A Network model of systemic risk : identifying the sources of dependence across institutions

We design a financial network model that explicitly incorporates linkages across institutions through a direct contagion channel, as well as an indirect common exposure channel. In particular, common exposure is setup so as to link the financial to the real sector. The model is calibrated to balance sheet data on the colombian financial sector. Results indicate that commercial banks are the most systemically important financial institutions in the system. Whereas government owned institutions are the most vulnerable institutions in the system.

Network externalities across financial institutions

We propose and estimate a financial distress model that explicitly accounts for the interactions or spill-over effects between financial institutions, through the use of a spatial continuity matrix that is build from financial network data of inter bank transactions. Such setup of the financial distress model allows for the empirical validation of the importance of network externalities in determining financial distress, in addition to institution specific and macroeconomic covariates. The relevance of such specification is that it incorporates simultaneously micro-prudential factors (Basel 2) as well as macro-prudential and systemic factors (Basel 3) as determinants of financial distress. Results indicate network externalities are an important determinant of financial health of a financial institutions. The parameter that measures the effect of network externalities is both economically and statistical significant and its inclusion as a risk factor reduces the importance of the firm specific variables such as the size or degree of leverage of the financial institution. In addition we analyze the policy implications of the network factor model for capital requirements and deposit insurance pricing.

De lo micro a lo macro prudencial: Un análisis de la supervisión bancaria desde la econometría espacial

La crisis que se desató en el mercado hipotecario en Estados Unidos en 2008 y que logró propagarse a lo largo de todo sistema financiero, dejó en evidencia el nivel de interconexión que actualmente existe entre las entidades del sector y sus relaciones con el sector productivo, dejando en evidencia la necesidad de identificar y caracterizar el riesgo sistémico inherente al sistema, para que de esta forma las entidades reguladoras busquen una estabilidad tanto individual, como del sistema en general. El presente documento muestra, a través de un modelo que combina el poder informativo de las redes y su adecuación a un modelo espacial auto regresivo (tipo panel), la importancia de incorporar al enfoque micro-prudencial (propuesto en Basilea II), una variable que capture el efecto de estar conectado con otras entidades, realizando así un análisis macro-prudencial (propuesto en Basilea III).