Missing the logic of the text: Lord Butler’s report on intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction

This article focuses on the final report of Lord Butler’s review of British intelligence on weapons of mass destruction (WMD), specifically on its treatment of the accuracy of the use of intelligence on Iraqi WMD in a government dossier published in September 2002 ahead of the 2003 Iraq war. In the report, the demonstration of the accuracy of the “September Dossier” hinges on the insertion of tables that compare side-by-side quotations from this document and from intelligence assessments. The analysis of the textual and visual methods by which the report is written reveals how the logic of the comparative tables is missed in the Butler report: the logic of these tables requires that the comparison between quotations from the two documents should be performed at the level of their details but the Butler report performs its comparison only at a broad and general level.

Spooked: Britain, empire and intelligence since 1945

A collection of pieces on British intelligence including sources (Christopher R. Moran), methodology (Richard Aldrich), media (Philip H.J. Davies), historiography (Calder Walton and Christopher Andrew), South Africa and the Wilson government (Philip Murphy), Pakistan and ISI (Rob Johnson), and UK security policy in the face of radical Islam (Anthony Glees).

The British state and the Irish rebellion of 1916: an intelligence failure or an failure of response

The teleological narrative that has dominated the handling of intelligence by the British state in the events that led up to the 1916 Irish Rebellion in Dublin has been characterised as a cocktail of incompetence and mendacity. Using new and existing archive material this article argues that both the cabinet in London and key members of the Irish Executive in Dublin were supplied with accurate and timely intelligence by the Admiralty's signals intelligence unit, the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police with respect to this event. Far from being a failure of intelligence here is evidence to show that there occurred a failure of response on behalf of key decision-makers. The warnings that were given by intelligence organisations were filtered through the existing policy preferences and assumptions. As a result of these factors accurate evaluations and sound judgement were not exercised by key officials, such as Sir Matthew Nathan, in Dublin Castle.

MI(R,)G(R) and British Covert Operations, 1939-42

The Military Intelligence (Research) Department of the British War Office was tasked in 1940 with encouraging and supporting armed resistance in occupied Europe and the Axis-controlled Middle East. The major contention of this paper is that, in doing so, MI(R) performed a key role in British strategy in 1940-42 and in the development of what are now known as covert operations. MI(R) developed an organic, but coherent doctrine for such activity which was influential upon the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and its own sub-branch, G(R), which applied this doctrine in practice in East Africa and the Middle East in 1940-41. It was also here that a number of key figures in the development of covert operations and special forces first cut their teeth, the most notable being Major Generals Colin Gubbins and Orde Wingate.

Brand protection and the globalization of British business

In expanding on earlier analyses of the evolution of multinational business that have drawn from concepts of competition and innovation, this study examines the strategies used by British multinationals, between 1870 and 1929, to protect the global reputation of their brands, which were crucial to their survival and success. Even after the passage of new trademark legislation in 1876, enforcement of trademarks remained expensive, and often firms preferred to negotiate, rather than to prosecute violations. Many trademark imitators were based in the newly industrializing countries of the time—the United States, Germany, and Japan—and were part of the British export supply chains as licensees, franchisees, or wholesalers. British firms responded to infringements by lobbying governments, appointing local agents to provide intelligence, and collaborating with other firms.

A police state? The Nyasaland emergency and colonial intelligence.

