of questioning the legality of such a ban. In particular, in this case, the European Court of Justice was called on to rule on whether a measure such as the French lifetime exclusion from blood donation of the MSM population that was at issue before the referring court is contrary to EU law. The Court ruled that although discriminatory on the ground of sexual orientation, such a ban may be justified in certain circumstances, and left it to the national court to make the final decision. This article seeks to analyse the case and to explain why, in the author’s view, the Court can be accused of—once more—not going far enough in the protection of lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) rights.

Voting rights of refugees

The book develops a novel legal argument about the voting rights of recognised 1951 Geneva Convention Refugees. The main normative contention is that such refugees should have the right to vote in the political community where they reside, assuming that the political community is a democracy and that its citizens have the right to vote. The basis of this contention is that the right to political participation in some political community is a basic right from the point of view of dignity and the protection of one’s interests. Due to their unique political predicament, 1951 Geneva Convention Refugees are a special category of non-citizen residents. They are unable to participate in elections of their state of origin, do not enjoy its diplomatic protection and consular assistance abroad, and – most fundamentally – are unable or unwilling, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, to return to it; thus, they are in limbo for a potentially protracted period. Refugees, too, deserve to have a place in the world in the Arendtian sense, where their opinions are significant and their actions are effective. Their state of asylum is, for the time being, the only community in which there is any realistic prospect of political participation on their part.