Mixed oligopoly in education

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in education markets when schools can be private and public and when the quality of education depends on ìpeer groupî e§ects. In the Örst stage of our game schools set their quality and in the second stage they Öx their tuition fees. We examine how the (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium allocation (qualities, tuition fees and welfare) is a§ected by the presence of public schools and by their relative position in the quality range. When there are no peer group e§ects, e¢ ciency is achieved when (at least) all but one school are public. In particular in the two school case, the impact of a public school is spectacular as we go from a setting of extreme di§erentiation to an e¢ cient allocation. However, in the three school case, a single public school will lower welfare compared to the private equilibrium. We then introduce a peer group e§ect which, for any given school is determined by its student with the highest ability. These PGE do have a signiÖcant impact on the results. The mixed equilibrium is now never e¢ cient. However, welfare continues to be improved if all but one school are public. Overall, the presence of PGE reduces the e§ectiveness of public schools as regulatory tool in an otherwise private education sector.

Reflections about Complicity and its Application in some Socio Economics Crimes

In Colombia, the definitions of crimes are found in the special part of the Criminal Code. They are set out as though the only way of to commit them was by being the author of the punishable conduct there described. Nevertheless, in the general part of the Criminal Code, we find other forms of criminal responsibility for the conduct described in the special part. Complicity is one of those ways. Although complicity is established in the Criminal Code, it does not appear as a criminal definition and, as such it is ignored or, worse, applied incorrectly. For those reasons, this article tries to reflect upon the validity of complicity. Accordingly, this article analyzes: what is complicity, what is the difference between complicity and co-authorship and how would complicity work in some practical cases related to socio-economic crimes, in which it has being overlooked or, has been used incorrectly. The article concludes that complicity is still valid, and that the correct application of complicity materializes the ideal of justice.