El Acto Legislativo 01 de 2003. ¿Herramienta fallida para el fortalecimiento de los Partidos Políticos en Colombia?. Caso de estudio : Partido Social de Unidad Nacional - Partido de La U

La excesiva proliferación de partidos políticos y listas a las corporaciones públicas, permitidas por la debilidad normativa de la Constitución de 1991 y la suspicacia de los políticos colombianos, hizo necesaria una reforma política en el año 2003. Esta reforma, manifestada en el Acto Legislativo 01 de 2003, modificó el sistema electoral colombiano; los cambios más visibles modificaron la forma de conversión de votos en escaños, la forma de candidatura y modalidad del voto, y la creación una barrera legal. Estas modificaciones llevaron a la reagrupación de los partidos políticos, pero no necesariamente a su fortalecimiento, ya que no establece las herramientas necesarias para la transparencia y la democratización interna de los partidos, que conllevarían a su real institucionalización. El Partido Social de Unidad Nacional , partido de La U-, es creado después de la implementación de la reforma y consigue la mayor votación nacional en sus primeras elecciones. Pero, ¿lo convierte ese resultado electoral en un partido fuerte?.

Italian citizenship and the descendants of Italian citizens emigrated in Colombia. Removing a social injustice

Law is often the source of social discriminations, but, at the same time, it can be thekey to delete these social discriminations. The authors try to give an example of thisphenomenon, by analyzing the impact of the Italian citizenship’s rules over the descendantsof the Italian citizens emigrated abroad and, especially, in South America.Indeed, according to the former Italian law, only fathers could transmit iure sanguinisthe citizenship to their children: moreover, women automatically lost theItalian citizenship if they get a foreign citizenship by concluding a marriage witha foreign husband.These rules hardly discriminate the Italian women emigrated abroad and, especially,their descendants who were prevented to get the Italian’s citizenship.These discriminatory rules were finally deleted by the Italian Constitutional Courtin the Seventies and in the Eighties: however, the effects of those rules still persisted,since the decision of the Constitutional Court could not overcome the temporal limit of the entry into force of the Constitution (01.01.1948) and, therefore, could not“cover” the discriminatory facts occurred before that date.Finally in 2009, the Italian Supreme Court, by extending the effects ratione temporisof the decisions of the Constitutional Court, “reopened the doors” of the Italiancitizenship to a huge number of Italian citizenship born from Italian women beforethe 01.01.1948.Therefore, the authors focus on the social impact of this decision for all the potentialItalian citizens living in South America and try to assess its juridical effects overthe Italian law.

Entre la gobernanza social e institucional: Una mirada al fenómeno de la trata de personas en Colombia en el período entre 2000 y 2012

La presente monografía tiene por objetivo identificar la influencia de las acciones emprendidas por la sociedad civil y las organizaciones internacionales frente a la problemática de la trata de personas en Colombia, durante el período comprendido entre los años 2000 y 2012. En este sentido, la investigación constituye un esfuerzo por develar las transformaciones en las narrativas institucionales que han posibilitado el reconocimiento de los elementos de prevención y centralidad de las víctimas, como ejes articuladores del discurso gubernamental frente a la trata de personas. Para ello, se hace uso de la teoría de la gobernanza global enmarcada en el enfoque constructivista de las Relaciones Internacionales, en tanto permite establecer una relación entre las acciones de los diferentes actores y el impacto de estas en la construcción de estrategias nacionales para hacer frente a problemáticas que, como la trata de personas, se encuentran en estrecha relación con el mundo globalizado.

Allocation rules on networks

When allocating a resource, geographical and infrastructural constraints have to be taken into account. We study the problem of distributing a resource through a network from sources endowed with the resource to citizens with claims. A link between a source and an agent depicts the possibility of a transfer from the source to the agent. Given the supplies at each source, the claims of citizens, and the network, the question is how to allocate the available resources among the citizens. We consider a simple allocation problem that is free of network constraints, where the total amount can be freely distributed. The simple allocation problem is a claims problem where the total amount of claims is greater than what is available. We focus on consistent and resource monotonic rules in claims problems that satisfy equal treatment of equals. We call these rules fairness principles and we extend fairness principles to allocation rules on networks. We require that for each pair of citizens in the network, the extension is robust with respect to the fairness principle. We call this condition pairwise robustness with respect to the fairness principle. We provide an algorithm and show that each fairness principle has a unique extension which is pairwise robust with respect to the fairness principle. We give applications of the algorithm for three fairness principles: egalitarianism, proportionality and equal sacrifice.

Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.