Palaeohydrology of the Fazzan Basin and surrounding regions: The last 7 million years

We have integrated information on topography, geology and geomorphology with the results of targeted fieldwork in order to develop a chronology for the development of Lake Megafazzan, a giant lake that has periodically existed in the Fazzan Basin since the late Miocene. The development of the basin can be best understood by considering the main geological and geomorphological events that occurred thought Libya during this period and thus an overview of the palaeohydrology of all Libya is also presented. The origin of the Fazzan Basin appears to lie in the Late Miocene. At this time Libya was dominated by two large rivers systems that flowed into the Mediterranean Sea, the Sahabi River draining central and eastern Libya and the Wadi Nashu River draining much of western Libya. As the Miocene progressed the region become increasingly affected by volcanic activity on its northern and eastern margin that appears to have blocked the River Nashu in Late Miocene or early Messinian times forming a sizeable closed basin in the Fazzan within which proto-Lake Megafazzan would have developed during humid periods. The fall in base level associated with the Messinian desiccation of the Mediterranean Sea promoted down-cutting and extension of river systems throughout much of Libya. To the south of the proto Fazzan Basin the Sahabi River tributary know as Wadi Barjuj appears to have expanded its headwaters westwards. The channel now terminates at Al Haruj al Aswad. We interpret this as a suggestion that Wadi Barjuj was blocked by the progressive development of Al Haruj al Aswad. K/Ar dating of lava flows suggests that this occurred between 4 and 2 Ma. This event would have increased the size of the closed basin in the Fazzan by about half, producing a catchment close to its current size (-350,000 km(2)). The Fazzan Basin contains a wealth of Pleistocene to recent palaeolake sediment outcrops and shorelines. Dating of these features demonstrates evidence of lacustrine conditions during numerous interglacials spanning a period greater than 420 ka. The middle to late Pleistocene interglacials were humid enough to produce a giant lake of about 135,000 km(2) that we have called Lake Megafazzan. Later lake phases were smaller, the interglacials less humid, developing lakes of a few thousand square kilometres. In parallel with these palaeohydrological developments in the Fazzan Basin, change was occurring in other parts of Libya. The Lower Pliocene sea level rise caused sediments to infill much of the Messinian channel system. As this was occurring, subsidence in the Al Kufrah Basin caused expansion of the Al Kufrah River system at the expense of the River Sahabi. By the Pleistocene, the Al Kufrah River dominated the palaeohydrology of eastern Libya and had developed a very large inland delta in its northern reaches that exhibited a complex distributary channel network which at times fed substantial lakes in the Sirt Basin. At this time Libya was a veritable lake district during humid periods with about 10% of the country underwater. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Simulated global-mean sea level changes over the last half-millennium

Simulations of the last 500 yr carried out using the Third Hadley Centre Coupled Ocean-Atmosphere GCM (HadCM3) with anthropogenic and natural (solar and volcanic) forcings have been analyzed. Global-mean surface temperature change during the twentieth century is well reproduced. Simulated contributions to global-mean sea level rise during recent decades due to thermal expansion (the largest term) and to mass loss from glaciers and ice caps agree within uncertainties with observational estimates of these terms, but their sum falls short of the observed rate of sea level rise. This discrepancy has been discussed by previous authors; a completely satisfactory explanation of twentieth-century sea level rise is lacking. The model suggests that the apparent onset of sea level rise and glacier retreat during the first part of the nineteenth century was due to natural forcing. The rate of sea level rise was larger during the twentieth century than during the previous centuries because of anthropogenic forcing, but decreasing natural forcing during the second half of the twentieth century tended to offset the anthropogenic acceleration in the rate. Volcanic eruptions cause rapid falls in sea level, followed by recovery over several decades. The model shows substantially less decadal variability in sea level and its thermal expansion component than twentieth-century observations indicate, either because it does not generate sufficient ocean internal variability, or because the observational analyses overestimate the variability.

Climate change justice: getting motivated in the last chance saloon

A key reason for pessimism with respect to greenhouse gas emissions reduction relates to the ‘motivation problem’, whereby those who could make the biggest difference prima facie have the least incentive to act because they are most able to adapt: how can we motivate such people (and thereby everyone else) to accept, indeed to initiate, the changes to their lifestyles that are required for effective emissions reductions? This paper offers an account inspired by Rawls of the good of membership of ‘intergenerational cooperative union’ to achieve justice that provides a solution to the motivation problem.

Last charge of the knights? Iraq, Afghanistan and the special relationship

At the heart of the ‘special relationship’ ideology, there is supposed to be a grand bargain. In exchange for paying the ‘blood price’ as America's ally, Britain will be rewarded with exceptional influence over American foreign policy and its strategic behaviour. Soldiers and statesman continue to articulate this idea. Since 9/11, the notion of Britain playing ‘Greece’ to America's ‘Rome’ gained new life thanks to Anglophiles on both sides of the Atlantic. One potent version of this ideology was that the more seasoned British would teach Americans how to fight ‘small wars’ in Iraq and Afghanistan, thereby bolstering their role as tutor to the superpower. Britain does derive benefits from the Anglo-American alliance and has made momentous contributions to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet British solidarity and sacrifices have not purchased special influence in Washington. This is partly due to Atlanticist ideology, which sets Britain unrealistic standards by which it is judged, and partly because the notion of ‘special influence’ is misleading as it loses sight of the complexities of American policy-making. The overall result of expeditionary wars has been to strain British credibility in American eyes and to display its lack of consistent influence both over high policy and the design and execution of US military campaigns. While there may be good arguments in favour of the UK continuing its efforts in Afghanistan, the notion that the war fortifies Britain's vicarious world status is a dangerous illusion that leads to repeated overstretch and disappointment. Now that Britain is in the foothills of a strategic defence review, it is important that the British abandon this false consciousness.