The Nyasaland Emergency in 1959 proved a decisive turning point in the history of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which from 1953 to 1963 brought together the territories of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) under a settler-dominated federal government. The British and Nyasaland governments defended the emergency by claiming to have gathered intelligence which showed that the Nyasaland African Congress was preparing a campaign of sabotage and murder. The Devlin Commission, appointed to investigate the emergency, dismissed the evidence of a ‘murder plot’, criticised the Nyasaland government's handling of the Emergency and, notoriously, described Nyasaland as a ‘police state’. This article has two principal aims. First, using the recently declassified papers of the Intelligence and Security Department (ISD) of the Colonial Office, it seeks to provide the first detailed account of what the British government knew of the intelligence relating to the ‘murder plot’ and how they assessed it, prior to the outbreak of the emergency. It demonstrates that officials in the ISD and members of the Security Service adopted a far more cautious attitude towards the intelligence than did Conservative ministers, and had greater qualms about allowing it into the public domain to justify government policy. Second, the article examines the implications of Devlin's use of the phrase ‘police state’ for Nyasaland and for the late colonial state in general. It contrasts Devlin's use of the term with that of security experts in the ISD, who routinely applied it to policing systems that diverged from their own preferred model. Hence, whereas Devlin compared policing in Nyasaland unfavourably with that in Southern Rhodesia, implying, ironically, that Nyasaland was ‘under-policed’ (because there were fewer police per head of population in Nyasaland than in Southern Rhodesia), the ISD regarded the intensive system of policing operated by the British South Africa Police in Southern Rhodesia as characteristic of a ‘police state’. The article suggests that the frequent use of the term ‘police state’ was indicative of broader anxieties about what Britain's legacy would be for the post-independence African state.

Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Conference of the British Association for Biological Anthropology and Osteoarchaeology, Department of Archaeology, University of Reading

The Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Conference of the British Association for Biological Anthropology and Osteoarchaeology (BABAO) held at the University of Reading in 2007. Contents: 1) A life course perspective of growing up in medieval London: evidence of sub-adult health from St Mary Spital (London) (Rebecca Redfern and Don Walker); 2) Preservation of non-adult long bones from an almshouse cemetery in the United States dating to the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries (Colleen Milligan, Jessica Zotcavage and Norman Sullivan); 3) Childhood oral health: dental palaeopathology of Kellis 2, Dakhleh, Egypt. A preliminary investigation (Stephanie Shukrum and JE Molto); 4) Skeletal manifestation of non-adult scurvy from early medieval Northumbria: the Black Gate cemetery, Newcastle-upon-Tyne (Diana Mahoney-Swales and Pia Nystrom); 5) Infantile cortical hyperostosis: cases, causes and contradictions (Mary Lewis and Rebecca Gowland); 6) Biological Anthropology Tuberculosis of the hip in the Victorian Britain (Benjamin Clarke and Piers Mitchell); 7) The re-analysis of Iron Age human skeletal material from Winnall Down (Justine Tracey); 8) Can we estimate post-mortem interval from an individual body part? A field study using sus scrofa (Branka Franicevec and Robert Pastor); 9) The expression of asymmetry in hand bones from the medieval cemetery at Écija, Spain (Lisa Cashmore and Sonia Zakrezewski); 10) Returning remains: a curator’s view (Quinton Carroll); 11) Authority and decision making over British human remains: issues and challenges (Piotr Bienkowski and Malcolm Chapman); 12) Ethical dimensions of reburial, retention and repatriation of archaeological human remains: a British perspective (Simon Mays and Martin Smith); 13) The problem of provenace: inaccuracies, changes and misconceptions (Margaret Clegg); 14) Native American human remains in UK collections: implications of NAGPRA to consultation, repatriation, and policy development (Myra J Giesen); 15) Repatriation – a view from the receiving end: New Zealand (Nancy Tayles).

Did farming arise from a misapplication of social intelligence?

The origins of farming is the defining event of human history-the one turning point that has resulted in modern humans having a quite different type of lifestyle and cognition to all other animals and past types of humans. With the economic basis provided by farming, human individuals and societies have developed types of material culture that greatly augment powers of memory and computation, extending the human mental capacity far beyond that which the brain alone can provide. Archaeologists have long debated and discussed why people began living in settled communities and became dependent on cultivated plants and animals, which soon evolved into domesticated forms. One of the most intriguing explanations was proposed more than 20 years ago not by an archaeologist but by a psychologist: Nicholas Humphrey suggested that farming arose from the 'misapplication of social intelligence'. I explore this idea in relation to recent discoveries and archaeological interpretations in the Near East, arguing that social intelligence has indeed played a key role in the origin of farming and hence the emergence of the modern world.