Recognition of static and dynamic facial expressions: Influences of sex, type and intensity of emotion

Ecological validity of static and intense facial expressions in emotional recognition has been questioned. Recent studies have recommended the use of facial stimuli more compatible to the natural conditions of social interaction, which involves motion and variations in emotional intensity. In this study, we compared the recognition of static and dynamic facial expressions of happiness, fear, anger and sadness, presented in four emotional intensities (25 %, 50 %, 75 % and 100 %). Twenty volunteers (9 women and 11 men), aged between 19 and 31 years, took part in the study. The experiment consisted of two sessions in which participants had to identify the emotion of static (photographs) and dynamic (videos) displays of facial expressions on the computer screen. The mean accuracy was submitted to an Anova for repeated measures of model: 2 sexes x [2 conditions x 4 expressions x 4 intensities]. We observed an advantage for the recognition of dynamic expressions of happiness and fear compared to the static stimuli (p < .05). Analysis of interactions showed that expressions with intensity of 25 % were better recognized in the dynamic condition (p < .05). The addition of motion contributes to improve recognition especially in male participants (p < .05). We concluded that the effect of the motion varies as a function of the type of emotion, intensity of the expression and sex of the participant. These results support the hypothesis that dynamic stimuli have more ecological validity and are more appropriate to the research with emotions.

Heterogeneity and the formation of risk - sharing coalitions

We offer a new explanation of partial risk sharing based on coalition formation and segmentation of society in a risky environment, without assuming limited commitment and imperfect information. Heterogenous individuals in a society freely choose with whom they will share risk. A partition belonging to the core of the membership game obtains. Perfect risk sharing does not necessarily arise. Focusing on mutual insurance rule and assuming that individuals only differ with respect to risk, we show that the core partition is homophily-based. The distribution of risk affects the number and size of these coalitions. Individuals may pay a lower risk premium in riskier societies. A higher heterogeneity in risk leads to a lower degree of risk sharing. We discuss how the endogenous partition of society into risk-sharing coalitions may shed light on empirical evidence on partial risk sharing. The case of heterogenous risk aversion leads to similar results.