Labor's shares - aggregate and industry: accounting for both in a model of unbalanced growth with induced innovation

The relative stability of aggregate labor's share constitutes one of the great macroeconomic ratios. However, relative stability at the aggregate level masks the unbalanced nature of industry labor's shares – the Kuznets stylized facts underlie those of Kaldor. We present a two-sector – one labor-only and the other using both capital and labor – model of unbalanced economic development with induced innovation that can rationalize these phenomena as well as several other empirical regularities of actual economies. Specifically, the model features (i) one sector ("goods" production) becoming increasingly capital-intensive over time; (ii) an increasing relative price and share in total output of the labor-only sector ("services"); and (iii) diverging sectoral labor's shares despite (iii) an aggregate labor's share that converges from above to a value between 0 and unity. Furthermore, the model (iv) supports either a neoclassical steadystate or long-run endogenous growth, giving it the potential to account for a wide range of real world development experiences.

Intention-based economic theories of reciprocity

In recent years, several experiments have shown individuals exhibit authentic reciprocal behaviour in anonymous one-shot interactions. As reciprocity has been shown to be relevant in several economic fields, there have also been several attempts to model reciprocal bahaviour. I review the intention-based models of reciprocity and present an example of teacher management in the public sector in which the government offers an incentive scheme to implement a program. The incentive scheme has a prisoner´s dilemma structure. In both simultaneous and sequential games, equilibrium results may differ from those predicted by standard theory.

Economic shocks and crime: evidence from the crash of ponzi schemes

In November 2008, Colombian authorities dismantled a network of Ponzi schemes, making hundreds of thousands of investors lose tens of millions of dollars throughout the country. Using original data on the geographical incidence of the Ponzi schemes, this paper estimates the impact of their break down on crime. We find that the crash of Ponzi schemes differentially exacerbated crime in affected districts. Confirming the intuition of the standard economic model of crime, this effect is only present in places with relatively weak judicial and law enforcement institutions, and with little access to consumption smoothing mechanisms such as microcredit. In addition, we show that, with the exception of economically-motivated felonies such as robbery, violent crime is not affected by the negative shock.

Legal, political and economic aspects of the tragedy in rural Colombia in recent decades: hypothesis for analysis

Editorial

A model of school behavior: tuition fees and grading standards

This paper uses a hybrid human capital / signaling model to study grading standards in schools when tuition fees are allowed. The paper analyzes the grading standard set by a profit maximizing school and compares it with the efficient one. The paper also studies grading standards when tuition fees have limits. When fees are regulated a profit maximizing school will set lower grading standards than when they are not regulated. Credit constraints of families also induce schools to lower their standards. Given that in the model presented competition is not feasible, these results show the importance of regulation of grading standards.

A Network model of systemic risk : identifying the sources of dependence across institutions

We design a financial network model that explicitly incorporates linkages across institutions through a direct contagion channel, as well as an indirect common exposure channel. In particular, common exposure is setup so as to link the financial to the real sector. The model is calibrated to balance sheet data on the colombian financial sector. Results indicate that commercial banks are the most systemically important financial institutions in the system. Whereas government owned institutions are the most vulnerable institutions in the system.