The impact of price promotions on producer strategies in markets with large product heterogeneity

Although current research indicates that increasing the number of options has negative effects on the cognitive ability of consumers, little understanding has been given to the consequences on producers and their strategic behavior. This article tests whether a large portfolio of products is beneficial to producers by observing UK consumer response to price promotions. The article shows that discounts induce mainly segment switching (74% of the total impact), with a limited effect on stockpiling (26%) and no impact on purchase incidence. Consequently, consumers prefer to “follow the discount” rather than purchase multiple units of the same wine. This result seems to explain the current structure of the market, and suggests that discounts may conflict with segment loyalty, a situation that disfavors producers, particularly in very populated segments. Results also casts doubts on the economic sustainability of competition based on an intense product differentiation in the wine sector.

Institutional sustainability: at what price? UNDP and the new cost-sharing model in Brazil

By the turn of the twenty-first century, UNDP had embraced a new form of funding based on ‘cost-sharing’, with this source accounting for 51 per cent of the organisation’s total expenditure worldwide in 2000. Unlike the traditional donor - recipient relationship so common with development projects, the new cost-sharing modality has created a situation whereby UNDP local offices become ‘subcontractors’ and agencies of the recipient countries become ‘clients’. This paper explores this transition in the context of Brazil, focusing on how the new modality may have compromised UNDP’s ability to promote Sustainable Human Development, as established in its mandate. The great enthusiasm for this modality within the UN system and its potential application to other developing countries increase the importance of a systematic assessment of its impact and developmental consequences.

Risk and price in the bidding process of contractors

Formal and analytical risk models prescribe how risk should be incorporated in construction bids. However, the actual process of how contractors and their clients negotiate and agree on price is complex, and not clearly articulated in the literature. Using participant observation, the entire tender process was shadowed in two leading UK construction firms. This was compared to propositions in analytical models and significant differences were found. 670 hours of work observed in both firms revealed three stages of the bidding process. Bidding activities were categorized and their extent estimated as deskwork (32%), calculations (19%), meetings (14%), documents (13%), off-days (11%), conversations (7%), correspondence (3%) and travel (1%). Risk allowances of 1-2% were priced in some bids and three tiers of risk apportionment in bids were identified. However, priced risks may sometimes be excluded from the final bidding price to enhance competitiveness. Thus, although risk apportionment affects a contractor’s pricing strategy, other complex, microeconomic factors also affect price. Instead of pricing in contingencies, risk was priced mostly through contractual rather than price mechanisms, to reflect commercial imperatives. The findings explain why some assumptions underpinning analytical models may not be sustainable in practice and why what actually happens in practice is important for those who seek to model the pricing of construction bids.

Threshold effects in price transmission: The case of Brazilian wheat, maize, and soya prices

Recent studies into price transmission have recognized the important role played by transport and transaction costs. Threshold models are one approach to accommodate such costs. We develop a generalized Threshold Error Correction Model to test for the presence and form of threshold behavior in price transmission that is symmetric around equilibrium. We use monthly wheat, maize, and soya prices from the United States, Argentina, and Brazil to demonstrate this model. Classical estimation of these generalized models can present challenges but Bayesian techniques avoid many of these problems. Evidence for thresholds is found in three of the five commodity price pairs investigated.

Combinatorial peptide ligand libraries and plant proteomics: a winning strategy at a price

The mechanism of action and properties of a solid-phase ligand library made of hexapeptides (combinatorial peptide ligand libraries or CPLL), for capturing the "hidden proteome", i.e. the low- and very low-abundance proteins constituting the vast majority of species in any proteome, as applied to plant tissues, are reviewed here. Plant tissues are notoriously recalcitrant to protein extraction and to proteome analysis. Firstly, rigid plant cell walls need to be mechanically disrupted to release the cell content and, in addition to their poor protein yield, plant tissues are rich in proteases and oxidative enzymes, contain phenolic compounds, starches, oils, pigments and secondary metabolites that massively contaminate protein extracts. In addition, complex matrices of polysaccharides, including large amount of anionic pectins, are present. All these species compete with the binding of proteins to the CPLL beads, impeding proper capture and identification / detection of low-abundance species. When properly pre-treated, plant tissue extracts are amenable to capture by the CPLL beads revealing thus many new species among them low-abundance proteins. Examples are given on the treatment of leaf proteins, of corn seed extracts and of exudate proteins (latex from Hevea brasiliensis). In all cases, the detection of unique gene products via CPLL capture is at least twice that of control, untreated sample.

