Testing the law of one price in food markets: evidence for Colombia using disaggregated data

This paper applies stationarity tests to examine evidence of market integration for a relatively large sample of food products in Colombia. We Önd little support for market integration when using the univariate KPSS tests for stationarity. However, within a panel context and after allowing for cross sectional dependence, the Hadri tests provide much more evidence supporting the view that food markets are integrated or, in other words, that the law of one price holds for most products.

Los conceptos de salud financiera, riesgo y epidemiología en los estados financieros de las compañías del sector de extracción de petróleo crudo y gas natural en Colombia

El presente proyecto tiene como objeto identificar cuáles son los conceptos de salud, enfermedad, epidemiología y riesgo aplicables a las empresas del sector de extracción de petróleo y gas natural en Colombia. Dado, el bajo nivel de predicción de los análisis financieros tradicionales y su insuficiencia, en términos de inversión y toma de decisiones a largo plazo, además de no considerar variables como el riesgo y las expectativas de futuro, surge la necesidad de abordar diferentes perspectivas y modelos integradores. Esta apreciación es pertinente dentro del sector de extracción de petróleo y gas natural, debido a la creciente inversión extranjera que ha reportado, US$2.862 millones en el 2010, cifra mayor a diez veces su valor en el año 2003. Así pues, se podrían desarrollar modelos multi-dimensional, con base en los conceptos de salud financiera, epidemiológicos y estadísticos. El termino de salud y su adopción en el sector empresarial, resulta útil y mantiene una coherencia conceptual, evidenciando una presencia de diferentes subsistemas o factores interactuantes e interconectados. Es necesario mencionar también, que un modelo multidimensional (multi-stage) debe tener en cuenta el riesgo y el análisis epidemiológico ha demostrado ser útil al momento de determinarlo e integrarlo en el sistema junto a otros conceptos, como la razón de riesgo y riesgo relativo. Esto se analizará mediante un estudio teórico-conceptual, que complementa un estudio previo, para contribuir al proyecto de finanzas corporativas de la línea de investigación en Gerencia.

Competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

We study competition in two sided markets with common network externality rather than with the standard inter-group e¤ects. This type of externality occurs when both groups bene t, possibly with di¤erent intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality is relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satis es an homogeneity condition then platforms pro ts and price structure have some speci c properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to other, according to the homogeneity degree. In the speci c but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platform s pro t do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This is in sharp contrast to conventional results stating that the presence of network externalities in a two-sided market structure increases the intensity of competition when the externality is positive (and decreases it when the externality is negative). Prices are a¤ected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers.

Investment in transport capacity and regulation of regional monopolies in natural gas commodity markets

This paper develops a model of the regulator-regulated firm relationship in a regional natural gas commodity market which can be linked to a competitive market by a pipeline. We characterize normative policies under which the regulator, in addition to setting the level of the capacity of the pipeline, regulates the price of gas, under asymmetric information on the firm’s technology, and may (or may not) operate (two-way) transfers between consumers and the firm. We then focus on capacity and investigate how its level responds to the regulator’s taking account of the firm’s incentive compatibility constraints. The analysis yields some insights on the role that transport capacity investments may play as an instrument to improve the efficiency of geographically isolated markets.