What are the priorities for prevention and control of non-communicable diseases and injuries in sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia?

Last year’s UN high level meeting sought to galvanise the international community into scaling up its response to the escalating global burden of non-communicable diseases. With resources tight, D Chisholm and colleagues examine which interventions should be given priority for action and investment

Primary Prevention and Screening Strategies for Colorectal Cancer: Which Strategy Should Take?

Objective: To explore and define the utility of different strategies for primary prevention (ASA, diet, physical activity) and strategies of screening test (FOBT, sigmoidoscopy, colonoscopy, etc.) for colorectal cancer. Data source: Databases consulted were MEDLINE (1966 to 2006), DARE (1980 to 2006), Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials, Cochrane Collaboration’s Registry of Clinical Trials, Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews and LILACS. Study selection: Studies such clinical trial, cohort and case-control studies of the effectiveness of tests for screening and primary prevention adenoma and colorectal cancer were identified by two reviewers. Data Extraction: The extraction of data and its evaluation is done in most of the process so paired. Limitations: Not strictly complies with the methodology of a systematic review and therefore reproducibility is questionable, the conclusions of this study should be extrapolated with caution. Conclusions: The major strategy of screening on the effectiveness of early detection of premalignant lesions or cancer is colonoscopy every 5 years, however it is necessary to evaluate this measure cost-effectiveness studies. For primary prevention, aspirin and cyclooxygenase-2 inhibitors reduce the incidence of colorectal adenomas. Aspirin can reduce colorectal cancer incidence. However, these medications may be associated with a significant risk of cardiovascular events and gastrointestinal bleeding. The balance between risks and benefits must be evaluated in future studies.

Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard

We develop a model where a free genetic test reveals whether the individual tested has a low or high probability of developing a disease. A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease the probability of developing the disease. Agents are not obliged to take the test, but must disclose its results to insurers. Insurers offer separating contracts which take into account the individual risk, so that taking the test is associated to a discrimination risk. We study the individual decisions to take the test and to undertake the prevention effort as a function of the effort cost and of its e¢ ciency. We obtain that, if effort is observable by insurers, agents undertake the test only if the effort cost is neither too large nor too low. If the effort cost is not observable by insurers, they face a moral hazard problem which induces them to under-provide insurance. We obtain the counterintuitive result that moral hazard increases the value of the test if the effort cost is low enough. Also, agents may perform the test for lower levels of prevention e¢ ciency when effort is not observable