Shared HLA Class II in Six Autoimmune Diseases in Latin America: A Meta-Analysis

The prevalence and genetic susceptibility of autoimmune diseases (ADs) may vary depending on latitudinal gradient and ethnicity. The aims of this study were to identify common human leukocyte antigen (HLA) class II alleles that contribute to susceptibility to six ADs in Latin Americans through a meta-analysis and to review additional clinical, immunological, and genetic characteristics of those ADs sharing HLA alleles. DRB1∗03:01 (OR: 4.04; 95%CI: 1.41–11.53) was found to be a risk factor for systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE), Sjogren’s syndrome (SS), and type 1 diabetes mellitus (T1D). DRB1 ¨ ∗04:05 (OR: 4.64; 95%CI: 2.14–10.05) influences autoimmune hepatitis (AIH), rheumatoid arthritis (RA), and T1D; DRB1∗04:01 (OR: 3.86; 95%CI: 2.32–6.42) is a susceptibility factor for RA and T1D. Opposite associations were found between multiple sclerosis (MS) and T1D. DQB1∗06:02 and DRB1∗15 alleles were risk factors for MS but protective factors for T1D. Likewise, DQB1∗06:03 allele was a risk factor for AIH but a protective one for T1D. Several common autoantibodies and clinical associations as well as additional shared genes have been reported in these ADs, which are reviewed herein. These results indicate that in Latin Americans ADs share major loci and immune characteristics.

Evolution of analogical reasoning in children: follow-up from six to eleven years old

The aim of this study is to establish the time and period of development of Analogical Reasoning (AR) and evaluate its independence and performance with respect to the age. We performed a longitudinal cohort study of two age groups and six annual follow-up phases from each one (2000-2005, 2001-2006) in six to eleven years-old children in the city of Huanuco (Peru) with a sample of 167 children (first stage), and N=121 (sixth stage). The Raven’s progressive matrices test, coloured version, was applied individually without time limits. Results indicate that AR development occurs in a constant and late way from seven to eleven years-old children, and also that there is independence between the ability of AR and the children age. We discuss the importance of knowledge in the relationships between analogies topics, adjusted to the age, as a mediating factor in the development of AR.

Six party talks desafíos en la implementación de la política exterior de China (2003-2013)

Este estudio de caso se centra en los esfuerzos de China por reanudar los Six Party Talks o Diálogos a Seis Bandas que son considerados como la opción más viable para tratar la situación nuclear en la península coreana.

Competition between HMO and PPO: A Two-Sided Market Approach

We set-up a two-sided market framework to model competition between a Prefered Provider Organization (PPO) and a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO). Both health plans compete to attract policyholderson one side and providers on the other side. The PPO, which is characterized by a higher diversity of providers, attracts riskier policyholders. Our two-sided framework allows to examine the consequences of this risk segmentation on the providers’ side, especially in terms of remuneration. The outcome of competition mainly depends on two effects: a demand effect, influenced by the value put by policyholders on providers access and an adverse selection effect, captured by the characteristics of the health risk distribution. If the adverse selection effect is too strong, the HMO gets a higher profit in equilibrium. On the contrary, if the demand effect dominates, the PPO profit is higher in spite of the unfavorable risk segmentation. We believe that our model, by highlighting the two-sided market structure of the health plans’ competition, provides new insights to understand the increase in the PPOs’ market share observed during the last decade in the US.

Competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

We study competition in two sided markets with common network externality rather than with the standard inter-group e¤ects. This type of externality occurs when both groups bene t, possibly with di¤erent intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality is relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satis es an homogeneity condition then platforms pro ts and price structure have some speci c properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to other, according to the homogeneity degree. In the speci c but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platform s pro t do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This is in sharp contrast to conventional results stating that the presence of network externalities in a two-sided market structure increases the intensity of competition when the externality is positive (and decreases it when the externality is negative). Prices are a¤ected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers.

Doctors´ remuneration schemes and hospital competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

This paper uses a two-sided market model of hospital competition to study the implications of di§erent remunerations schemes on the physiciansí side. The two-sided market approach is characterized by the concept of common network externality (CNE) introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). This type of externality occurs when occurs when both sides value, possibly with di§erent intensities, the same network externality. We explicitly introduce e§ort exerted by doctors. By increasing the number of medical acts (which involves a costly e§ort) the doctor can increase the quality of service o§ered to patients (over and above the level implied by the CNE). We Örst consider pure salary, capitation or fee-for-service schemes. Then, we study schemes that mix fee-for-service with either salary or capitation payments. We show that salary schemes (either pure or in combination with fee-for-service) are more patient friendly than (pure or mixed) capitations schemes. This comparison is exactly reversed on the providersíside. Quite surprisingly, patients always loose when a fee-for-service scheme is introduced (pure of mixed). This is true even though the fee-for-service is the only way to induce the providers to exert e§ort and it holds whatever the patientsívaluation of this e§ort. In other words, the increase in quality brought about by the fee-for-service is more than compensated by the increase in fees faced by patients.