Combinatorial peptide ligand libraries and plant proteomics: a winning strategy at a price

The mechanism of action and properties of a solid-phase ligand library made of hexapeptides (combinatorial peptide ligand libraries or CPLL, for capturing the "hidden proteome", i.e. the low- and very low-abundance proteins Constituting the vast majority of species in any proteome. as applied to plant tissues, are reviewed here. Plant tissues are notoriously recalcitrant to protein extraction and to proteome analysis, Firstly, rigid plant cell walls need to be mechanically disrupted to release the cell content and, in addition to their poor protein yield, plant tissues are rich in proteases and oxidative enzymes, contain phenolic Compounds, starches, oils, pigments and secondary metabolites that massively contaminate protein extracts. In addition, complex matrices of polysaccharides, including large amount of anionic pectins, are present. All these species compete with the binding of proteins to the CPLL beads, impeding proper capture and identification I detection of low-abundance species. When properly pre-treated, plant tissue extracts are amenable to capture by the CPLL beads revealing thus many new species among them low-abundance proteins. Examples are given on the treatment of leaf proteins, of corn seed extracts and of exudate proteins (latex from Hevea brasiliensis). In all cases, the detection of unique gene products via CPLL Capture is at least twice that of control, untreated sample. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

How contractors price risk in bids: theory and practice

Formal and analytical models that contractors can use to assess and price project risk at the tender stage have proliferated in recent years. However, they are rarely used in practice. Introducing more models would, therefore, not necessarily help. A better understanding is needed of how contractors arrive at a bid price in practice, and how, and in what circumstances, risk apportionment actually influences pricing levels. More than 60 proposed risk models for contractors that are published in journals were examined and classified. Then exploratory interviews with five UK contractors and documentary analyses on how contractors price work generally and risk specifically were carried out to help in comparing the propositions from the literature to what contractors actually do. No comprehensive literature on the real bidding processes used in practice was found, and there is no evidence that pricing is systematic. Hence, systematic risk and pricing models for contractors may have no justifiable basis. Contractors process their bids through certain tendering gateways. They acknowledge the risk that they should price. However, the final settlement depends on a set of complex, micro-economic factors. Hence, risk accountability may be smaller than its true cost to the contractor. Risk apportionment occurs at three stages of the whole bid-pricing process. However, analytical approaches tend not to incorporate this, although they could.

Deciding the price of fame

Previous studies of ignorance-driven decision-making have either analyzed when ignorance should prove advantageous on theoretical grounds, or else they have examined whether human behavior is consistent with an ignorance driven inference strategy (e.g., the recognition heuristic). The current study merges these research goals by examining whether – under conditions where ignorance driven inference might be expected – the type of advantages theoretical analyses predict are evident in human performance data. A single experiment shows that, when asked to make relative wealth judgments, participants reliably use recognition as a basis for their judgments. Their wealth judgments under these conditions are reliably more accurate when some of the target names are unknown than when participants recognize all the names (the “less-is-more effect”). these data are robust against a number of variations on the size of the pool from which participants have to choose and the nature of the wealth judgment.

The price of risk in construction projects: contingency approximation model (CAM)

Little attention has been focussed on a precise definition and evaluation mechanism for project management risk specifically related to contractors. When bidding, contractors traditionally price risks using unsystematic approaches. The high business failure rate our industry records may indicate that the current unsystematic mechanisms contractors use for building up contingencies may be inadequate. The reluctance of some contractors to include a price for risk in their tenders when bidding for work competitively may also not be a useful approach. Here, instead, we first define the meaning of contractor contingency, and then we develop a facile quantitative technique that contractors can use to estimate a price for project risk. This model will help contractors analyse their exposure to project risks; and help them express the risk in monetary terms for management action. When bidding for work, they can decide how to allocate contingencies strategically in a way that balances risk and reward.