The effect of Ponzi schemes on crime: Evidence from the colombian case

This paper estimates the impact of a massive negative income shock led by the simultaneous crash down of several Ponzi schemes (also known as financial ``pyramids"") in Colombia on crime rates at the municipal level. Using novel data on the spatial incidence of the latest wave of Colombian pyramids and their crash down date, I estimate difference-in-differences models with both monthly and yearly frequency. I find that the negative income shock of the pyramids" crash down differentially exacerbates crime in affected municipalities compared to those with no presence of Ponzi schemes. This is true for minor offenses like commercial theft or residential burglary, but not for major crimes as murder or terrorism.

The differential effect on dropout of increasing grades' supply by integrating or expanding schools: evidence from a quasi-experiment in Bogotá

En el año 2002, la Secretaría de Educación de Bogotá estipuló la Resolución 2101 que tenía por objeto asegurar el ciclo de la educación completo en los colegios públicos. El propósito de este trabajo es evaluar el impacto de los mecanismos seguidos a la aplicación de esta política sobre la tasa de deserción escolar. Las escuelas tenían tres mecanismos diferentes para alcanzar el objetivo de la presente resolución: expandir los grados escolares ofertados, integrarse con otros colegios de la zona, o ambos. Para ello, utilizo variables instrumentales para resolver el sesgo causado por el hecho de que los colegios que siguen determinada estrategia eran los que tenían altas tasas de deserción inicialmente. Usando datos sobre las características institucionales y las características socio-demográficas de la población cerca del colegio, evalúo el impacto de estos tres mecanismos sobre las tasas de deserción escolar. Los resultados sugieren que las instituciones que aumentaron los grados experimentan un aumento en el número de estudiantes que abandonan el colegio en 12.1 puntos porcentuales, mientras que las instituciones que complementaron este mecanismo con la integración de un colegio próximo pre existente mostraron una reducción en la tasa de deserción escolar de 9.8 puntos porcentuales.

Doctors´ remuneration schemes and hospital competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

This paper uses a two-sided market model of hospital competition to study the implications of di§erent remunerations schemes on the physiciansí side. The two-sided market approach is characterized by the concept of common network externality (CNE) introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). This type of externality occurs when occurs when both sides value, possibly with di§erent intensities, the same network externality. We explicitly introduce e§ort exerted by doctors. By increasing the number of medical acts (which involves a costly e§ort) the doctor can increase the quality of service o§ered to patients (over and above the level implied by the CNE). We Örst consider pure salary, capitation or fee-for-service schemes. Then, we study schemes that mix fee-for-service with either salary or capitation payments. We show that salary schemes (either pure or in combination with fee-for-service) are more patient friendly than (pure or mixed) capitations schemes. This comparison is exactly reversed on the providersíside. Quite surprisingly, patients always loose when a fee-for-service scheme is introduced (pure of mixed). This is true even though the fee-for-service is the only way to induce the providers to exert e§ort and it holds whatever the patientsívaluation of this e§ort. In other words, the increase in quality brought about by the fee-for-service is more than compensated by the increase in fees faced by patients.