The politics of resource booms

This paper develops a simple model to investigate how resource-driven economic booms shape the equilibrium political institutions of resource-rich societies and influence the likelihood of experiencing civil war. In our model a strong government apparatus favors property rights protection but also makes the state more powerful and hence may induce predatory autocratic regimes over democracy. We characterize the parameter space of each political outcome in terms of the type of the available natural resources. Economic booms based on resources that are privately exploited empower the citizens and tend to ease democratic transitions. In contrast, booms based on resources exploited by the state tend to favor more dictatorial regimes. Finally, economic booms based on resources that can be exploited either by the state or by private citizens incite preemptive actions by both parties that may result in civil war. We discuss the predictions of the model using historical and contemporary examples.

La política comercial de Estados Unidos en el marco de la Organización Mundial del Comercio. Discurso vs. comportamiento con relación a prácticas anticompetitivas

El objetivo principal de esta monografía es identificar cuáles son las razones que justifican las contradicciones entre el discurso y el comportamiento de Estados Unidos en el marco de la Organización Mundial del Comercio, particularmente con relación a prácticas anticompetitivas derivadas del programa de protección a la agricultura del país. Para ello se analizan el interés nacional y los elementos de la seguridad nacional a partir de los cuales éste se ha construido. También se evalúan los procesos de formulación de política comercial y las interacciones entre los representantes políticos, las asociaciones de productores y el sector privado para mostrar como este comportamiento contradictorio corresponde a la legitimización de un interés particular.

Natural resource windfalls and efficiency of local government expenditures: evidence from Peru

We study the role of natural resource windfalls in explaining the efficiency of public expenditures. Using a rich dataset of expenditures and public good provision for 1,836 municipalities in Peru for period 2001-2010, we estimate a non-monotonic relationship between the efficiency of public good provision and the level of natural resource transfers. Local governments that were extremely favored by the boom of mineral prices were more efficient in using fiscal windfalls whereas those benefited with modest transfers were more inefficient. These results can be explained by the increase in political competition associated with the boom. However, the fact that increases in efficiency were related to reductions in public good provision casts doubts about the beneficial effects of political competition in promoting efficiency.