Legal, political and economic aspects of the tragedy in rural Colombia in recent decades: hypothesis for analysis

Editorial

On the design of education conditional cash transfer programs and non education outcomes: the case of teenage pregnancy

We investigate the effect of education Conditional Cash Transfer programs (CCTs) on teenage pregnancy. Our main concern is with how the size and sign of the effect may depend on the design of the program. Using a simple model we show that an education CCT that conditions renewal on school performance reduces teenage pregnancy; the program can increase teenage pregnancy if it does not condition on school performance. Then, using an original data base, we estimate the causal impact on teenage pregnancy of two education CCTs implemented in Bogot´a (Subsidio Educativo, SE, and Familias en Acci´on, FA); both programs differ particularly on whether school success is a condition for renewal or not. We show that SE has negative average effect on teenage pregnancy while FA has a null average effect. We also find that SE has either null or no effect for adolescents in all age and grade groups while FA has positive, null or negative effects for adolescents in different age and grade groups. Since SE conditions renewal on school success and FA does not, we can argue that the empirical results are consistent with the predictions of our model and that conditioning renewal of the subsidy on school success crucially determines the effect of the subsidy on teenage pregnancy

Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard

We develop a model where a free genetic test reveals whether the individual tested has a low or high probability of developing a disease. A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease the probability of developing the disease. Agents are not obliged to take the test, but must disclose its results to insurers. Insurers offer separating contracts which take into account the individual risk, so that taking the test is associated to a discrimination risk. We study the individual decisions to take the test and to undertake the prevention effort as a function of the effort cost and of its e¢ ciency. We obtain that, if effort is observable by insurers, agents undertake the test only if the effort cost is neither too large nor too low. If the effort cost is not observable by insurers, they face a moral hazard problem which induces them to under-provide insurance. We obtain the counterintuitive result that moral hazard increases the value of the test if the effort cost is low enough. Also, agents may perform the test for lower levels of prevention e¢ ciency when effort is not observable

Ética hacker y propiedad intelectual: una nueva perspectiva para abordar la normatividad sobre derechos de autor en el espacio digital

En el presente texto se busca mostrar las capacidades explicativas que puede tener la conjunción entre las perspectivas de la ética hacker y la defensa de la propiedad intelectual para dar cuenta de las reacciones generalizadas de rechazo ante las normatividades de derechos de autor en el espacio digital. Así, se lleva a cabo un resumen de los principios de cada una de estas perspectivas dando cuenta de sus capacidades explicativas y características teóricas para, posteriormente, aplicarlas a la realidad empresarial, laboral y de opinión en el marco social contemporáneo. Cómo conclusión de este trabajo se logra observar que a pesar de que en principio ambas perspectivas podrían parecer contradictorias, existen aspectos comunes que permiten vislumbrar como un trabajo en conjunto permitiría generar normatividades que se acoplen a las realidades contemporáneas.