Is there a common genetic basis for autoimmune diseases?

Autoimmune diseases (ADs) represent a diverse collection of diseases in terms of their demographic profile and primary clinical manifestations. The commonality between them however, is the damage to tissues and organs that arises from the response to self-antigens. The presence of shared pathophysiological mechanisms within ADs has stimulated searches for common genetic roots to these diseases. Two approaches have been undertaken to sustain the “common genetic origin” theory of ADs. Firstly, a clinical genetic analysis showed that autoimmunity aggregates within families of probands diagnosed with primary Sjögren's (pSS) syndrome or type 1 diabetes mellitus (T1D). A literature review supported the establishment of a familiar cluster of ADs depending upon the proband's disease phenotype. Secondly, in a same and well-defined population, a large genetic association study indicated that a number of polymorphic genes (i.e. HLA-DRB1, TNF and PTPN22) influence the susceptibility for acquiring different ADs. Likewise, association and linkage studies in different populations have revealed that several susceptibility loci overlap in ADs, and clinical studies have shown that frequent clustering of several ADs occurs. Thus, the genetic factors for ADs consist of two types: those which are common to many ADs (acting in epistatic pleitropy) and those that are specific to a given disorder. Their identification and functional characterization will allow us to predict their effect as well as to indicate potential new therapeutic interventions. Both autoimmunity family history and the co-occurrence of ADs in affected probands should be considered when performing genetic association and linkage studies.

Competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

We study competition in two sided markets with common network externality rather than with the standard inter-group e¤ects. This type of externality occurs when both groups bene t, possibly with di¤erent intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality is relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satis es an homogeneity condition then platforms pro ts and price structure have some speci c properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to other, according to the homogeneity degree. In the speci c but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platform s pro t do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This is in sharp contrast to conventional results stating that the presence of network externalities in a two-sided market structure increases the intensity of competition when the externality is positive (and decreases it when the externality is negative). Prices are a¤ected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers.

Doctors´ remuneration schemes and hospital competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

This paper uses a two-sided market model of hospital competition to study the implications of di§erent remunerations schemes on the physiciansí side. The two-sided market approach is characterized by the concept of common network externality (CNE) introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). This type of externality occurs when occurs when both sides value, possibly with di§erent intensities, the same network externality. We explicitly introduce e§ort exerted by doctors. By increasing the number of medical acts (which involves a costly e§ort) the doctor can increase the quality of service o§ered to patients (over and above the level implied by the CNE). We Örst consider pure salary, capitation or fee-for-service schemes. Then, we study schemes that mix fee-for-service with either salary or capitation payments. We show that salary schemes (either pure or in combination with fee-for-service) are more patient friendly than (pure or mixed) capitations schemes. This comparison is exactly reversed on the providersíside. Quite surprisingly, patients always loose when a fee-for-service scheme is introduced (pure of mixed). This is true even though the fee-for-service is the only way to induce the providers to exert e§ort and it holds whatever the patientsívaluation of this e§ort. In other words, the increase in quality brought about by the fee-for-service is more than compensated by the increase in fees faced by patients.

Bilateral Transport Cost, Infrastructure, Common Bilateral Ties and Political Stability.

Los costos de transporte son una de las más importantes fuentes de barreras al comercio. Inspirados por este aspecto, utilizamos un modelo empírico ad-hoc con el fin de examinar los posibles determinantes de los costos de transporte. Utilizando una base de datos de costos de transporte bilaterales para el año 1990, replicamos el trabajo de Limao y Venables (2001) y encontramos que el efecto de su ´índice de infraestructura sobre los costos de transporte no es robusto. Siguiendo a Micco (2004) y Micco y Serebrinzky (2005) calculamos dos ´índices alternativos de infraestructura. Utilizando estos ´índices encontramos que aparte de la distancia, la infraestructura, la estabilidad política, las relaciones bilaterales comunes y los acuerdos de cielos abiertos son otros importantes canales mediante los cuales los costos de transporte pueden reducirse.