El mercado móvil de telecomunicaciones en Colombia ante externalidades de red

Si bien la generalidad de los mercados de telefonía móvil se consideran suficientemente competidos, los mercados en los que el operador más grande supera ampliamente en participación de mercado a sus seguidores constituyen un motivo de preocupación para sus respectivas autoridades regulatorias y de competencia. El análisis económico del problema ha llevado a que exista una cantidad creciente de literatura relacionada, principalmente con el propósito de analizar la persistencia de la asimetría en las cuotas de mercado. Tal es el caso del mercado móvil de telecomunicaciones en Colombia, donde la Comisión de Regulación de Comunicaciones ha sostenido que a la luz del problema de competencia que se origina por la unión de una participación de mercado considerablemente asimétrica y el diferencial de precios, el operador más grande adquiere una ventaja competitiva considerable frente a los demás operadores en el mercado, y por lo tanto es un operador con poder significativo de mercado, u operador con posición dominante. Por lo anterior, el presente trabajo evalúa la imposición de algunas medidas regulatorias con el fin de verificar si estas contribuyen a generar una mayor competencia en el mercado, y mejores condiciones para los operadores competidores.

De lo micro a lo macro prudencial: Un análisis de la supervisión bancaria desde la econometría espacial

La crisis que se desató en el mercado hipotecario en Estados Unidos en 2008 y que logró propagarse a lo largo de todo sistema financiero, dejó en evidencia el nivel de interconexión que actualmente existe entre las entidades del sector y sus relaciones con el sector productivo, dejando en evidencia la necesidad de identificar y caracterizar el riesgo sistémico inherente al sistema, para que de esta forma las entidades reguladoras busquen una estabilidad tanto individual, como del sistema en general. El presente documento muestra, a través de un modelo que combina el poder informativo de las redes y su adecuación a un modelo espacial auto regresivo (tipo panel), la importancia de incorporar al enfoque micro-prudencial (propuesto en Basilea II), una variable que capture el efecto de estar conectado con otras entidades, realizando así un análisis macro-prudencial (propuesto en Basilea III).

Competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

We study competition in two sided markets with common network externality rather than with the standard inter-group e¤ects. This type of externality occurs when both groups bene t, possibly with di¤erent intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality is relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satis es an homogeneity condition then platforms pro ts and price structure have some speci c properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to other, according to the homogeneity degree. In the speci c but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platform s pro t do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This is in sharp contrast to conventional results stating that the presence of network externalities in a two-sided market structure increases the intensity of competition when the externality is positive (and decreases it when the externality is negative). Prices are a¤ected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers.

Doctors´ remuneration schemes and hospital competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

This paper uses a two-sided market model of hospital competition to study the implications of di§erent remunerations schemes on the physiciansí side. The two-sided market approach is characterized by the concept of common network externality (CNE) introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). This type of externality occurs when occurs when both sides value, possibly with di§erent intensities, the same network externality. We explicitly introduce e§ort exerted by doctors. By increasing the number of medical acts (which involves a costly e§ort) the doctor can increase the quality of service o§ered to patients (over and above the level implied by the CNE). We Örst consider pure salary, capitation or fee-for-service schemes. Then, we study schemes that mix fee-for-service with either salary or capitation payments. We show that salary schemes (either pure or in combination with fee-for-service) are more patient friendly than (pure or mixed) capitations schemes. This comparison is exactly reversed on the providersíside. Quite surprisingly, patients always loose when a fee-for-service scheme is introduced (pure of mixed). This is true even though the fee-for-service is the only way to induce the providers to exert e§ort and it holds whatever the patientsívaluation of this e§ort. In other words, the increase in quality brought about by the fee-for-service is more than compensated by the increase in fees faced by patients.

Information externalities and export trade duration at the firm level

Recent empirical work emphasizes the importance of the extensive margin of trade (new exporters, new export activities) for long run export growth. In this context, understanding the determinants of duration of new exporters is key for underpinning the dynamics of exports growth. As new exporters tend to show low survival rates, identifying the determinants of export duration is highly relevant for academic and policy purposes. In this paper, we explore whether information externalities arising from different levels of spatial interaction allow new exporters to increase the duration of their trade activities. For this, we use transaction level data on Colombian exports between 2004 and 2011. Results show that export networks, understood as the agglomeration of exporting firms at different spatial levels, reduce the risk of dropping out from exporting and that this effect is stronger the more similar are export activities carried out by firms

Network externalities across financial institutions

We propose and estimate a financial distress model that explicitly accounts for the interactions or spill-over effects between financial institutions, through the use of a spatial continuity matrix that is build from financial network data of inter bank transactions. Such setup of the financial distress model allows for the empirical validation of the importance of network externalities in determining financial distress, in addition to institution specific and macroeconomic covariates. The relevance of such specification is that it incorporates simultaneously micro-prudential factors (Basel 2) as well as macro-prudential and systemic factors (Basel 3) as determinants of financial distress. Results indicate network externalities are an important determinant of financial health of a financial institutions. The parameter that measures the effect of network externalities is both economically and statistical significant and its inclusion as a risk factor reduces the importance of the firm specific variables such as the size or degree of leverage of the financial institution. In addition we analyze the policy implications of the network factor model for capital requirements and deposit insurance pricing.