Essays on economics of education and inequality

El documento resume los resultados de los tres ensayos sobre economía de la educación y de igualdad de oportunidades que se realizaron para el caso de Colombia.

Recognition of static and dynamic facial expressions: Influences of sex, type and intensity of emotion

Ecological validity of static and intense facial expressions in emotional recognition has been questioned. Recent studies have recommended the use of facial stimuli more compatible to the natural conditions of social interaction, which involves motion and variations in emotional intensity. In this study, we compared the recognition of static and dynamic facial expressions of happiness, fear, anger and sadness, presented in four emotional intensities (25 %, 50 %, 75 % and 100 %). Twenty volunteers (9 women and 11 men), aged between 19 and 31 years, took part in the study. The experiment consisted of two sessions in which participants had to identify the emotion of static (photographs) and dynamic (videos) displays of facial expressions on the computer screen. The mean accuracy was submitted to an Anova for repeated measures of model: 2 sexes x [2 conditions x 4 expressions x 4 intensities]. We observed an advantage for the recognition of dynamic expressions of happiness and fear compared to the static stimuli (p < .05). Analysis of interactions showed that expressions with intensity of 25 % were better recognized in the dynamic condition (p < .05). The addition of motion contributes to improve recognition especially in male participants (p < .05). We concluded that the effect of the motion varies as a function of the type of emotion, intensity of the expression and sex of the participant. These results support the hypothesis that dynamic stimuli have more ecological validity and are more appropriate to the research with emotions.

Natural disasters and clientelism: the case of floods and landslides in Colombia

What are the effects of natural disasters on electoral results? Some authors claim that catastrophes have a negative effect on the survival of leaders in a democracy because voters have a propensity to punish politicians for not preventing or poorly handling a crisis. In contrast, this paper finds that these events might be beneficial for leaders. Disasters are linked to leader survival through clientelism: they generate an in-flow of resources in the form of aid, which increase money for buying votes. Analyzing the rainy season of 2010-2011 in Colombia, considered its worst disaster in history, I use a difference-in-differences strategy to show that in the local election incumbent parties benefited from the disaster. The result is robust to different specifications and alternative explanations. Moreover, places receiving more aid and those with judicial evidence of vote-buying irregularities, are more likely to reelect the incumbent, supporting the mechanism proposed by this paper.

On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation / dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation / dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 1). We show that this result cannot be extended neither to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1 – Example 1), nor to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all other agents’ quotas equal 1 – Example 2). Finally, we prove that for each stable mechanism, dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 2), i.e., independently of the quotas.

Publicness of goods and violent conflict : evidence from Colombia

How the degree of publicness of goods affect violent conflict? Based on the theoretical model in Esteban and Ray (2001) we find that the effect of the degree of publicness depends on the group size. When the group is small (large), the degree of publicness increases (decreases) the likelihood of conflict. This opens an empirical question that we tackle using microdata from the Colombian conflict at the municipality level. We use three goods with different publicness degree to identify the sign of the effect of publicness on conflict. These goods are coca crops (private good), road density (public good subject to congestion) and average education quality (a purer public good). After dealing with endogeneity issues using an IV approach, we find that the degree of publicness reduces the likelihood of both paramilitary and guerrilla attacks. Moreover, coca production exacerbates conflict and the provision of both public goods mitigates conflict. These results are robust to size, geographical, and welfare controls. Policies that improve public goods provision will help to fight the onset of conflict.