A model of school behavior: tuition fees and grading standards

This paper uses a hybrid human capital / signaling model to study grading standards in schools when tuition fees are allowed. The paper analyzes the grading standard set by a profit maximizing school and compares it with the efficient one. The paper also studies grading standards when tuition fees have limits. When fees are regulated a profit maximizing school will set lower grading standards than when they are not regulated. Credit constraints of families also induce schools to lower their standards. Given that in the model presented competition is not feasible, these results show the importance of regulation of grading standards.

Media bias and central bank response. Evidence from the nominal exchange rate behavior in Colombia

Since 1991 Colombia has had a market-determined Peso - US Dollar Nominal Exchange Rate (NER), after more than 20 years of controlled and multiple exchange rates. The behavior (revaluation / devaluation) of the NER is constantly reported in news, editorials and op-eds of major newspapers of the nation with particular attention to revaluation. The uneven reporting of revaluation episodes can be explained by the existence of an interest group particulary affected by revaluation, looking to increase awareness and sympathy for help from public institutions. Using the number of news and op-eds from a major Colombian newspaper, it is shown that there is an over-reporting of revaluation episodes in contrast to devaluation ones. Secondly, using text analysis upon the content of the news, it is also shown that the words devaluation and revaluation are far apart in the distribution of words within the news; and revaluation is highly correlated with words related to: public institutions, exporters and the need of assistance. Finally it is also shown that the probability of the central bank buying US dollars to lessen revaluation effects increases with the number of news; even though the central bank allegedly intervenes in the exchange rate market only to tame volatility or accumulate international reserves.

Soft budget constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capital investment is financed in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders’ inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthy position of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome, i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing firms on a regular basis. This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction between the economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy explanations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle, providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some LatinAmerican countries in the late seventies and early nineties.