State ownership, bank loans, and corporate investment

We study the effect of bank loans on Chinese publicly listed firms' investment decisions based on the underinvestment and overinvestment theories of leverage. Evidence from China is of particular importance because China is the world's largest emerging and transitional economy. At first we show that there is a negative relationship between bank loan ratios and investment for Chinese publicly listed firms. And this negative relationship is much stronger for firms with low growth than firms with high growth. Secondly, we find that both short-term and long-term loan ratios are negatively correlated with investment. However, the higher the long-term loan ratios are, the weaker the negative relationship between long-term loan ratios and investment is. Thirdly, firm ownership only matters to the effect of short-term bank loans on investment in our sample. That is, the negative relationship between short-term loan ratios and investment is weaker for SOEs than for non-SOEs. Lastly, we show that the reform of China's banking system in 2003 has not strengthened the negative relationship between bank loans and investment. Our findings suggest that although Chinese state-owned banks are severely intervened by government policies, they still have a disciplining role on firms' investment, especially in firms with low growth.

Rethinking the literature on the performance of Chinese multinational enterprises

We synthesize the literature on Chinese multinational enterprises (MNEs) and find that much of the prior research is based on as few as a dozen case studies of Chinese firms. They are so case-specific that it has led to a misplaced call for new theories to explain Chinese firms’ internationalization. In an attempt to better relate theory with empirical evidence, we examine the largest 500 Chinese manufacturing firms. We aim to find out the number of Chinese manufacturing firms to be true MNEs by definition, and to examine their financial performance relative to global peers using the financial benchmarking method. We develop our theoretical perspectives from new internalization theory. We find that there are only 49 Chinese manufacturing firms to be true MNEs, whereas the rest is purely domestic firms. Their performance is poor relative to global peers. Chinese MNEs have home country bound firm-specific advantages (FSAs), which are built upon home country-specific advantages (home CSAs). They have not yet developed advanced management capabilities through recombination with host CSAs. Essentially, they acquire foreign firms to increase their sales in domestic market, but they fail to be competitive internationally and to achieve superior performance in overseas operations. Our findings have important strategic implications for managers, public policy makers, and academic research.

The political economy of bovine tuberculosis in Great Britain

A brief history of bovine tuberculosis (bTB) and its control in Great Britain is presented. Numerous diverse policies to control the disease in man, cattle and wildlife have been pursued over the last 100 years and many millions of pounds have been spent. After notable success in reducing the incidence and prevalence of bTB in cattle in GB from the 1950s to the mid-1980s, the number of cattle slaughtered has increased with increased geographical spread continually since that time with a high point of bTB incidence in 2008. This increase appeared to coincide with changing policy regarding the control of the disease in badgers with a more humane approach adopted and with strengthened protection for badgers through legislation. Indeed, much controversy has been involved in the debate on the role of badgers in disease transmission to cattle and the need for their control as vectors of the disease with various commissioned research projects, trials, public consultations and media attention. The findings of two social science investigations presented as examples showed that citizens generally believed that bTB in cattle is an important issue that needs to be tackled but objected to badgers being killed, whilst cattle farmers were willing to pay around £17/animal/year for a bTB cattle vaccine. It is noted that successes regarding the control of bTB in other countries have combined both cattle and wildlife controls and had strong involvement from industry working with government.